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This monograph examines the relationship between labor unions and the 
economic performance and behavior of U.S. firms. A model of union rent- 
seeking is developed in which unions capture a share of the quasi-rents that 
make up the normal return to investment in long-lived capital and research and 
development (R&D). In response to union rent-seeking, firms adjust their in 
vestment in vulnerable tangible and intangible capital. In order to examine em 
pirically union effects on firm performance, a survey was conducted to collect 
information on the extent of collective bargaining coverage among publicly trad 
ed manufacturing firms. Data from the union survey are matched with firm 
and industry data to form a large panel data set of firms for the 1968-1980 period. 
These data permit a relatively detailed examination of the relationship of 
unionization with firm profitability and market value, investment in physical 
capital and R&D, productivity, and productivity growth.
Firm-level union coverage is found to vary substantially both across and within 
industries. Evidence is provided showing that companies with extensive 
unionization had lower rates of profit, market value, capital investment, and 
R&D investment than did similar nonunion firms and those firms with limited 
collective bargaining coverage. Returns to physical capital and R&D and the 
disequilibrium returns associated with demand shifts, rather than monopoly 
profits associated with market structure, appear to provide the primary sources 
for union gains. Although union-nonunion differences in profitability and in 
vestment are large on average, there is substantial variability in estimated union 
effects across industries. Econometric evidence on productivity and produc 
tivity growth differences between union and nonunion companies is fragile and 
allows few clear-cut inferences to be drawn. The recent contraction in the size 
of the union sector, it is argued, resulted in part from the long-run response 
by firms to union rent-seeking, and was inevitable given the relatively poor 
profit performance, diminished market value, and low investment by unioniz 
ed companies during the 1970s.
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During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a substantial decline in the 
relative importance of labor unions and of manufacturing production 
in the United States. Over this same period, a marked slowdown in ag 
gregate wage and productivity growth drew increased attention from 
policymakers and economists. Only recently have researchers focused 
attention on the effects of labor unions on economic performance and 
examined the relationship between economic performance and declin 
ing union membership. This study analyzes in detail union effects on 
profitability, investment behavior, productivity, and productivity growth 
during the 1970s, based on new evidence collected on union member 
ship at the firm level.
The decline in U.S. unionization has been greeted with unrestrained 
glee by many business groups and with grave concern (often coupled 
with resignation) by union supporters. The extent of the union decline 
is evinced by statistics on union membership and representation elec 
tions. Union density, measured by the percentage of nonagricultural 
employment comprised of union members, fell from 30 percent in 1970, 
to 23 percent in 1980, and to 17 percent by 1987 (19 percent were covered 
by collective bargaining agreements during 1987).! The survey of publicly 
traded U.S. manufacturing companies conducted for this study (see 
chapter 3) finds that among 452 companies providing information for 
both 1977 and 1987, collective bargaining coverage declined from 30.5 
percent in 1977 to 25.0 percent in 1987. Current Population Survey (CPS) 
data on individual manufacturing sector workers in 1987 indicates that 
24.7 percent were covered by a collective bargaining agreement (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 1989, table 684). Data on new union organizing 
reveal a similar pattern over time, the ratio of union representation elec 
tions and new workers organized to total employment both falling sharply 
since the 1950s.2 Although it is difficult to predict future levels of union 
representation, Freeman (1985, p. 49) calculated a long-run, steady-state
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union coverage density of about 10 percent in the private sector, based 
on trends in new organizing and coverage loss (decay) through 1980. 
Subsequent organizing and decay trends now suggest steady-state levels 
of private sector union coverage of less than 5 percent (Freeman 1988; 
Chaison and Dhavale 1990).
Explanations for the decline in unionism abound, although the relative 
importance of contributing factors remains very much in doubt (see, 
for example, Dickens and Leonard 1985; Hirsch and Addison 1986, chap. 
3; Freeman 1988; Reder 1988). The explanation most commonly prof 
fered is that "structural" changes in the U.S. economy have led to declines 
in unionization. It is argued that employment has declined in historical 
ly highly unionized sectors of the economy (e.g., production jobs in 
manufacturing), whereas job growth has occurred in nonproduction jobs 
in the largely nonunion service sector. Complementary explanations in 
clude increased foreign competition impacting most directly the goods- 
producing sectors of the economy, deregulation in highly unionized 
transportation and communication industries, more rapid job growth in 
low-union regions of the country, increased entry of women into low- 
union sectors of the labor market, and less favorable attitudes toward 
unions exhibited by management, workers, legislatures, and ad 
ministrative and judicial authorities.
Recent studies have challenged purely structural explanations for declin 
ing unionism. Linneman and Wachter (1986) provide evidence that within 
1-digit industries, declines in employment from 1973-1984 are restricted 
almost entirely to union workers while, in contrast, nonunion employ 
ment grew in almost all sectors. They calculate union premiums in each 
industry, relative to an "opportunity cost" wage in growing (primarily 
nonunion) sectors of the economy. Union premiums are found to have 
increased over this period and Linneman and Wachter conclude that much 
of the decline in union employment was in response to higher union 
wage premiums. Linneman, Wachter, and Carter (1990), who provide 
more recent and detailed evidence, reach an identical conclusion. 
Likewise, Freeman (1985; 1988) is skeptical of the structural explana 
tion, noting that Canada has not had such significant declines in unionism, 
despite similar structural changes. Freeman links the decline in unionism
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to increased management opposition (evidenced primarily by increased 
unfair labor practice charges) resulting, he argues, from an increased 
union wage premium and less favorable NLRB rulings. Blanchflower 
and Freeman (forthcoming) utilize international data and conclude that 
in the United States the union wage premium is larger, and decline in 
union density greater, than in other OECD countries.
This monograph examines a related explanation for union decline. A 
model of union rent-seeking is described in which unions capture some 
share of the quasi-rents that make up the normal return to investment 
in long-lived capital and in research and development (R&D). In response, 
firms rationally reduce their investment in vulnerable tangible and in 
tangible capital. Contraction of the union sector, it is argued, has resulted 
in part from the long-run response by firms to union rent-seeking, and 
was inevitable given the relatively poor economic performance and pros 
pects among unionized companies during the 1970s. Specifically, com 
panies with extensive unionization are found to have had lower rates of 
profit, market value, capital investment, and R&D investment than similar 
companies whose workers had limited collective bargaining coverage.
The union rent-seeking framework introduced in this monograph con 
trasts with the traditional on-the-demand curve model. In the traditional 
model, union monopoly power in the labor market is viewed as chang 
ing relative factor prices through its ability to raise union compensation 
above competitive levels. In response to a higher wage, union firms move 
up and along their labor-demand curve by decreasing employment, hir 
ing higher-quality workers, and increasing the ratio of capital to labor. 
Total investment in innovative activity and labor-saving capital can in 
crease or decrease owing to offsetting substitution and scale effects.
The traditional model may be inadequate in this instance for at least 
two reasons. First, settlements off-the-labor-demand curve, with lower 
wages and greater employment than would obtain in the on-the-demand 
curve model, are preferred by both the union and management. If set 
tlements are not on-the-labor-demand curve, the effect of unions on factor 
mix cannot be predicted in straightforward fashion. A second shortcoming 
is the traditional model©s characterization of union wage increases as 
exogenous or independent of factor price changes. In the rent-seeking 
framework, union wage premiums are viewed as levying a tax on firm
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earnings. The union tax is not viewed as an independent factor price 
change but, rather, as an outcome made possible by both union power 
in the labor market and the presence of firm quasi-rents.
Implications of the rent-seeking model differ from the traditional on- 
the-demand curve model. Firms may be less rather than more likely 
to commit to tangible and intangible capital investments that are relatively 
long-lived and nontransferable, since such investments will face high 
union tax rates. Long-run implications deriving from the union rent- 
seeking model include the possibility of lower rates of profit and capital 
investment, decreases in R&D and other innovative activities, and slower 
productivity and output growth. These possibilities are explored in subse 
quent chapters.
Empirical work in this monograph builds on a rapidly growing literature 
examining union effects on profitability and productivity, and a more 
limited body of evidence examining union effects on firm investment 
and productivity growth. Studies examining union effects on profits almost 
universally find that unions decrease profitability. This conclusion holds 
for studies using industries, firms, or lines of business as the unit of 
observation; for models where the profitability measures are industry 
price-cost margins, firm rates of return to capital or sales, Tobin©s q or 
other market value measures, or stock market value changes in response 
to union "events"; for simultaneous equation as well as single equation 
models; and regardless of the time period under study.
Despite the consensus that profitability is lower in unionized settings, 
there is disagreement as to the magnitude of the profit reduction and 
the sources from which union gains are obtained. Economists are 
understandably skeptical that large profit differentials can survive in a 
competitive economy, notwithstanding the sizable union-nonunion prof 
it differences found in the empirical literature. Unfortunately, little at 
tention has been given to the sources from which unions appropriate 
rents. Several studies conclude that unions reduce profits primarily in 
highly concentrated industries and that monopoly power provides the 
primary source for union compensation gains. Other studies call this 
conclusion into question and argue that returns from firm-specific R&D 
capital and weak foreign competition are more likely sources for union 
gains.
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Little attention has been given to union-nonunion differences in in 
vestment behavior. The union rent-seeking model predicts that unioniz 
ed firms invest less in highly taxed investment paths than do similar non 
union firms. The small number of previous studies examining union ef 
fects on firm investment behavior provide support for the union rent- 
seeking model. Unionized companies invest less in physical capital and 
R&D than do similar nonunion companies, and the level of innovative 
activity appears to be decreased by union coverage. If unionized firms 
invest less in tangible and intangible capital, over the long run they should 
have slower growth in output and employment. While there is surpris 
ingly little research on this latter topic, studies do suggest, however, that 
unionization has produced significantly slower employment growth (Lin- 
neman, Wachter, and Carter 1990; Leonard forthcoming) and, perhaps, 
weaker sales (output) growth (Clark 1984; Freeman and Medoff 1984).
Union effects on productivity have received considerable attention since 
the appearance of the study by Brown and Medoff (1978), which con 
cluded that union establishments are about 20 percent more productive 
than similar nonunion establishments, after accounting for differences 
in capital intensity and labor quality. Considerable methodological reser 
vations attach to this and other studies in this literature, however. The 
fuller body of empirical evidence does not suggest a sizable union pro 
ductivity effect, nor are large productivity effects consistent with em 
pirical evidence on profitability and employment (Addison and Hirsch 
1989).
The link between unions and productivity growth is rather opaque. 
There are numerous studies examining total factor productivity growth, 
many of which include industry union density as a control variable. These 
studies generally find productivity growth lower among firms and in 
dustries with high union densities, but this result is suspect given the 
data and econometric limitations of these studies. The rent-seeking model 
implies, however, that even if unionism has no direct effect on produc 
tivity growth, it may affect it indirectly via union effects on growth- 
enhancing investments in physical and R&D capital.
A serious limitation of much of the previous empirical research on 
unions and firm performance has been the difficulty in obtaining firm- 
level measures of union coverage. In order to examine union effects on
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firm performance, 1977 union data from the survey conducted in this 
study were matched to company and industry data on a panel of U.S. 
manufacturing firms over the 1968-1980 period. Use of this data set 
facilitates a detailed examination of the relationship between unioniza 
tion and firm performance.
Union coverage data for 1987 were also collected. Because of limita 
tions on other firm and industry data available at the time this study 
was conducted, the 1987 data were not used to analyze union effects 
on firm performance. The data, however, provide direct evidence on 
the magnitude of firm-specific changes in union coverage between 1977 
and 1987 (chapter 3). No such information is publicly available.
In the following chapters, theory and evidence on the relationship be 
tween unions, investment, and economic performance are provided. 
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical development of the union rent-seeking 
model, in which union effects on profitability, the level and mix of tangible 
and intangible capital investments, factor usage, and productivity growth 
are examined. In chapter 3, detailed discussion of the union coverage 
survey is provided. Chapter 4 provides the modeling and estimation of 
union effects on firm profitability and market value. Firm investment 
behavior is examined in chapter 5, while productivity and productivity 
growth are the focus of chapter 6. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 each contain 
a brief survey of previous research in the area under study. A summary 
and evaluation are provided in chapter 7.
NOTES
1. Data for 1970 and 1980 are from Troy and Sheflin (1985, table 3.41). Figures for 1987 are deriv 
ed from the Current Population Survey (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989, table 684). Although 
the former source calculates figures based on union-reported dues, and the latter on surveys of 
individuals, figures from the two surveys are very close during years in which both report union 
density. Private sector union membership density is substantially lower than economywide densi 
ty. Estimates of union membership and contract coverage by detailed industry and geographic area 
are provided in Curme, Hirsch, and Macpherson (1990).
2. Election data are summarized in NLRB Annual Reports (these reports have not appeared regularly 
during the 1980s) and are made available on data tapes. There was a particularly sharp and perma 
nent drop in union organizing activity between 1981 and 1982; the average 1982-1987 level of organiz 




Economic Performance of Firms
A firm and labor union engage in a long-run bilateral relationship 
in which both parties have market power and receive economic quasi- 
rents from their mutual relationship. Quasi-rents are the returns accru 
ing to previously "installed" physical, intangible, or human capital above 
those obtainable in the capital©s best alternative use. Quasi-rents, 
therefore, are prevalent where physical capital or worker skills are 
specialized, long-lived, and costly to transfer to an alternative use. 
Although competitive labor market conditions heavily influence bargain 
ing outcomes, both parties possess some degree of market power. On 
the one hand, U.S. labor law specifies that the union be the sole represen 
tative of covered workers and that the firm bargain in good faith with 
the union. Workers possess legally protected rights and firm-specific 
skills, and firms have made significant investments in human, physical, 
and intangible capital. Because it is costly for a firm to replace its unioniz 
ed workforce, the union can appropriate some share of the firm©s 
quasi-rents.
On the other hand, because workers possess nontransferable job skills 
(partially financed by workers) and face fixed costs of job switching, 
the firm may behave opportunistically and capture worker quasi-rents 
by paying workers only their current opportunity costs. Opportunistic 
behavior by the firm may be severely constrained, however, by the 
necessity to maintain a good reputation so as to attract quality workers 
in the future.
The existence of mutual rents in a long-run bargaining situation be 
tween firms and unions provides the setting for the union rent-seeking 
framework. Emphasis in this study is given to the ability of unions 
to appropriate firm quasi-rents. Below, union and firm behavior are
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analyzed and the implications for firms© investment behavior and 
economic performance are developed.
Union Behavior
Labor unions attempt to acquire gains for their members. Gains 
primarily take the form of wage increases, but may also be evinced 
by increases in nonwage compensation, improved employment securi 
ty, changes in the wage distribution, and changes in the work environ 
ment and governance structure of firms. It is assumed that union leaders 
are responsive to the demands of the rank-and-file. Interest compatibility 
between agent (union leadership) and principals (rank-and-file) is enhanc 
ed by the necessity of union leaders to be reelected and to obtain ma 
jority approval of collective bargaining agreements. The simplest model 
of union behavior is the median voter model wherein preferences are 
well-ordered or "single peaked," so that individual preferences can 
be aggregated into ordered group preferences. Majority rule voting in 
this case produces a determinate and stable equilibrium. The median 
voter model predicts that union leaders propose and attempt to execute 
actions most consistent with the demands of union members with me 
dian or average preferences (Hirsch and Addison 1986, chap. 2; Farber 
1986). While the assumptions of the median voter model are an overly 
simplistic description of union decisionmaking, the model provides a 
reasonable and appropriate framework for analyzing most union 
behavior.
Even if unions accurately represent current rank-and-file with me 
dian preferences, an inefficient output of union services results because 
the voting process does not readily permit weighting the intensity of 
preferences. More fundamental to the discussion that follows, if the 
concept of efficiency in union services is extended to include the 
preferences of potential or future union members, unions are likely to 
be "rationally myopic" in their actions, discounting too heavily long- 
run outcomes. Myopia results because incumbent union members do 
not have sufficient incentive to take into account the welfare of poten 
tial or future union members. The future is highly discounted because
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union members cannot sell their place in the union, members cannot 
transfer their membership as a bequest to children or friends, and the 
preferences of potential union members (i.e., qualified workers in the 
union queue) need not be taken into account. The discount rate at which 
unions evaluate long-run outcomes is increased further if the preferences 
of senior union members receive particularly large weights in the union 
calculus. It is argued below that the combination of union rent-seeking 
and myopia leads to important union effects on firm profitability and 
investment decisions, as well as other aspects of economic performance.
Union Rent-Seeking and Profitability
If unions reduce profitability significantly below a normal rate of 
return, survival rates for unionized firms (or lines of business within 
firms) will be lower than for their nonunion competitors. It is thus unlike 
ly that unions can maintain large wage premiums in competitive in 
dustries with small stocks of specialized capital unless they also increase 
productivity significantly or organize industrywide in markets facing 
low product demand elasticities (due, say, to limited foreign competi 
tion). Industrywide unionism, in this case, acts much like a cartelizing 
device to lower output and raise price. The possibility that unions in 
crease productivity sufficiently to offset higher wage costs is address 
ed subsequently.
Unions obtain compensation above competitive levels principally by 
sharing in a firm©s monopoly returns and quasi-rents. Unionization is 
less likely to have an impact on firm survival and pricing-output deci 
sions if excess returns accruing from imperfect product market com 
petition provide the principal source for union gains. Although excess 
returns associated with market power may provide a target and poten 
tial source for union gains, it need not follow that unions can appropriate 
such returns. If the firm can continue operations during a sustained strike, 
or the resources that generate the monopoly returns can be costlessly 
transferred to a nonunion environment, the union may have relatively 
little bargaining power to tax monopoly returns. For example, a phar 
maceutical company whose primary assets are highly valued patents
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may be able to sell (or license) these patents to another company. A 
strike threat by unionized production workers to shut down production 
would not be credible in this situation, since resources can be transfer 
red at low cost to an equally valued alternative use. If a company©s assets 
are costly to transfer and not equally valued elsewhere, returns associated 
with monopoly patents might better be treated as potentially appropriable 
quasi-rents. 1
Quasi-rents are returns accruing to installed fixed-cost capital above 
its opportunity cost. For example, once investment in specialized plant 
or equipment has been made, a sizable reduction in the return stream 
from that capital will not cause it to be sold, scrapped, or shut down. 
Rather, assets will continue in use as long as they retain a return above 
that available in their best alternative use. Quasi-rents can, but need 
not, arise from imperfect competition; even with free entry and open 
competition, specialized assets create quasi-rents that make up the com 
petitive return to investment. It is argued here that quasi-rents provide 
a primary source for union rent-seeking. And once a specialized asset 
is in place, union wage gains financed by appropriated returns are unlike 
ly to affect that asset©s use. In the long run, however, decreases in ex 
pected rates of return will cause union firms to invest less in long-lived 
specialized capital, until expected rates of return net of the union tax 
are equal to competitive market rates of return.
Effective union rent-seeking should lower firm profitability, regardless 
of whether union gains are at the expense of above-normal returns 
resulting from market power, or represent a share of the quasi-rents 
making up the normal returns to capital owners. Firm profitability can 
be represented by traditional accounting measures of earnings, market 
value measures (if the firm is publicly traded), or some combination 
of the two. The accounting profit measure utilized in subsequent em 
pirical work is the rate of return on capital (earnings/capital stock). Ac 
counting returns reflect historically observed performance, but do not 
directly reflect future performance or adjustments for risk. The return 
on equity (earnings/equity) constitutes a hybrid measure, mixing ac 
counting earnings in the numerator with the stock market valuation of 
assets in the denominator. Union effects on the return to equity should 
be small, since the rate of return to investors should tend toward equality
Union Rent-Seeking and Economic Performance 11
across investment paths. That is, lower earnings by a union company 
(shown in the numerator) will decrease that firm©s equity value (in the 
denominator), but generally have small effects on the ratio.
Union effects on firm market value reflect investors© expectations about 
unionism©s impact on the present value of future earnings. Market value 
measures provide forward-looking, risk-adjusted estimates of union ef 
fects. These effects on market value can differ from unionism©s impact 
on current earnings. For example, a union may significantly decrease 
current earnings but not market value if investors believe the firm can 
adjust in the future or in some way offset the union©s current negative 
impact. Or, a union may have little immediate impact on earnings but 
significantly decrease market value if investors expect the union to have 
a detrimental effect on firm growth and future earnings. Empirical studies 
examining union effects on market value have typically measured prof 
itability by either Tobin©s q (which will be used here), representing 
market value divided by the replacement cost of assets, or by changes 
in market value resulting from the "unanticipated" portion of union- 
related events (e.g., a union representation election).
This study will examine union-nonunion differences in accounting 
rates of return and market value during the 1970s. A principal advan 
tage of this analysis will be the use of company-specific (rather than 
industry-specific) data on collective bargaining coverage, which poten 
tially allows us to distinguish the effects of firm coverage, industry 
coverage, and numerous other firm and industry determinants of prof 
itability. To be examined are overall union effects on alternative profit 
ability measures, changes in these effects over the 1968-1980 period, 
differences in the magnitude of the union profit effect across broad 2-digit 
industries, sources from which unions appear to extract gains, varia 
tion in the union effect with the extent of firm coverage (i.e., the linearity 
of the union-profits relationship), and the sensitivity of estimates to 
specification. One of the principal arguments of this study is that union 
rent-seeking affects firm investment behavior. Thus, we also will link 
any evidence of union profit effects to subsequent evidence on invest 
ment decisions by the firm.
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Union Bargaining Outcomes, Quasi-Rents, 
and Investment Behavior
Unions and firms engage in repeated bargaining over what are typically 
unlimited time horizons. Cooperative bargaining outcomes, if possi 
ble, would maximize the sum of the firm©s market value, representing 
the discounted stream of future expected earnings to shareholders, and 
the present value of expected rents accruing to the union. Cooperative 
or "efficient" bargaining outcomes could be nondistortionary if labor 
market conditions were stable, contracts were binding for very long 
time periods, and the time horizon over which the union evaluates its 
welfare was at least as long as the life of the firm©s prospective new 
capital. In practice, however, one observes long-run repetitive bargaining 
governed by short-term (typically three-year) contracts, accompanied 
by often unpredictable changes in labor and product market conditions. 
Both parties may be deterred from engaging in short-term opportunistic 
behavior when such behavior is expected to have deleterious effects 
on future contract negotiations. But even if such cooperative bargain 
ing obtains, union-management bargaining will still distort investment 
decisions (relative to a nonunion firm) if the union©s time horizon is 
relatively short or, stated similarly, if the union discounts the future 
at a higher rate than shareholders. 2
As argued previously, union myopia is likely since the time period 
over which voting rank-and-file or, more precisely, members with me 
dian preferences evaluate their welfare is likely to be shorter than the 
life of current or prospective firm-specific capital. In particular, influen 
tial rank-and-file may have limited time horizons if they have few re 
maining work years and face little prospect of layoffs owing to reverse 
seniority provisions. They have little stake in the future financial health 
of the firm if they cannot sell (or transfer to relatives or friends) their 
union membership, and if they do not own significant amounts of the 
company©s stock. To the extent that a worker©s future pension payments 
are contingent upon the future health of the company, the worker©s time 
horizon is lengthened, although such a response may be mitigated by 
government pension guarantees. Thus, cooperative long-run bargain 
ing outcomes between a firm and a myopic union may shift income
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streams (relative to a nonunion outcome) toward the present by taxing 
long-lived capital already in place and decreasing current investment 
in tangible and intangible capital.
While cooperative long-run bargaining outcomes are possible, they 
are unlikely to systematically prevail over noncooperative outcomes, 
since both parties have incentive to behave opportunistically. The union 
is willing to lower its current wage demand in exchange for an employ 
ment level greater than that shown on the labor-demand curve, or in 
the expectation of realizing higher future employment and wages than 
would otherwise occur. Once a contract is in place, however, the firm 
has incentive to decrease its use of labor to a point on the labor-demand 
curve. Firms also can appropriate returns on specific human capital 
(Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; Crawford 1988). Opportunistic 
behavior by the firm, however, may be effectively constrained as long 
as it must renegotiate contracts with the union on a recurring basis and 
if the union can maintain a credible threat to impose large costs on the 
firm through means of a strike. 3
The union typically has greater incentive than the firm to engage in 
opportunistic or noncooperative behavior inconsistent with long-term 
joint wealth maximization. Once specific assets are brought on line, 
a union with bargaining power and a credible strike threat is likely to 
appropriate some portion of the quasi-rents that comprise the normal 
returns to investment. This situation can be characterized as one of non- 
binding contracts in that the length of the labor contract is less than 
the life of specific capital, so that once the capital is in place, labor 
can "reopen" bargaining every three or so years. Firms will respond 
to the union tax on specific capital by reducing investment until the after 
tax rate of return equals the market rate of return on investment. 4
There are few mechanisms by which to move the union and firm from 
a noncooperative to a cooperative long-term outcome. 5 The union could 
pledge a future low-wage bargaining strategy in return for the firm©s 
promise to increase investment in specific capital. But in the absence 
of a bond held by a third party, the union©s ability to renege on its pro 
mise would prevent such a declaration from being credible (van der 
Ploeg 1987). The firm might encourage union members to adopt a 
longer run outlook through increased reliance on compensation in the
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form of the company©s stock and greater back-end loading of the con 
tract (bonuses based on current profits, as opposed to the stock price, 
are not likely to expand workers© time horizon). But risky and delayed 
compensation is not likely to appeal to senior rank-and-file. Perhaps 
the most powerful incentive to extend rank-and-file©s time horizon and 
encourage cooperative union behavior is management©s control over 
pension funds. Indeed, Ippolito (1985; 1988) has argued that unioniz 
ed companies have incentive to underfund their pension plans in order 
to moderate future union wage demands. 6
The union rent-seeking model, therefore, predicts unambiguously a 
reduction in investment among unionized companies as compared to 
their nonunion counterparts. Even if union and management engage in 
cooperative long-run wealth maximization, union myopia will discourage 
investment in specific long-lived capital. And in the more likely case 
of noncooperative bargaining outcomes, union bargaining power will 
be employed to tax the quasi-rents accruing to fixed tangible and in 
tangible capital, further reducing firm investment. Reductions in long- 
lived capital will subsequently reduce a union©s bargaining power and 
wage demands.
It is worth noting briefly differences between the bargaining model 
approach to union rent-seeking developed above and the standard 
microeconomic model of union settlements on-the-demand curve. The 
standard model treats the union wage as an exogenous change in the 
factor price. In response to an increase in the wage, the profit-maximizing 
firm decreases employment. The effect on capital usage is indeterminate. 
On the one hand, the increase in the wage lowers the relative price of 
capital, leading to an increase in optimal capital usage and investment 
(a substitution effect). On the other hand, the decrease in profit- 
maximizing output associated with the union cost increase causes an 
increase in demand (a scale effect). Thus, the net effect on capital in 
vestment resulting from an exogenous wage increase is indeterminate, 
depending on the size of the relative demand shifts. The standard model 
does predict, however, that the capital-labor ratio will increase in 
response to a wage increase.
The on-the-demand curve outcome is not in general Pareto optimal, 
however, since there exist potential settlements off-the-demand curve
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preferred by both the union and firm. The potential gain from 
simultaneous bargaining over wages and employment can be seen in 
figure 2.1, which shows not only the firm©s labor demand curve, but 
also the union©s utility curve, Ut , and the firm©s isoprofit curve, TT,, 
at the on-the-demand curve settlement (vv2 , L2). The lens-shaped area 
formed by the intersection of these two curves contains wage- 
employment combinations preferred by both parties. "Efficient" con 
tract settlements lie along a contract curve formed by the tangencies 
of U{ and IT,. The "strong efficiency" case corresponds to a vertical 
contract curve, CC, at the competitive employment level, L,. In this 
special case, the competitive employment and capital-labor ratio ob 
tain in the short run; i.e., holding constant the level of capital.
The strong efficiency case can be further illustrated by contrasting 
it with the inefficient on-the-demand curve case. Subject to constraints, 
let the union maximize "rents,"
(2.1) max R = (wu - wc)L, (union maximand)
where wu is the realized union wage, wc is the opportunity cost or com 
petitive wage (we ignore the effect of unions on nonunion wages), and 
L is employment. R, a measure of the excess of the union wage bill 
over the competitive wage bill, has been a common maximand assum 
ed in the literature (e.g., Rosen 1969). The firm in turn maximizes prof 
its, ?r, given wu . That is,
(2.2) max TT = PQ - rK - wJL, (firm maximand)
where Q is output, P product price, K capital, r the price of capital, 
and all else as defined above. Sequential wage-employment determina 
tion, wherein the union maximizes R and the firm responds by select 
ing L to maximize profits, given WM , corresponds to the on-the-demand 
curve outcome (vv2 , Z^) shown in figure 2.1.
An efficient bargaining situation on a vertical contract curve implies 
that the two parties will maximize the total value of the enterprise V 
(Abowd 1989b), being the sum of firm profits (TT) and union rents (R), 
and then bargain over division of the surplus. Maximizing V results 
in the same output, price, and input usage as obtains in the case where
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the firm maximizes TT subject to the competitive wage or opportunity 
cost wage, vvc ; that is,
(2.3) max V = TT + R
= PQ-rK-wJL + (wu - wc)L 
= PQ - rK - wj..
The firm, therefore, adjusts employment according to the opportunity 
cost wage and not its "own" wage. 7 Here, the union has no short-run 
real effects; rather, Q, P, K, and L are identical to the competitive case. 
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By contrast, the rent-seeking model outlined here is a long-run bargain 
ing model in which capital stocks are assumed to be variable. As discuss 
ed previously, the bargaining model treats the wage premium as an out 
come of union rent-seeking made possible by the existence of monopo 
ly returns and quasi-rents. In the long run, the equivalency between 
the union and competitive outcomes shown in eq. (2.3) breaks down. 
First, capital and other fixed-cost inputs are no longer fixed and are 
free to vary between union and nonunion firms. Moreover, if eq. (2.3) 
is converted from a single-period model to a multiperiod present value 
model, the equivalency between the outcomes no longer holds. The 
reason for this is that the present value of wj-, evaluated by the union 
does not match the present value of w^ evaluated by the firm, since 
the union is evaluating it over a shorter time period (or more highly 
discounting the future). Thus, the wJL terms in the second line of eq. 
(2.3) no longer cancel out.
Our primary interest is to examine the effects of union rent-seeking 
on the firm©s investment activity. As developed previously, it was seen 
that the rent-seeking model predicts lower investment in long-lived 
specific tangible and intangible capital than would occur in the absence 
of the union. In addition to a "direct" union effect on investment, ow 
ing to the union tax on returns emanating from tangible and intangible 
capital, union rent-seeking is likely to have an "indirect" effect on in 
vestment (Hirsch, forthcoming). Indirect effects result if unions decrease 
company earnings, and if such earnings provide a low-cost source of 
funds for firm investments. Subsequent empirical analysis will attempt 
to distinguish unionism©s direct and indirect effects.
Graphically, union rent-seeking can be represented as levying a tax 
on the returns associated with relation-specific tangible and intangible 
capital. Figure 2.2 (a-c) presents diagrams showing curves labeled MRI, 
representing the marginal rate of return on investment, and MFC, 
representing the marginal financing cost of funds. Initially, we assume 
that the firm faces constant marginal financing costs (this would occur 
in a world with a neutral tax system and a competitive capital market 
with no transaction/information costs). Firms will carry out investment 
up to the point where the marginal rate of return on investment equals
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marginal costs, corresponding to investment level /t in figure 2.2(a). 
This framework can be applied not only to investment in physical capital, 
but also to investment in intangible capital such as R&D.
The union tax on the prospective returns to investment flattens or 
rotates downward the MRI curve to MRI©, with a slope of (\-f)S, where 
S is the absolute value of the slope of the nonunion MRI curve and t 
is the tax rate (i.e., the proportion of the return to capital appropriated 
by the union). The union tax places a wedge between nonunion and 
union rates of return, so the union firm reduces investment until its after 
tax rate of return is equal to its marginal financing costs. In figure 2.2(a), 
this implies a reduction in investment from 7j to /2 ; marginal and average 
rates of return on investment are lower for a union than for a nonunion 
firm at any given level of investment. If the MFC schedule were up 
ward sloping, the equilibrium decrease in /would be somewhat smaller 
owing to the falling opportunity cost of funds at lower levels of /.
The effect of the union tax on investment activity is more complicated 
if union coverage affects the marginal financing cost. Assume for sake 
of illustration that the lower profitability owing to union bargaining power 
causes an upward shift in marginal financing costs, from MFC to MFC©, 
as seen in figure 2.2(b). In this case, investment falls from /t to /3 , ow 
ing both to the direct effect of the union tax from I{ to /2 , and to an 
indirect effect associated with the higher financing cost from /2 to Iy 
Perhaps a more realistic case is an MFC curve that is discontinuous 
at the point where a firm must shift from internal to external financing 
of investment. Figure 2.2(c) identifies such an MFC schedule. In the non 
union case, the MFC schedule is represented by acef; at point c the 
firm must shift from internal to external funds. In the union case, re 
tained earnings or profits are reduced, leading to the MFC schedule 
abdf, the up ward" shift now occurring at the lower level b. In this case, 
if both the pre- and postunion tax MRI schedules intersect MFC to the 
right of point e, or to the left of point b, the entire union effect on / will 
be a direct effect. Intuitively, the union will have no indirect effect if 
the marginal financing cost is unchanged; that is, if the firm would re 
ly on external marginal financing with or without a union, or if it relies 
entirely on internal funds with or without a union. Otherwise, there 
will be both a direct and an indirect union effect on investment activity.
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Although different from the traditional model, the union rent-seeking 
approach, which treats union wage demands as endogenous, does not 
rule out the existence of substitution and scale effects. Union bargain 
ing power facilitates cost increases that unambiguously reduce output 
(scale) and hence usage of all factor inputs. And if the union tax on 
capital can be reduced by a reduction in employment, the traditional 
substitution effect is more likely to operate. Substitution or relative price 
effects will affect the mix as well as level of investment, leading to 
relatively lower use of factors taxed heavily by the union, and greater 
reliance on factors whose returns are difficult for unions to appropriate. 
For example, unionized firms are likely to decrease investment in long- 
lived capital with high fixed costs, and in innovative activity that leads 
to firm-specific returns. By contrast, the firm may increase investment 
in technologies and innovative activity expected to lead to labor-saving 
and whose returns are not vulnerable to union appropriation. Note that 
long-lived, specific physical capital is perhaps most vulnerable to union 
capture, even if such capital is labor-saving. Of course, the net effect 
of unions on input use and investments in tangible and intangible capital 
is ultimately an empirical question.
Union rent-seeking is likely to reduce not only investment in physical 
capital, but also investment in R&D and other forms of innovative ac 
tivity. The stock of knowledge and improvements in processes and pro 
ducts emanating from R&D are likely to be relatively long-lived and 
firm specific. To the extent that the returns from innovative activity 
are appropriable, firms will respond to union power by reducing these 
investments. Collective bargaining coverage within a company is most 
likely to reduce investment in product innovations and relatively factor- 
neutral process innovations, while having ambiguous effects on labor- 
saving process innovation. 8 R&D expenditures also tend to signal, or 
be statistically prior to, investments in physical capital. 9 Therefore, firms 
reducing long-range plans for physical capital investment in response 
to union rent-seeking are likely to reduce investment in R&D.
Patents applied for or granted are a measure of innovative output 
emanating from a company©s R&D stock. Patent activity is likely to 
exhibit a relationship with company union coverage largely similar to
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that exhibited by R&D inputs. Unionized companies, however, may 
be more likely to patent, given their stock of innovation capital, as a 
means of reducing union rent appropriation (Connolly, Hirsch, and 
Hirschey 1986). Although the patent application process is often cost 
ly and revealing of trade secrets, patents offer the opportunity for firms 
to license product and process innovations. The opportunity to license 
transforms what might otherwise be firm-specific innovative capital into 
general capital, and lessens a union©s ability to appropriate the quasi- 
rents from that capital. 10
A final point worth emphasizing is that most collective bargaining 
agreements are made at the plant (establishment) or multiplant level, 
rather than for the entire firm. To the extent that capital and produc 
tion can easily be shifted to nonunion plants within a firm, a union©s 
ability to appropriate returns from investment may be constrained. In 
fact, a firm©s implicit or explicit threat to transfer production to non 
union plants may limit union wage demands. To the extent that unionized 
operations remain vital to the firm, however, union labor can still ap 
propriate a share of a firm©s quasi-rents emanating from capital in its 
nonunion operations. Similarly, the threat of union organizing in non 
union plants and wage standardization across union and nonunion plants 
within a firm lessen a firm©s ability to avoid the union tax through a 
reallocation of capital away from its unionized plants. Ultimately, it 
is an empirical question as to how unionization affects firm performance 
and investment behavior. Data on within-firm or establishment-level 
allocations of investment funds and economic performance, however, 
would enhance our understanding of the process (see Verma 1985).
Summary
Unions and firms engage in a repeated bargaining relationship in which 
the union attempts to appropriate quasi-rents emanating from firm- 
specific capital. Rent-seeking by the union results in lower earnings 
and market value among union companies than among similar non 
union companies. The level and mix of capital investment is affected 
in turn because of the union tax on the quasi-rents that make up the
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normal returns to investment and because earnings, which provide a 
low-cost source of funds, are lower. Union effects on investment 
behavior will result even if cooperative or jointly maximizing long-run 
bargaining outcomes obtain, owing to myopia on the part of senior rank- 
and-file. Union effects on investment will be more negative if non- 
cooperative bargaining outcomes are the norm. Most likely to be af 
fected by union rent-seeking are investments in long-lived, relation- 
specific physical capital, and innovative activity leading to firm-specific 
innovation and subsequent physical capital. Union companies are ex 
pected to have a higher propensity to patent, given their R&D stock, 
as a means of decreasing the union tax on quasi-rents.
The analysis to this point has assumed that unions have no signifi 
cant effect on productivity in the firm. If unions do have systematic 
effects on productivity, the above analysis must be qualified since union 
effects could either reinforce or offset changes in compensation costs 
engendered by union rent-seeking. Unions will affect productivity and 
productivity growth indirectly, via their effects on investment behavior 
and the use of inputs. Less clear is the direct role of unionism in affect 
ing productivity and productivity growth independent of levels and 
changes in input usage. Union effects on productivity have been the 
focus of considerable study in recent years, whereas relatively little at 
tention has been given to productivity growth. We turn to these issues 
in chapter 6.
NOTES
1 .To the extent that patents result from previous investments in R&D or other forms of innovative 
activity, the returns on patents might best be considered a quasi-rent. Of course, notions of fairness 
in the labor market also may produce a positive relationship between profits and wages, even 
if resources are relatively mobile. For an example of such a model, see Akerlof (1982).
2. For such a model, see Bronars and Deere (1989) and related discussions in Hirsch (1990a, 
forthcoming).
3. See Reder and Neumann (1980) for a discussion of bargaining "protocols" that develop be 
tween management and labor. A firm (or industry) in failing condition may encourage oppor 
tunistic behavior by both management and the union. That is, noncooperative bargaining out 
comes become more likely as one moves from infinitely repeated bargaining to a time-limited 
bargaining horizon. Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) examine the case of a declining industry with 
large fixed costs in long-lived capital. They argue that labor demand elasticity will decrease since 
substituting capital for labor is less attractive in a declining industry. Hence, union bargaining
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power and the wage premium may increase in the short run. Over the long run, employment 
and output will be substantially reduced. They believe their model applies with some force to 
the U.S. steel industry.
4. See Grout (1984) for an examination of investment decisions in situations with binding and 
nonbinding contracts. Baldwin (1983) contends that firms will respond to union "expropriation" 
of returns by retaining second-best or relatively less productive capital as a means of moderating 
union wage demands. Union wage demands commensurate with productivity at a firm©s efficient 
plants would then necessitate shutdowns at the firm©s less efficient plants. Tauman and Weiss 
(1987) develop a duopoly model in which union and nonunion firms select their technologies.
5. Baldwin (1983) explores several possibilities. Wachter and Cohen (1988) propose a cooperative 
implicit contract rule (named the "sunk-cost loss rule") wherein firms faced with declining de 
mand can lower their wage bill through a reduction in hours but not wages, thus insuring that 
profits are reduced.
6. Interestingly, government regulations and guarantees with respect to pension funding, although 
defensible on other grounds, lessen union members© stake in the long-run future of the firm and 
their union. A similar argument can be made with respect to antidiscrimination (nepotism) laws 
applied to unions if, in their absence, rank-and-file could pass on membership to friends and relatives.
7. The prediction that a union firm will adjust employment to the labor market or opportunity 
cost wage, and not to its own wage, has formed the basis for some of the empirical tests of strong 
efficiency. Among the papers in this area are Brown and Ashenfelter (1986), McCurdy and Pen- 
cavel (1986), Card (1986), Eberts and Stone (1986), and Svejnar (1986).
8. Most company-financed R&D is described as product R&D, although many final products in 
the producer goods sector end up as inputs into the production process of firms downstream.
9. Lach and Schankerman (1989) provide evidence that R&D "Granger causes" capital invest 
ment, but investment doesn©t Granger cause R&D.
10. We treat the ratio of patents to R&D stock as a measure of patent propensity, and expect 
unionized companies to have higher ratios. Alternatively, the ratio can be considered a measure 
of R&D efficiency firms with higher ratios achieve greater innovative output from given in 
puts. By this interpretation, union companies also should have higher patent to R&D stock ratios 
since the union tax on investment returns implies a higher before-tax rate of return (or productivi 
ty) to innovative activity in union companies. Empirical analyses of R&D and patents are found 
in Griliches (1984). Levin et al. (1987) discuss numerous factors determining the appropriability 
of returns from R&D, but do not mention labor unions.

3 
Union Coverage Among U.S. Firms
Union Coverage Survey
In this study, the relationship between union coverage and various 
dimensions of economic performance are examined at the firm level. 
A serious limitation of past studies has been the difficulty in measuring 
union coverage at the level of the firm.© There are no publicly available 
data on the extent of union coverage among U.S. companies. The Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS) does collect and publish announcements of 
union contract agreements covering large groups of workers. Firm-level 
coverage figures can thus be constructed by aggregating the number 
of covered workers across all of a firm©s listed contracts and dividing 
that sum by total employees in a firm. Such calculations are neither 
simple nor necessarily reliable. Beyond the nontrivial problem of match 
ing individual contract information to the appropriate flrm(s), there is 
no mandatory reporting of contract information. Hence, estimates of 
the proportion of a firm©s workforce covered by a collective bargain 
ing agreement will understate actual union coverage, since only large 
contracts are included, and since there may be incomplete recording 
of these contracts. 2
The difficulty in obtaining firm-level information on union coverage 
has prompted authors of previous firm-level studies examining union 
effects on economic performance (Salinger 1984; Connolly, Hirsch, 
and Hirschey 1986; Hirsch and Connolly 1987; Bronars and Deere 1989) 
to match 3-digit industry-level data, based on calculations from the May 
Current Population Surveys, to individual firms. Such studies, however, 
fail to account for what may be considerable intraindustry variation in 
unionization, and entangle to an unknown degree union and industry 
effects on market value, investments in tangible and intangible capital, 
and productivity.
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As part of this study, a survey of U.S. firms was conducted in order 
to obtain more direct and reliable information on union coverage. The 
survey, conducted during late 1987 and 1988, contacted firms from a 
master list of 1,904 firms taken from the R&D Master File, a data file 
comprised of all publicly traded manufacturing sector companies 
operating in 1976 that were included on Compustat tapes during 
1976-1978. 3 Firms were asked to answer the following question for 1987 
and, as best they could, for 1977 (as their company then existed):
To the best of your knowledge, approximately what percent 
age of your corporation©s total North American workforce 
is covered by collective bargaining agreements?
The largest 300 firms (based on 1976 sales) were contacted by phone 
and/or mail and received a follow-up questionnaire if they did not in 
itially respond; the remaining firms were mailed a questionnaire. 4 Union 
data for 1977 corresponds to the firm as it existed in 1977. In cases 
where firms had merged, efforts were made to acquire union figures 
for the operating units as they existed in 1977.
Usable data for 1977 or 1987 were obtained from 475 firms through 
the mail and phone survey. A direct measure of 1977 union coverage 
was obtained from 460 firms; 467 firms provided 1987 figures; and 
452 firms provided both 1977 and 1987 figures. The relatively few firms 
not providing 1977 data typically indicated the data were not available 
and they could not provide an estimate. Firms for which 1977 but not 
1987 data were available were those that were publicly traded in 1977, 
but are now a subsidiary or fully integrated part of a merged firm.
The empirical work in this monograph utilizes a constructed measure 
of 1977 union coverage, available for a total of 632 firms. In addition 
to the 460 firms for which a direct measure of 1977 coverage was ob 
tained, we estimate 1977 coverage for an additional 15 firms based on 
reported 1987 coverage figures in the same survey, and for 157 firms 
based on firm coverage figures collected in an independent 1972 Con 
ference Board Survey (see below). Union coverage figures for 1977 
were estimated for the 15 firms by multiplying the 1987 figures by 1.22, 
based on the ratio of 1977- to-1987 coverage data among the 452 firms 
for which both years of data were available (the simple correlation be 
tween the 1977 and 1987 figures is 0.87).
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The 1972 union data were kindly provided by David C. Hershfield, 
who developed the figures from data collected in a 1972 survey by the 
Conference Board. These data, measuring the percentage of produc 
tion and maintenance workers covered by a collective bargaining agree 
ment, were available for 315 Fortune 1000 firms in our data base, 157 
for which we could not obtain a response in our survey, and 158 for 
which we obtained 1977 data (data from the merged surveys for 1972, 
1977, and 1987 were available for 154 firms). Because we are interested 
in the extent of unionization within the entire firm, the 1972 coverage 
figures for production workers were multiplied by the estimated pro 
portion of production workers in the firm based on 2-, 3-, and 4-digit 
SIC industry figures for 1972. This conversion assumes zero coverage 
among nonproduction workers, thus biasing downward the total firm 
coverage estimates. Data for 1972 and 1977 were available for 158 firms; 
total workforce coverage figures were about 20 percent higher in 1972 
than in 1977 among these firms (the two measures had a simple cor 
relation of 0.71). The 157 firms for whom only 1972 data were available 
were assigned a 1977 coverage estimate equal to 0.84 times the adjusted 
1972 figure.
We do not believe the empirical results or conclusions presented in 
subsequent chapters are affected substantially by response bias in the 
survey. The R&D Master File included information on virtually all firms 
in the target population publicly traded firms in the manufacturing sec 
tor. From this population, the union survey sample contains a dispropor 
tionate number of large companies. But the number of small companies 
who responded to the survey is substantial and firm size is a control 
variable in subsequent empirical work. As a check for possible survey 
bias, measures of profitability and investment were compared among 
companies for whom firm union coverage is measured and companies 
in the R&D Master File for whom no union measure is available. Dif 
ferences in these measures between responding and nonresponding com 
panies are small, and never close to statistical significance once firm 
size and industry group are controlled.
The determination of firms© union status is not a principal focus of 
this monograph. Firm-level union coverage information, however, is 
interesting in its own right, particularly so since such figures are not
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widely available. In tables 3.1 and 3.2, union coverage figures for 1972, 
1977, and 1987, disaggregated by industry category, are presented. Data 
for three samples of firms are included: the 154 companies for whom 
1972, 1977, and 1987 union coverage figures are available (table 3.1); 
the 452 companies for whom data were obtained in this survey for both 
1977 and 1987 (table 3.2); and the 632 firms for whom 1977 union 
coverage was directly obtained, or estimated based on data from 1972 
or 1987 (table 3.2). This latter measure, designated by UN, is the union 
coverage measure utilized in the monograph©s subsequent chapters. 5
The secular decline in union coverage among U.S. firms is evident 
from the data presented in both tables. Table 3.1 presents coverage 
figures for the 154 Fortune 1000 firms for whom coverage data were 
available from the 1972 Conference Board Survey, and for both 1977 
and 1987 from the 1987 Hirsch survey conducted for this project. While 
intertemporal changes are not measured precisely due to differences 
in the periods and the nature of the surveys, the magnitude of the changes 
in sample means is large. Union coverage among these relatively large 
companies is estimated to have declined from 41.6 percent in 1972, 
to 34.9 percent in 1977, and to 28.3 percent in 1987. A comparable 
trend over the last decade is evident for the 452 firms in the Hirsch 
survey (table 3.2, columns (2) and (3)): coverage declines from 30.5 
percent in 1977 to 25.0 percent in 1987. In fact, union coverage declined 
in 19 out of the 20 industry categories, the exception being electrical 
equipment and supplies, where coverage remained roughly constant at 
a low level of about 7 percent. Union coverage is lower among firms 
in this larger sample than in the 154-firm sample because the Hirsch 
survey included firms outside the Fortune 1000, among whom zero union 
coverage was not uncommon.
The reliability of the estimated intertemporal change in union coverage 
cannot be known with certainty. Differences between the 1972 and 1977 
figures arise not only because of changes in coverage over time, but 
also because the data are derived from different surveys, the 1977 figures 
were reported in 1987, and the 1972 figures were converted from a 
measure of coverage among production workers to a measure of coverage 
among total workers. The 1977 and 1987 figures are more comparable 
in that they derive from the same survey and responses were provided
Table 3.1 
Company Union Coverage Figures by Industry: 1972, 1977, and 1987
Total
Food & kindred products
Textiles & apparel
Chemicals, excluding drugs
Drugs & medical instruments
Petroleum refining
Rubber & miscellaneous plastics
Stone, clay, & glass
Primary metals
Fabricated metal products
Engines, farm & const, equip. 
Office, computers, & acct. equip. 
Other machinery, not electric 
Electrical equipment & supplies
Communication equipment 
Motor vehicle and transp. equip.
Aircraft & aerospace 
Professional & scientific equip.
Lumber, wood, & paper






























































































































































NOTE: The sample is comprised of 154 companies responding in both the Hirsch survey for 1977 and 1987, and the Conference Board Survey for 
1972. The surveys are described in the text.
Table 3.2 
Company Union Coverage Figures by Industry: 1977 and 1987
Total
Food & kindred products
Textiles & apparel
Chemicals, excluding drugs
Drugs & medical instruments
Petroleum refining
Rubber & miscellaneous plastics
Stone, clay, & glass
Primary metals
Fabricated metal products
Engines, farm & const, equip.
Office, computers, & acct. equip.
Other machinery, not electric
Electrical equipment & supplies
Communication equipment
Motor vehicle and transp. equip.
Aircraft & aerospace
Professional & scientific equip.
Lumber, wood, & paper
























































































































































































NOTE: Columns reporting COV-77 and COV-87 are for the sample of 452 companies reporting both 1977 and 1987 union coverage in the Hirsch 
survey. UN represents estimated union coverage in 1977 for 632 firms providing information in either the Hirsch or Conference Board surveys. Con 
struction of UN is described in the text.
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by the same person for both years. Many firms, however, did not have 
records of 1977 union coverage, and the reliability of the respondents© 
estimates for 1977 cannot be directly ascertained.
Confidence in the reported union coverage figures is enhanced by 
comparison with other available figures. Mean union coverage in 1977 
for the full 632-firm sample is estimated to be 32.7 percent. For the 
452-firm Hirsch survey sample, the corresponding figure is 30.5 per 
cent, while for the smaller 154-firm sample for which data from both 
surveys are available, union coverage is estimated to be 34.9 percent. 
These figures can be compared to the figure of 36.8 percent coverage 
among eligible workers in all manufacturing, based on union member 
ship data from the 1976-1978 May Current Population Surveys (Kok- 
kelenberg and Sockell 1985, table 4). Calculated union density among 
all would be about 2 percentage points lower, or 35 percent (see Curme, 
Hirsch, and Macpherson 1990, p. 9). Estimated 1987 union coverage 
among the 452 firms in the Hirsch survey is 25.0 percent. This is very 
close to the 25.8 percent figure reported by CPA firm Grant Thornton 
in a 1987 survey of manufacturing firms (Wall Street Journal, 5-31-88, 
p. 1), and the 24.7 percent coverage figure among manufacturing 
employees derived from the 1987 CPS household surveys (U.S. Bureau 
of the Census 1989, table 684).
Interindustry and intraindustry variation in firm-level union coverage 
is substantial. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide means and standard devia 
tions of coverage by 2-digit manufacturing industry; we focus on table 
3.2, where sample sizes within industry categories are largest. 6 Disper 
sion of firm union coverage is large within most broad industry 
categories. In fact, in 1987 there was at least one firm in every industry 
category with zero union coverage (there were two industry categories 
with no nonunion companies in 1977). The substantial intraindustry 
variation in unionization supports the proposition that measurement of 
union coverage at the firm level is essential for obtaining reliable 
estimates of union effects on firm performance.
The least highly organized industry categories are office, computers, 
and accounting equipment; electrical equipment and supplies; profes 
sional and scientific equipment; and drugs and medical instruments. 
Although union coverage among firms in these industries is relatively low
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and declining, unionization among firms in most industries remains 
substantial. Average coverage among all firms in 1987 was 25.0 per 
cent; coverage figures among production workers only are substantial 
ly higher. 7 Unionization remains widely prevalent among firms in the 
primary metals (62.1 percent), food and kindred products (40.1 per 
cent), and motor vehicle and transportation equipment (38.0 percent) 
industries. Declines in firm union coverage between 1977 and 1987 were 
particularly large in the aircraft and aerospace, communication equip 
ment, motor vehicle and transportation equipment, and engines, farm, 
and construction equipment industries.
Based on these data, it is tempting to draw inferences regarding causes 
of union decline over this period. We make no such attempt at this point. 
The results of the firm-level surveys on union coverage, summarized 
in tables 3.1 and 3.2, do illustrate two points, however. First, substan 
tial intraindustry variation in union coverage make it essential to use 
firm-level coverage measures in econometric analyses of union effects. 
Second, the large differences in average unionization across industry 
categories makes it necessary to carefully control for a broad array of 
industry measures in estimating union effects on firm performance. 8
Construction of the Data Set
Empirical analysis in this monograph matches the firm-level union 
survey information discussed previously with firm- and industry-specific 
financial, investment, and production data. The R&D Master File, com 
prised of publicly traded manufacturing sector companies operating in 
1976, was constructed at the National Bureau of Economic Research 
and Harvard University and matches company data from Compustat 
with U.S. patents data from the Office of Technology Assessment and 
Forecasting. 9 Compustat, which is produced by Standard & Poor©s (S&P) 
Compustat Services, Inc., provides computer-readable "libraries" of 
financial, statistical, and market information covering several thousand 
industrial and nonindustrial companies. Information is obtained from 
10-K reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, com 
pany reports to shareholders, other S&P publications, telephone contacts,
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and stock market information services. The R&D Master File utilizes 
information from various industrial Compustat files.
The R&D Master File provides panel data for companies for the years 
1958 through 1980. Because missing data increase as one moves away 
from 1976 and no time-series union coverage is available, subsequent 
analysis focuses on the years 1968-1980. The data file contains relatively 
complete reporting of company market value, accounting rates of return, 
gross and net plant, and the book value of debt; less complete report 
ing of R&D investment and patents; and relatively incomplete report 
ing of advertising expenditures and labor compensation.
Industry data on shipments, capital intensity, payroll, and the ratio 
of production to total employees are obtained from the Bureau of In 
dustrial Economics tape consolidating data from the Annual Survey of 
Manufactures. Data on industry concentration (adjusted for imports and 
regional concentration), as well as import penetration, were available 
for 1972 and 1977 in data assembled by Weiss and Pascoe (1986). In 
dustry data are matched to the firm at the 2-, 3-, or 4-digit levels, bas 
ed on the Compustat SIC-code variable designating the firm©s principal 
industry in 1976.
Data Appendix 1 presents means and standard deviations for several 
variables of interest from the data set, cross-tabulated by union status. 
The data are presented separately for the full sample of 632 firms over 
the 13-year period 1968-1980, and for firms divided into similarly siz 
ed groups of nonunion (UN = 0), "low" coverage (0<UN<.30), 
"medium" coverage (.30 < UN < .60), and "high" coverage (UN> .60) 
companies. Total sample sizes given are significantly less than 13 times 
632 owing to missing data. The substantial differences in firm-level and 
industry-level performance between union and nonunion companies 
evinced by the variable means make detailed empirical analysis of union 
impacts on performance essential. Subsequent chapters examine in detail 
the relationship of company-level union coverage with profitability, 
market value, investment behavior, productivity, and productivity growth 
during the 1970s.
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NOTES
1. Notable exceptions are Clark (1984), who uses the PIMS Database on lines of business, and 
single-industry studies of the cement (Clark 1980a; 1980b) and construction (Alien 1986; 1987) 
industries. Citations to more recent studies are in Addison and Hirsch (1989), Hirsch (1991), 
and elsewhere in the text.
2. The BLS currently collects information on contracts covering a thousand or more workers; 
prior to 1981, information was collected for contracts covering 500 or more workers. The Bureau 
of National Affairs (BNA) collects similar data, including smaller contracts, although these data 
are proprietary (but see Abowd 1989b). The name of the business on the contract must be match 
ed to the firm name of the parent company, however, since there are no firm-level identifier codes 
attached to the contract information. Moreover, multiemployer contracts do not provide informa 
tion on covered workers by firm.
3. The R&D Master File is described later in the chapter.
4. Coverage data were collected for additional firms following completion of the empirical work 
and initial draft of this manuscript. These data are utilized in subsequent research (Hirsch 1991, 
forthcoming).
5. Subsequent empirical analysis in chapters 4-6 rely on the largest possible samples of firms. 
When samples are restricted only to those firms for whom a direct 1977 union coverage response 
is provided in the Hirsch survey, most results are highly similar to those shown.
6. The industry categories, previously utilized in the R&D Master File, are taken from Body and 
Jaffe (no date). Although highly similar, they do not correspond exactly to a 2-digit SIC 
classification.
7. The survey conducted for this monograph also asked for the percentage of a company©s pro 
duction workforce covered by collective bargaining agreements. Responses to this question were 
less complete and reliable than responses to the coverage question applying to a company©s entire 
workforce.
8. Subsequent analysis bears out these points. When only an industry measure of union coverage 
is included in regression models, its coefficient is highly sensitive to specification. When detailed 
industry control variables are included, its coefficient is close to zero. When few industries are 
included, their coefficient is often quite large (in absolute value). Because firms are matched only 
to their primary industry and the industry codes from the Compustat and the CPS cannot be match 
ed precisely, there exists far greater measurement error in the industry than in the firm union 
coverage measure.
9. Documentation on the R&D Master File is provided in Cummins et al. (1985) and Body and 
Jaffe (no date). The data were kindly made available by Zvi Griliches.
Labor Unions and Firm Profitability
Union compensation gains can be expected to lower firm profitabili 
ty, unless they are offset by productivity enhancements in the workplace 
or higher prices in the product market. Lower profitability will be 
reflected in decreased current earnings and measured rates of return 
on capital, and in a lower market valuation of the firm©s assets, thus 
decreasing Tobin©s q (market value divided by the replacement cost of 
physical capital) and other market valuation measures.
Profit-maximizing responses by firms to cost differentials should limit 
the magnitude of differences in profitability between union and non 
union companies in the very long run. Profit differentials will be reduced 
through the movement of resources out of union into nonunion sectors. 
That is, investment in and by union operations will decrease until post- 
tax (i.e., post-union) rates of return are equivalent to nonunion rates 
of return or, stated alternatively, union coverage will be restricted to 
economic sectors realizing above-normal pre-union rates of return. 
Because the quasi-rents accruing to long-lived capital may provide a 
principal source for union gains and complete long-run adjustments occur 
slowly, we are likely to observe differences in profitability at any point 
in time. 1
This chapter briefly reviews previous studies examining union effects 
on profitability. The data set assembled for this study is then employed 
to examine union-nonunion differences in profitability. In addition to 
estimating the overall differential, we examine differences in union ef 
fects across industries and over time, and explore the possible sources 
from which unions capture profits. Conclusions and interpretation of 
the results follow.
Previous empirical analyses find unionization (or unanticipated union 
contract gains) to be associated with significantly lower profitability, 
although studies differ in their conclusions regarding the magnitude and 
source of union gains. 2 Studies using aggregate industry data (e.g.,
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Freeman 1983; Karier 1985; Voos and Mishel 1986; and Domowitz, 
Hubbard, and Petersen 1986) typically employ as their dependent 
variable the industry price-cost margin, PCM, defined by [(Total 
Revenue - Variable Costs) / Total Revenue] and typically measured by 
[(Value Added - Payroll - Advertising) / Shipments]. Line of business 
and some firm-level studies have used accounting profit rate measures: 
the rate of return on sales, TTS , measured by earnings divided by sales, 
and the rate of return on capital, Kk , measured by earnings divided by 
the value of the capital stock (e.g., Clark 1984; Hirsch and Connolly 
1987; Hirsch 1990b).
Firm-level analyses of publicly traded firms (e.g., Salinger 1984; Con 
nolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey 1986; Hirsch and Connolly 1987; Hirsch 
1990b) have used market value measures of profitability, a common 
measure being Tobin©s q, defined as firm market value divided by the 
replacement cost of assets. Finally, there have been several "event" 
studies in which changes in market value attributable to union represen 
tation elections or unanticipated changes in collective bargaining 
agreements have been examined (e.g., Ruback and Zimmerman 1984; 
Bronars and Deere £990; Becker 1987; and Abowd 1989b). 3
The conclusion that unionization is associated with lower profitabili 
ty holds for studies using industries, firms, or lines of business as the 
unit of observation; for models where the profitability measures are 
industry price-cost margins, firm rates of return to capital or sales, 
Tobin©s-^ or other market value measures, or stock market value changes 
in response to union "events"; for simultaneous equation as well as 
single equation models; and regardless of the time period under study.
Despite the consensus that profitability is lower in unionized settings, 
there is disagreement as to the magnitude of the profit reduction and 
the sources from which union gains obtain. Economists are understand 
ably skeptical that large profit differentials can survive in a competitive 
economy, notwithstanding the sizable union-nonunion profit differences 
found in the empirical literature, and possible econometric biases causing 
union effects to be understated. There are several potential biases that 
work to bias toward zero the estimated union effect. First, profit func 
tions are estimated only for surviving firms since those for whom union 
effects are most deleterious may be less likely to remain in the sample.
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Second, unions are more likely to be organized where potential profits 
are higher; hence, the negative union effect on profits may be 
underestimated in empirical work where union density is treated as ex 
ogenous (see Voos and Mishel 1986). Finally, in firm-level studies us 
ing an industry-level union density variable, measurement error is likely 
to bias the union coefficient toward zero. On the other hand, the 
magnitude of the estimated union-nonunion profit differential is often 
sensitive to specification. Omission of factors positively correlated with 
union coverage and negatively correlated with profitability will bias the 
union profit estimate in the opposite direction
Less attention has been given to the sources from which unions ap 
propriate rents (see Addison and Hirsch 1989). Several studies con 
clude that unions reduce profits primarily in highly concentrated in 
dustries, and that monopoly power provides the primary source for union 
compensation gains (e.g., Freeman 1983; Salinger 1984; Karier 1985), 
whereas Clark (1984) finds that unions reduce profits only among 
businesses with low market shares. Hirsch and Connolly (1987) seriously 
question both sets of findings. They find neither product nor labor market 
evidence to support the hypothesis that profits associated with industry 
concentration provide a source for union rents (see also Domowitz, Hub- 
bard, and Petersen 1986). Rather, they argue that returns from firm- 
specific market shares, R&D capital, and weak foreign competition are 
more likely sources for union gains. Hirsch (1990b), using a data set 
with a firm-specific union coverage measure, even more clearly rejects 
the hypothesis that concentration-related profits provide a source for 
union rents.
Union Effects on Profitability: Specification 
and Full-Sample Results
In this chapter, both accounting and market value measures of prof 
itability are examined. Accounting profit rates, measuring realized an 
nual earnings relative to a sales or asset base, are historical and readily 
available from financial reports. By contrast, market value measures 
are forward-looking, reflect expected performance over time rather than
38 Labor Unions and Firm Profitability
accounting performance for a single period, measure risk-adjusted 
returns, and are less likely to be affected by differences in accounting 
procedures across firms.
Prior to presentation of regression model results, differences in firm- 
level profit measures, cross-tabulated by union status, warrant men 
tion. Data Appendix 1 presents means of Tobin©s q and the rate of return 
on capital, irk , for the full sample of firms over the 13-year period 
1968-1980, and for firms divided into similar-sized groups of non 
union (UN = 0), low-coverage (0<UN<.30), medium-coverage 
(.30<UN<.60), and high-coverage (UN>.60) companies. Market 
valuation of firm assets, as measured by Tobin©s q, drops sharply with 
respect to union coverage, particularly as one moves from the non 
union to low-union sample of companies (mean q equals 2.34, 1.41, 
0.99, and 0.88 for the four union categories, respectively). The sug 
gestion is that even a low level of coverage significantly reduces in 
vestors© expectations of future earnings. Likewise, the rate of return 
on capital, vk, decreases continuously with respect to union coverage. 
And in results not presented, gross rates of return on equity, ire , defined 
as gross cash flows divided by equity value, do not vary systematically 
with union coverage (ire is 0.18, 0.22, 0.20, and 0.21 in the nonunion 
through high-union categories, respectively). This is to be expected since 
equity values adjust to differences in expected earnings; that is, if union 
firms have lower earnings, equity value falls until ire is similar for 
union and nonunion firms. 4
Profitability equations using the natural logarithm of Tobin©s q and 
the rate of return on capital as dependent variables are estimated. A 
general form of the profit function is:
(4.1) TT,, = EfcXtt, + ZtyUN   Zjit + eit ,
where TT,, is the profitability of firm i in year t, measured alternatively 
by log(<?) and irk ; X includes k firm- and industry-specific variables (in 
cluding the constant one) that affect profitability directly; (3k are the 
coefficients attaching to X; and eit is a random error term assumed (for 
now) to have zero mean and constant variance. Z is a subset of X and 
includes j firm- and industry-specific variables (including the constant 
one) that affect profitability in conjunction with unionization of the firm, 
UN, while \j/j are the coefficients attaching to UN • Z. 5
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Company profits arise from differences between revenues and costs; 
thus, measurable firm and industry characteristics that affect either 
revenues or costs may have an impact on profitability. In a competitive 
market, economic profits will tend toward zero in the long run, while 
large interfirm differences in risk-adjusted profitability at any point in 
time may signal disequilibrium. Therefore, some portion of the varia 
tion in profitability will be associated with differences in firm- and 
industry-specific sales growth rates, which proxy, in part, disequilibrium- 
related profits. Because profitability measures reflect accounting as well 
as economic profits, measured profitability also will differ with respect 
to company stocks of physical capital, innovative capital (proxied by 
the R&D stock), and other forms of intangible capital (good will, loca 
tion, etc.). That is, much of what is measured as profits reflects the 
normal return to investment and special factors of production.
Market structure may influence price, revenues, and the profitabili 
ty of firms. Therefore, variables proxying the degree of competition 
(e.g., industry concentration and import penetration) are included in 
profit equations. No direct measure of firms© market shares is available 
for firms in the sample (but see Hirsch 1990b). Union effects on prof 
itability may also differ with respect to market structure; therefore, in 
teraction terms between union coverage and market structure variables 
warrant examination. Empirical analyses must control as well for size 
differences among firms, since size may have an impact on costs, or 
reflect realized efficiencies in the marketplace. Likewise, a union©s 
bargaining power and ability to capture rents may differ systematically 
with firm size.
The effects of union coverage on profitability should be reflected 
primarily in the form of union-nonunion differences in wage rates. In 
subsequent empirical work, we do not directly measure differences in 
labor costs facing firms but, rather, include a union coverage variable 
to reflect these cost differences. 6 In the absence of firm-level union 
coverage or the threat of union organizing, quality-adjusted wage rates 
should be similar across firms, although there will be real differences 
owing to differences across areas in labor market conditions, cost of 
living, taxes, and the like. Stronger support can be furnished for the
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contention that companies face similar capital prices at any point in time, 
since new capital and investment funds are relatively mobile. Because 
factor price differences are not readily measurable, they are not included 
directly in our profitability equations.
The inclusion of firm and industry union coverage variables is ex 
pected to capture important differences in labor costs and the threat of 
union organizing, respectively. Year dummies capture factor price dif 
ferences uniformly impacting all firms over time, while industry dum 
mies capture differences uniformly affecting all firms in a broadly defined 
industry group. Estimated union coefficients will be biased due to the 
omission of factor prices only to the extent that factor price differences 
not resulting from union coverage differences are in fact correlated with 
the error term in the profit equation. The existence or direction of such 
bias cannot be determined a priori.
Initially, a simple specification of eq. (4.1), including only a con 
stant in Z, is estimated. That is, firm unionization, UN, is included in 
eq. (4.1) as a separate variable, and not in interaction with variables 
in Z. Among the variables to be included in X are measures of firm 
size, capital intensity, the R&D stock, firm sales growth, industry con 
centration, foreign competition, industry sales growth, and dummies 
for industry and year. Specific variables will be described as empirical 
results are discussed. Data Appendix 2 provides definitions for all 
variables used in the profitability regressions.
Unionization is measured in 1977 both at the firm (UN) and industry 
(I-UN) levels, and is assumed fixed over the period. To be examined 
subsequently are interactions of UN with variables in Z, interindustry 
differences in union profit effects, changes over time in unionism©s ef 
fects, models accounting for varying levels of industry controls, and 
models correcting for serial correlation of error terms within firms across 
years. Two important possibilities omitted variable bias associated with 
firm fixed effects and simultaneity bias between unionization and 
profitability are examined subsequently in a less satisfactory manner.
Initial time-series/cross-section regression results using the entire 
1968-1980 panel, with the log of Tobin©s q and the rate of return on 
capital (TT^) as dependent variables, are presented in table 4.1. Com 













Dependent variable - log(^) 
























































































































































Dependent variable - log(^) Dependent variable - irk



























































NOTES: | t | in parentheses. Below are coefficients (1 1 \ ) obtained substituting union dummies for UN in equations (4) and (4©), with nonunion the omit 
ted reference group and where UN-LOW=1 if (0<UN<.30); UN-MED = 1 if (.30<UN<.60); and UN-HIGH = 1 if (UN>.60).
(4): -0.217 UN-LOW - 0.3% UN-MED - 0.371 UN-HIGH. 
(9.68) (16.92) (14.85)
(4X ): -0.015 UN-LOW - 0.028 UN-MED - 0.026 UN-HIGH. 
(9.01) (15.52) (13.65)
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of observations in earlier and later years. Total sample sizes are 6,248 
for the log(<7) equations and 6,236 for the irk equations. Attention is 
focused on the coefficients on the time-invariant variable (UN) measuring 
the proportion of workers covered by a collective bargaining contract 
in the firm in 1977. In regression results not presented, the estimated 
effects of unionization on a profitability variable measuring the rate of 
return to sales are found to be generally similar to those found for irk .
Regression results presented in table 4.1 include specifications with 
and without 2-digit industry dummies and for two samples of firms (see 
below). Coefficients and f-ratios are presented in a table note for a 
specification omitting UN, but instead including union dummies for low- 
union (firms with coverage less than .30), middle-union (with coverage 
from .30 to .60), and high-union (with coverage .60 or greater) com 
panies. Nonunion is the omitted reference group. Year dummies are 
included in all specifications.
Sample sizes are limited owing to missing data on annual R&D ex 
penditures and the R&D stock, particularly for the earlier years. No 
distinction can be made in the data set between missing and zero R&D 
(see Bound et al. (1984) on this issue). For the analysis in this chapter, 
we have constructed a predicted R&D stock intensity variable, (R&D- 
STK/S)est , equal to the actual value for those firms with reported 
values, and equal to the predicted value for companies without such 
data but with information on its patent stock. The predicted R&D stock 
intensity variable is calculated based on coefficient estimates from an 
auxiliary regression of R&D-STK/S on linear, squared, and cubed 
variables measuring the patent stock divided by deflated sales, plus year 
and industry dummies. The regression had a sample size of 4,547 and 
R2 of 0.42. Regression results are presented both for the larger sample 
sizes using actual and predicted values of the R&D-STK/S stock inten 
sity variable (columns (3), (4), (30, and (40), and for smaller sample 
sizes wherein R&D-STK/S measures firms© actual stocks (columns (1), 
(2), (I 7), and (20). 7 The R&D stock is divided by S rather than by the 
physical capital stock, since the latter is included in q and thus might 
lead to coefficient bias owing to mismeasured capital on both sides of 
the equation.
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Prior to examining union effects, the relationship of profitability with 
other variables in table 4.1 is noted. R&D intensity, measured by the 
estimated real R&D stock divided by (constant dollar) sales, has a 
positive and significant impact on market value, but is negatively related 
to the current accounting profit rate. This apparent anomaly may result 
because current R&D expenditures (which are highly correlated with 
the R&D stock measured here) lower current earnings, but raise ex 
pected future earnings and the market value of the firm. Previous studies 
have found a negative relationship between accounting profits and R&D 
divided by sales (Ravenscraft 1983). The R&D-STK/S coefficient is 
highly sensitive to inclusion of the industry dummies, but relatively in 
sensitive to sample. The log of the capital-labor ratio is included as a 
control variable in the profitability equations. It is negatively related 
to q and irk, indicating decreasing marginal returns to capital or 
measurement error in the capital stock variable. 8
Profitability measure Trk is not found to be significantly related to 
company size, as measured by log(L), while Tobin©s q is found to in 
crease moderately with respect to size, ceteris paribus. Firm-specific 
two-year growth rates in sales are found to be positively related to cur 
rent accounting profits, but not to the market valuation of the firm©s 
assets, after accounting for other determinants of q. 9 We also considered 
the relationship between advertising and profitability. In work not shown, 
an advertising intensity variable, ADV/S, is positively and significant 
ly related to profitability in regressions excluding industry dummies, 
but less significant in regressions including industry dummies. To avoid 
a significant reduction in sample size, advertising is not considered in 
empirical work presented in the monograph.
Industry-level variables are also found to affect firm profitability. 
I-GROWTH, the annualized growth rate in real industry sales between 
years t and t-4, is positively and significantly related to all profit rate 
measures, even after accounting for firm-specific sales growth. The in 
dustry concentration ratio (I-CR4), measuring the percentage of sales 
accounted for by the four largest firms in the assigned industry, is 
positively and significantly related to both profitability measures. The 
share of U.S. firms in domestic sales, I-DOMSH, is positively related 
to profitability measures when industry controls are excluded, but this
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relationship is not significant in specifications with industry controls 
(20 dummies to account for 21 industry categories). Industry dummy 
variables capture any otherwise unmeasured differences in profit deter 
minants that vary systematically across broad industry categories. Their 
inclusion in the profit equations also can be argued on statistical grounds; 
the industry dummies are jointly significant by all standard criteria. 10
We now turn to results on the firm-level union coverage variable, 
UN. By any measure, union firms have significantly lower market valua 
tion and profit rates than similar nonunion firms, although the magnitude 
of the estimated differentials displays some sensitivity to specification. 
Comparing nonunion to union firms with 42.3 percent coverage (cor 
responding to mean coverage among unionized companies), coefficient 
estimates from specifications (4) and (4;) indicate that q and irk are 
lower by an average 20 and 14 percent, respectively, in union firms 
than in nonunion firms. 11 The magnitude of the estimated union profit 
effect is even larger when 2-digit industry dummies are excluded, sug 
gesting that union coverage is higher among firms in less profitable in 
dustries. Note that this evidence need not be inconsistent with the 
theoretical prediction that unions are most likely to organize firms where 
there exist above-normal monopoly returns or quasi-rents.
In order to check on the robustness of the estimated union effect, 
specifications also were estimated with 105 industry dummy variables, 
corresponding to the firms© Compustat SIC codes, provided at the 2-, 
3-, and 4-digit SIC levels. Following addition of the dummies, the coef 
ficient on UN fell from -0.493 to -0.446 in the log(g) equations, while 
remaining constant at -0.033 in the irk equation. Because the union 
coefficients are not highly sensitive to inclusion of detailed industry dum 
mies, subsequent analysis using industry dummy variables includes only 
the 20 dummies corresponding to the broader industry categories.
Of particular interest is the fact that the estimated coefficients on firm 
coverage variable, UN, while sensitive to inclusion of the broad in 
dustry dummies, are little affected by inclusion of a measure of industry 
union coverage, I-UN. This result increases our confidence that we are 
in fact capturing firm-level union effects on profitability and not 
unmeasured industry-specific effects correlated with unionization. In 
dustry union density is negatively related to market value, but positively
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related to current accounting profit rates. Such relationships are con 
sistent with high industry union density decreasing industry output, in 
creasing product price, and improving current profitability, while at 
the same time having a negative effect on the market valuation by in 
vestors of firms© assets (due, perhaps, to a greater threat of union organiz 
ing). The sensitivity of estimated coefficients on I-UN to sample, 
specification, and profitability measure, however, makes us reluctant 
to draw any inferences about the relationship between industry coverage 
and firm profitability. Moreover, in results not shown, there was ex 
treme specification sensitivity of estimated union coefficients when the 
CPS-based industry union measure is used as a proxy for firm coverage 
(i.e., when I-UN but not UN is included). This reinforces our prior 
conclusion that a firm-level measure of union coverage is strongly prefer 
red to industry measures.
Union Profitability Effects by Industry and Year
In addition to the pooled time-series/cross-sectional analysis presented 
above, the profitability equations are estimated separately by broad in 
dustry category and by year. We first examine union-nonunion dif 
ferences in profitability within 19 broad 2-digit industry groupings. In 
order to facilitate presentation, three broad industry groupings  
miscellaneous consumer goods, miscellaneous manufacturing not 
elsewhere classified, and conglomerates have been combined into a 
single industry grouping. To the best of our knowledge, industry dif 
ferences in union profit effects have not been examined prior to this 
project (for related analysis, see Hirsch 1991).
Table 4.2 provides estimates of the union coverage coefficients from 
log(<7) and wk regressions, using as alternative coverage measures the 
proportion of a company©s workforce covered by collective bargaining 
agreements, UN, and a union coverage dummy variable, UN-DUM, 
equal to one if UN >. 10 and 0 otherwise. The alternative measures are 
used because sample sizes of firms and variability in union coverage 
are limited within some industry groupings. Because estimated union 
effects proved sensitive to the union measure in some cases, alternative
Table 4.2 
Union Profitability Effects by Industry, 1968-1980
Industry
All manufacturing
Food & kindred products
Textiles & apparel
Chemicals, excluding drugs
Drugs & medical instruments
Petroleum refining
Rubber & miscellaneous plastics
Stone, clay & glass
Primary metals
Fabricated metal products
Engines, farm & const, equip.
Office, computers & acct. equip.
Other machinery, not electric
Electrical equip. & supplies
Communication equipment
Motor vehicle & trans. equip.
Aircraft & aerospace
Professional & scientific equip.
Lumber, wood & paper


























































































































































































































NOTE: Control variables in industry-specific regressions include R&D-STK/Sest , log(L), log(A7L), GROWTH, I-GROWTH, I-CR4, I-DOMSH, and 
year dummies. The all-manufacturing regression also includes I-UN. The variable UN-DUM = 1 if UN>. 10.
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estimates are presented. The top row of table 4.2 presents union coef 
ficient estimates for the entire sample, taken from regressions including 
both 2-digit industry dummies and industry union density, I-UN. The 
remainder of the table presents estimated union effects by industry group 
ing, based on regressions with firm and industry control variables, but 
not industry dummies or industry union density (the latter varied little 
across firms within some of the industry categories).
The results reveal substantial variability among industries in the im 
pact of unions on firm profitability. We ignore the results for mis 
cellaneous manufacturing goods and conglomerates (the bottom row), 
since firms within that category differ so extensively that comparisons 
have little meaning. No evidence is found for sizable or significant 
positive effects of unionization on profitability in any of the industry 
categories. There is little evidence, however, of negative union effects 
on profitability in the fabricated metal products; engines, farm, and con 
struction equipment; electrical equipment; and aircraft and aerospace 
industry categories. And in the textile and apparel; petroleum refining; 
office, computer, and accounting equipment; and communication equip 
ment categories, statistically significant negative effects are found for 
one, but not the other, measure of profitability. 12 Evidence of negative 
union profit effects is relatively clear-cut in the remaining industries, 
with particularly sizable impacts found in chemicals; rubber and plastics; 
primary metals; nonelectric machinery; motor vehicles and transporta 
tion equipment; professional and scientific equipment; and lumber, 
wood, and paper. 13
Although some of the interindustry variability in estimated union profit 
effects is due to relatively small sample sizes of companies within broad 
industry categories, it is implausible that this is the primary explana 
tion for these differences. It is, of course, not surprising that union ef 
fects on profitability differ among industries, given that there are substan 
tial differences in bargaining power, labor relations, and union effects 
on productivity and wages across industries. Unfortunately, it appears 
difficult to discern a clear-cut pattern in the estimated union effects. 
Many of those factors that might explain differences in union power  
industry concentration, import penetration, firm capital intensity, firm
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and industry growth, and the like are already accounted for in the 
regressions. And in a set of profitability regressions including the union 
variable and year dummies, but not other control variables, estimated 
union-nonunion differentials in profitability were not systematically 
higher or lower than the estimates presented above where detailed con 
trol variables are included. Providing an explanation for the sizable inter 
industry differences in union profit effects thus poses an important and 
possibly fruitful avenue for future research.
Union-nonunion profitability differences by year are examined next. 
The primary advantage of the pooled time-series/cross-section regres 
sions used to this point is the substantial increase in sample size and 
efficiency associated with pooled analysis. Separate annual regressions, 
however, also provide significant advantages. First, separate annual 
regressions avoid the statistical problems of positively correlated error 
terms (within firms across years) and biased standard errors inherent 
in the pooled model. 14 Second, annual regressions can help us apprise 
the degree of measurement error in UN. Union coverage is estimated 
at a single point in time thus, measurement error should bias downward 
its coefficients as one moves away from 1977. Findings to the contrary 
would suggest that our 1977 union measure provides a reasonable 
measure of coverage over time. Finally, allowing the union coefficient 
(as well as others) to vary by year provides evidence as to how union- 
nonunion differences in profitability have varied over time. Such 
evidence is of considerable interest and has not been examined previous 
ly. For example, a finding that union-nonunion profitability differences 
were decreasing over time might suggest union bargaining power had 
weakened and that future contraction in the size of the unionized sector 
will slow. By contrast, large or increasing profit differences at the end 
of our period might suggest continued financial pressure on firms© union 
operations. Alternatively, changes in union profit effects over time can 
be interpreted in a macroeconomic context, although such an effort would 
be highly speculative.
Table 4.3 provides a summary of the coefficients on the union variable 
from the log(#) and -Kk equations, estimated by year. The top line pro 
vides estimates from the pooled model, with year dummies (correspond 
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The annual estimates are from an identical model, minus the year dum 
mies. The estimates from both sets of equations display reasonable stabili 
ty across time there is no clearly evident secular pattern in the union 
profit effect. 15 The demonstrated intertemporal stability of the estimated 
union effects provides support for relying on estimates from the pool 
ed models presented in table 4.3.
Interpretation of the annual regression results is not altogether clear. 
It appears that union coverage significantly reduces companies© earn 
ings and market values, and the magnitude of this detrimental effect 
has varied little over time. A reasonable interpretation of this evidence 
is that in response to the large and continuing union tax on profits, there 
has been a sizable expansion in nonunion operations and a concomitant 
decrease in the extent of union coverage among U.S. companies. We 
will return to this theme subsequently. There is the suggestion that union- 
nonunion differences were particularly large during 1972-1973, years 
in which stock market values in mean q were also very high. This result 
is consistent with a hypothesis of union rent-sharing in which unions 
tax profits at a higher rate during good years. Union rent-sharing in 
profits also is consistent with the hypothesis of risk-shifting from 
stockholders to labor (Decker and Olson 1989).
An alternative interpretation of the annual results is that the union 
variable is proxying some other important determinant of profitability, 
and that this omitted factor has had a stable effect over time. Although 
this latter possibility cannot be dismissed out of hand, it is difficult to 
identify what this omitted factor might be. And there is no reason to 
expect that the effect of this omitted determinant of profitability would 
have had a constant effect over a 13-year period. We would, of course, 
have greater confidence in our intertemporal results were union coverage 
measured throughout the period, and not just in 1977. 16
Union Rent-Seeking and the Sources of Union Gains
Extant empirical evidence has shown clearly that unionization is 
associated with significantly lower profitability among U.S. firms and
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industries. Although there is general agreement that unions reduce prof 
its, there is no consensus as to the sources from which unions appropriate 
gains. 17 On the one hand, some authors (Freeman 1983; Salinger 1984; 
Karier 1985) have contended that monopoly profits associated with in 
dustry concentration provide the principal source of union gains, whereas 
Clark (1984) has found that unions reduce profits principally among 
companies with low market shares. Hirsch and Connolly (1987) have 
challenged both sets of results. They soundly reject the notion that in 
dustry concentration provides a source for union gains, based both on 
the absence of such evidence from their firm-level data set and on labor 
market evidence indicating that union-nonunion premiums are, if 
anything, somewhat lower in more concentrated industries. They pro 
vide evidence suggesting that returns associated with R&D capital, 
market share, and, possibly, limited foreign competition, provide more 
likely sources for union rents.
The relatively rich data set employed in this study provides a good 
opportunity to reexamine these unsettled issues. The general specifica 
tion of the profit model, shown as eq. (4.1), provides for inclusion of 
variables interacting union coverage with selected explanatory variables. 
The interpretation of a coefficient on an interaction variable is that it 
measures union-nonunion differences in that variable©s effect on firm 
profitability. For example, a positive coefficient on concentration and 
a negative coefficient on a union-concentration interaction term would 
indicate that industry concentration is associated with higher profitability 
in companies with low union coverage, but that concentration contributes 
less to profitability as coverage increases. In general, negative coeffi 
cients on union interaction variables would be consistent with a union 
rent-seeking model in which unions tax some portion of the returns 
associated with profit-enhancing characteristics.
We estimate two versions of eq. (4.1), the first in which UN enters 
only as a separate variable, and a second in which UN is interacted with 
all the right-hand side variables, apart from the 2-digit industry and 
year dummies. As stated above, the coefficients on the interaction terms 
provide tests as to how the impact of each of the firm and industry deter 
minants of profitability differs with the extent of firm-level union 
coverage. Although a simple union tax model would predict that union
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firms have flatter profiles relating profitability to all profit-enhancing 
firm and industry characteristics, it is likely that unions are more suc 
cessful at capturing the returns from some profit determinants than from 
others. Hence, union interaction coefficients are allowed to vary freely 
across the right-hand side variables. 18
Table 4.4 presents regression results for the log(^) and irk equations. 
The first column under each profitability measure (columns (1) and (I©)) 
presents regression results in which a single union variable, UN, but 
not interaction terms are included (these estimates were presented 
previously in table 4.1, columns (4) and (4©)). The adjacent columns 
present regression results from equations with a full set of interaction 
terms. The F statistics presented in these columns test the null hypothesis 
that the union slope interactions equal zero; in both cases, the null is 
rejected using standard criteria.
First examined is the extent to which industry monopoly power, prox- 
ied crudely by industry concentration, increases firm profitability, and 
the extent to which these returns are captured by union labor. In a number 
of past firm-level studies, industry concentration has not been found 
to be a significant determinant of profitability; indeed, it has often been 
negatively rather than positively related to profitability (Bothwell, 
Cooley, and Hall 1984). 19 In this data set, however, industry concen 
tration is positively related to log(#) and irk . The hypothesis that 
monopoly profits associated with concentration provide a significant 
source of union gains implies that the coefficient on CR should be positive 
and that on UN«CR negative. That is, CR would significantly increase 
profitability for nonunion companies, but not for highly unionized com 
panies since unions would capture a share of the above-normal returns 
associated with monopoly power.
For both the log(^) and Trk equations there are large positive coeffi 
cients on UN»CR, implying that concentration, if anything, increases 
profitability more in highly unionized firms than in nonunion firms. 
These findings are consistent with labor market evidence indicating 
smaller union-nonunion wage differentials among workers in more con 
centrated industries. This is strong evidence against the hypothesis that 
monopoly profits associated with industry concentration provide an
Table 4.4 
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important source for union gains. Rather, it suggests that union-nonunion 
profitability differences are most substantial in highly competitive in 
dustries. 20
Although no evidence is found to support the hypothesis that labor 
unions capture concentration-related profits, evidence does support the 
hypothesis that unions capture some share of the improved current earn 
ings associated with limited foreign competition. Evidence from the irk 
regressions indicates that limited foreign competition (a high domestic 
share) is associated with higher earnings in nonunion firms, but not in 
highly unionized firms. The weakness of the relationship between log(<?) 
and the extent of foreign competition suggests that gains from limited 
foreign competition among firms in the manufacturing sector are relative 
ly short-lived; despite higher current earnings, investors do not expect 
these excess returns to continue indefinitely.
Previous empirical evidence in Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey 
(1986), based on a single 1977 sample of Fortune 500 firms, an industry- 
level measure of union density, and the use of R&D expenditures as 
a proxy for the R&D stock, suggests that the returns to R&D invest 
ment provide an important source for union gains. This conclusion was 
based on the finding of a negative coefficient on a union-R&D intensi 
ty variable in a market valuation equation; that is, R&D investment added 
less to the market value of a unionized firm than to an otherwise similar 
nonunion firm. 21 The results from estimation of the \og(q) equation here 
provide strong support for this hypothesis. The size of a firm©s R&D 
stock, divided by sales, adds significantly less to the market value of 
a firm as its union coverage increases (as seen by the negative coeffi 
cient on UN»R&D-STK/S). These results provide support to the 
hypothesis that quasi-rents emanating from a firm©s innovative capital 
stock provide an important source for labor union gains. The implica 
tions of these findings for subsequent firm investment behavior are ex 
plored in the next chapter. As seen previously, a firm©s R&D stock 
is not positively or significantly related to current earnings. Although 
the union-R&D interaction term is negative in the irk equation, no in 
ferences can be made from these results alone. The evidence supports 
only the proposition that the current R&D stock produces higher future 
earnings, and unions are expected to appropriate some portion of the 
returns from these investments.
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In addition to examining the market valuation of R&D capital in union 
and nonunion firms, the valuation of a firm©s patent stock is considered. 
Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey (1986) suggest that innovative capital 
that can be patented or licensed is less likely to have its returns ap 
propriated by union labor, since the firm can more easily avoid the union 
tax. In order to examine this hypothesis, the variable PAT/S, measur 
ing a company©s patent stock (Body and Jaffe, no date) divided by 
constant-dollar sales, is added to the profitability equations shown in 
table 4.4, separately and in interaction with UN (to conserve space, 
these results are not shown). The interaction term should not be negative 
if returns from patented innovative capital can be shielded from union 
appropriation. Consistent with the finding in Connolly, Hirsch, and 
Hirschey, however, the interaction term is neither negative nor signifi 
cant, regardless of profitability measure. The absence of a significant 
union-patent interaction lends credence to the union rent-seeking model 
outlined earlier wherein the union tax rate varies across different types 
of tangible and intangible capital.
Union rent-seeking at the expense of returns from long-lived physical 
capital leads to the prediction of a negative interaction term between 
union coverage and capital intensity, UN»log(#/L). The coefficient on 
this interaction term is negative and significant in both the log(#) and 
Trk equations. Although these results are consistent with the hypothesis 
of union appropriation of the returns from capital, coefficient bias 
resulting from measurement error in the net capital stock (which is on 
both sides of the equation), and simultaneity between profitability, capital 
investment, and unionization, make us reluctant to attach undue weight 
to these results. Subsequent evidence in chapter 5, indicating lower an 
nual capital investment by unionized firms, however, provides cor 
roborative evidence and support for the union tax model.
Strong evidence is found for a negative relationship between profitabili 
ty and interactions between unionization and both firm and industry sales 
growth. Growth-related profits may represent, in part, quasi-rents and 
disequilibrium returns associated with variable product demand. Results 
from the irk regressions indicate that unions tax a significant propor 
tion of the current earnings emanating from faster firm and industry 
sales growth. The results from the log(^) regressions indicate that rapid
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sales growth adds less to the market valuation of union companies than 
to otherwise similar nonunion companies, supporting a tax model in 
which union appropriation of earnings is sustained over time and lowers 
investors© market valuation of the firm. Such results are consistent with, 
and may help explain, recent trends indicating simultaneous nonunion 
employment growth and union membership decline within industries 
(Linneman and Wachter 1986; Linneman, Wachter, and Carter 1990). 
In addition, the results support the proposition of implicit risk-sharing 
between the union and shareholders. Union gains increase during good 
times and fall during bad times. This evidence supports the proposition 
by Becker and Olson (1989) that there is a shifting of risk from 
shareholders to labor in unionized companies. They base their conclu 
sion on evidence of lower stock market "betas" (a measure of systematic 
risk) among highly unionized companies. 22
The effect of industry union density, I-UN, on firm profitability is 
not clear-cut. Union bargaining power and the size of the union-nonunion 
wage premium tend to increase with industry density, placing unionized 
firms at an increasing disadvantage as density rises. Increased density, 
coupled with threat effects raising wages for nonunion workers, also 
permit price increases to be more easily sustained (i.e., unions act like 
a cartelizing device). Thus we would expect increased industry density 
to be associated with lower profitability for union firms, but either higher 
profitability or less detrimental density effects for nonunion firms. The 
coefficients on I-UN and UN»I-UN presented in table 4.4 provide lit 
tle evidence in support of this hypothesis, the standard errors on the 
union density variables being particularly large. In results not shown, 
however, a union dummy U-DUM (equal to one if UN>.10) is 
substituted for UN in specifications (2) and (2©). Using this specifica 
tion, stronger support is found for the hypothesis. In both the log(^) 
and irk equations, coefficients on I-UN are positive and significant, 
while coefficients on U-DUM*I-UN are negative and significant.
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Econometric Qualifications: Correlated Errors, 
Union Endogeneity, and Fixed Effects
In this section, three potential shortcomings of the previous analysis 
are examined positively correlated firm-specific error terms across 
time, the possible endogeneity of firm union coverage, and omitted firm- 
specific effects on profitability. Omitted variables affecting company 
earnings and market value may have similar effects over time. Hence, 
firm residuals in one year are likely to be positively correlated with 
firm residuals in subsequent years, biasing downward coefficient stan 
dard errors, and possibly biasing coefficient estimates. Correlation of 
firm residuals is corrected using a two-step estimation procedure (a 
related procedure is suggested by Bronars and Deere 1989). In first- 
step regressions, log(^) and Trk are regressed on all firm and industry 
variables that vary from year-to-year, year dummies, and firm dum 
mies for each firm (571 dummies corresponding to 572 firms in the 
estimating sample). Excluded are variables fixed over time in our data 
set UN, I-UN, and industry dummies. The coefficients of the dum 
mies are then used as the independent variables in second-step regres 
sions (the excluded reference firm is assigned a value of zero) in which 
the fixed variables UN, I-UN, and IND are included. Coefficients on UN 
provide estimates of the union profit effect with unbiased standard errors.
Results from the second-step regressions (n=572) can be compared 
to previous estimates presented in table 4.1, columns (4) and (4©). The 
union coefficient (1 1 \ ) in the second-step log(#) equation, which includes 
UN, I-UN, and industry dummies on the right-hand side, is -0.330 
(3.41), as compared to -0.493 (15.87) in the single-stage pooled model. 
Similarly, the union coefficient in the Kk changes from -0.033 (13.74) 
in the single-stage model presented previously, to -.025 
(3.60) in the two-stage model. There is the strong suggestion in these 
results that pooling across years not only biases downward the stan 
dard errors, but may also have resulted in too high an estimate of the 
union profit effect. But even after accounting for bias resulting from 
simple pooling, estimated union effects remain large and statistically 
significant. 23
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A potential shortcoming of virtually all empirical studies of union 
effects on economic performance has resulted from the fact that union 
coverage is not randomly distributed across firms or industries. If union 
coverage is determined simultaneously with firm profitability, or if 
significant determinants of profitability are not controlled for but are 
correlated with union coverage, estimated union effects are likely to 
be biased.
It is likely that union organizing is more extensive and successful 
among firms with larger monopoly profits and quasi-rents from which 
unions can appropriate gains. Union coverage, therefore, not only af 
fects firm profitability, but firm profitability also affects the level of 
coverage. Moreover, the direction of bias resulting from simultaneity 
appears clear. If higher profits lead to greater union coverage, then the 
negative effect of unionization on profitability is understated using or 
dinary least squares (OLS) estimation (Voos and Mishel 1986). Past 
attempts to estimate a simultaneous relationship between unionization 
and profitability have produced two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates 
of union profit effects that are even more negative than are estimates 
obtained from OLS (Voos and Mishel 1986; Hirsch and Connolly 1987).
The primary difficulty in accounting for union endogeneity is that 
one must identify and measure factors that influence union coverage, 
but not profitability. That is, there must exist at least one variable that 
is included in a reduced-form union equation, but reasonably can be 
excluded from a structural profitability equation. This task is particularly 
difficult in this study since unionization is measured at the firm-level, 
and measurable firm-level variables that influence union coverage and 
have no impact on profitability are not readily available. Nevertheless, 
we experimented with various choices of instruments and exclusions 
from the profit equations in order to obtain 2SLS estimates of union 
profit effects. In all cases, estimated union profit effects were more 
negative after accounting for union endogeneity.
Table 4.5 presents OLS, 2SLS, and Hausman specification test results 
for our preferred set of estimates. The Hausman (1978) specification 
test provides a formal test of the hypothesis that a variable is exogenous. 
Both the union coverage variable, UN, and an instrumental variable,
Table 4.5 
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UN-HAT, measuring predicted union coverage are included in the profit 
equations. 24 If the instrumental variable is significantly different from 
zero, the null hypothesis of union coverage exogeneity can be rejected. 
For both the 2SLS and exogeneity test estimation, a reduced-form union 
equation that includes 105 industry dummies is first estimated. The detail 
ed industry dummies are in turn excluded from the subsequent profit 
equation (20 2-digit dummies are included). 
Column (1) provides OLS estimates of the union coefficient, column
(2) presents the 2SLS estimates, and column (3) presents OLS results 
when both UN and UN-HAT are included. Examining first the market 
value equations, it is seen that the OLS estimate is that a firm with 
average union coverage (UN = .423) has a q about 20 percent lower 
than the average nonunion firm. Column (2) provides 2SLS results, with 
UN-HAT included rather than UN. Consistent with expectations, the 
estimated union effect on profitability is larger after accounting for 
simultaneity, the coefficient changing from -0.493 to -0.709. Column
(3) provides evidence for a Hausman (1978) specification test where 
the null is that UN is exogenous. Although the null is rejected in the 
log(<?) equation (the coefficient on UN-HAT is significant), the relative 
magnitudes of the coefficients and f-ratios on UN and UN-HAT sug 
gest that exogeneity may not be too inappropriate an assumption.
Although there is some evidence for simultaneity between firm union 
coverage and market value, no evidence is found for simultaneity be 
tween unionization and rates of return on capital. Union coefficient 
estimates from the 2SLS profitability equations are only slightly larger 
(in absolute value) than with OLS, and the null hypothesis that UN is 
exogenous cannot be rejected. 25 The difficulty in identifying appropriate 
instruments to exclude from a profitability equation, however, makes 
us reluctant to attach much weight to any specific set of estimates us 
ing techniques designed to account for simultaneity bias.
An additional source of concern is that omitted determinants of prof 
itability may be correlated with the union coverage variable, thus leading 
us to mistakenly attribute to unionism the impact of some omitted fac 
tor. The primary means by which such a pitfall is avoided is through 
the inclusion of detailed control variables in all equations. Estimates
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of union effects have been based on regressions including numerous 
firm- and industry-level control variables, including firm-specific sales 
growth and detailed industry dummies (generally 20 2-digit dummies 
are included, but as seen earlier, the estimated union effect is relative 
ly insensitive to inclusion of 105 2-, 3-, and 4-digit dummies). Inclu 
sion of such detailed control variables in fact may cause an understate 
ment of the true effect of union coverage since some of unionism©s im 
pact is likely to occur through, say, slower growth in sales and lower 
stocks of R&D, while some of the effects captured by detailed industry 
dummies may be the result of firm and industry unionization rates.
An alternative way to account for omitted firm-specific effects is the 
use of a fixed-effects or first-difference model. Rather than estimate 
the profitability equations in levels form, one can estimate changes in 
profitability as a function of changes in union coverage and other ex 
planatory variables. Any omitted variables whose effects on company 
profit levels are fixed over time will thus "fall out" of the difference 
equation. 26 Unfortunately, data requirements for estimation of fixed- 
effects models are often prohibitive. Data must be available on the same 
observations for at least two time periods, degrees of freedom are cut 
in half if there are only two periods, bias resulting from measurement 
error in variables is magnified in a change equation (Griliches and 
Hausman 1986), and the length of time between periods must be suffi 
ciently long for there to be a measurable response of the dependent 
variable to changes in the independent variables, but not so long a period 
that the model©s parameters change significantly.
Estimation of such a model here is made difficult by the absence of 
repeated observations on firm-level union coverage at different points 
in time. Union data for both 1972 and 1977 (along with all other 
necessary variables) are available for 149 companies, however, therefore 
allowing a fixed-effects model to be estimated for these firms. Regres 
sion equations with the change in profitability between 1972 and 1977 
as the dependent variable, and the change in union coverage and in all 
other explanatory variables during the same period, are estimated. 27 
Unfortunately, estimates from these equations provide little informa 
tion. Estimated coefficients on the change in union coverage variables
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are close to zero with large standard errors. The models estimated have 
extremely poor explanatory power and do not allow one to draw in 
ferences about union effects on profitability.
Taken at face value, results from the fixed-effects models suggest 
that true union effects on profitability are small and that the significant 
negative effects previously estimated (both here and in all other studies) 
result from omitted variable(s) positively correlated with unionism and 
negatively with profitability. Such a conclusion is unfounded, however, 
in the absence of suspect omitted variables that could possibly account 
for such large union-nonunion differences in profitability observed in 
a cross section. No such suspect has been identified. Moreover, the 
estimated fixed-effects model has a number of deficiencies that are likely 
to account for the absence of a relationship between changes in union 
coverage and profitability. First, sample size is relatively small. More 
fundamentally, the union coverage measures are from different surveys 
and initially measured different things (the 1972 response measured the 
proportion of a company 's production workers covered; this figure was 
converted to an estimate of company wide coverage). The 1977 measure 
was collected in 1987-1988 and thus also may contain a fair degree of 
measurement error. Measurement error in levels is compounded when 
constructing a difference variable; that is, the ratio of noise to true varia 
tion in union coverage is extremely high, biasing the union change coef 
ficient toward zero (Freeman 1984; Griliches and Hausman 1986).
An additional source for concern in the fixed-effects model is that 
there is likely to be simultaneity between changes in profitability and 
changes in company union coverage between 1972 and 1977. Com 
panies with improving profit performance may be more likely to at 
tract union organizing efforts and less likely to attempt cutbacks among 
their unionized workers. Positive effects of profitability growth on union 
growth may partially or fully offset negative effects of union growth 
on profitability growth. On the other hand, firms with improving prof 
it performance may be more likely to expand and build new facilities, 
many (or most) of which are likely to be nonunion. This bias would 
work in the opposite direction, leading to an exaggeration of any 
deleterious union effects. Neither theory nor data is so rich that these 
relationships can be separated and identified in a reliable fashion. Future
Labor Unions and Firm Profitability 65
research utilizing this study©s figures on 1977 and 1987 union coverage 
promises to provide more reliable evidence on the relationship between 
changes in profitability and changes in union coverage.
Conclusions
The results presented in this chapter provide evidence broadly sup 
portive of the union tax model, whereby unions appropriate a share of 
the returns from profit-enhancing firm and industry characteristics. Union 
coverage at the firm level exhibits a strong negative relationship with 
company earnings and market value, even after controlling in detail for 
firm and industry characteristics. Average union effects on profitabili 
ty have been relatively stable over the 1968-1980 period. Differences 
across 2-digit industries in the union profit effect are substantial, 
however, and do not lend themselves to simple explanation. The evidence 
strongly rejects the hypothesis that monopoly profits associated with 
industry concentration provide a source for union gains. By contrast, 
evidence is provided suggesting that unions capture current earnings 
associated with limited foreign competition, both current and future earn 
ings associated with disequilibrium or growing firm and industry de 
mand (sales growth), future earnings emanating from R&D capital, and 
current and future quasi-rents emanating from long-lived physical capital.
The poor profit performance of unionized companies during the 1970s 
may provide an important explanation for the marked decline in union 
membership during the 1980s. As noted by Linneman, Wachter, and 
Carter (1990) and others, employment declines have been concentrated 
in the unionized sectors of the economy; nonunion employment has ex 
panded even in highly unionized industries. Although important, shifts 
in industry demand are an insufficient explanation for the marked decline 
in private sector unionism. The evidence presented here supports the 
thesis that declines in union membership and coverage in no small part 
have been a response to the continuing poor profit performance of 
unionized companies throughout this period. 28 In subsequent chapters, 
the implications of union rent-seeking on firm investment behavior, pro 
ductivity, and productivity growth are explored.
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NOTES
1. Lazear (1983) provides a model in which firms that can prevent union organizing at a low 
cost will be nonunion, and firms that have high prevention costs will be unionized. Although 
marginal union and nonunion firms will have equivalent profit rates in equilibrium, union firms 
will on average have lower profit rates than nonunion firms.
2. Becker and Olson (1987) and Addison and Hirsch (1989) provide surveys and analyses of the 
profit and market value studies.
3. Several studies examine the effect of strikes on market value. For a review, see Becker and 
Olson (1987). Interesting as well is the detailed analysis by Abowd (1989b), who finds that unan 
ticipated changes in labor contracts are offset roughly dollar-for-dollar by opposite changes in 
market value. Abowd interprets these results as supporting the case for "strongly efficient" bargain 
ing outcomes, wherein the union and firm maximize the joint value of the enterprise (market value 
plus worker rents), and bargain over division of the surplus. Note that Abowd©s results imply 
unions are nondistortionary, given the firm©s capital stock. His results do not imply that unions 
have no effect on firms© investment decisions.
4. The ratio of current earnings to equity may differ with respect to union status due to differences 
in debt financing, risk, or life-cycle earnings among companies with equivalent present values. 
For example, if union companies shift earnings to the present and rely heavily on debt (Bronars 
and Deere 1991), they may have a higher earnings-equity ratio than nonunion companies. Or 
if shareholder risk (beta) is lower in unionized firms (Becker and Olson 1989), earnings-equity 
ratios and accounting rates of return will be lower (and market valuation of assets higher) than 
in otherwise similar nonunion firms.
5. The dependent variable log(^) rather than q is employed as the dependent variable on theoretical 
and statistical grounds. Based on estimates using the Box-Cox transformation to compare func 
tional forms, and the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the semilog form of the q equation is found 
to be strongly preferred to the linear (Hirsch and Seaks 1990). Derivation of the multiplicative 
semilog model is shown in Hirsch and Seaks.
6. Firm-specific labor costs cannot be directly measured for most companies in our sample. It 
is therefore difficult to estimate how much of the union effect on profitability is due to differences 
in labor costs.
7. Because R&D-STK/S is bounded below by zero, Tobit model estimation of its predicted value 
would be preferable to use of ordinary least squares. It is unlikely that estimates of union profit 
effects are sensitive to the estimation method used for the R&D intensity proxy.
8. Measurement error can lead to a spurious negative correlation since capital is included in the 
denominator on the left-hand side and in the numerator on the right-hand side. In order to lessen 
the potential for such bias, the lagged value of the log of the capital-labor ratio was used as an 
instrument; however, results are highly similar to those presented in table 4.1.
9. The coefficient on GROWTH is significant in log(^) equations in which firm-year observa 
tions with extreme values of GROWTH are omitted from the sample.
10. As discussed below, more detailed industry dummies (105 versus 20 dummies) at the 2-, 3-, 
and 4-digit levels are also included. Estimated union coefficients are affected little. Subsequent 
tables in the monograph providing separate estimates by industry category show 19 rather than 
21 industry groupings, owing to a merging of the miscellaneous consumer goods, miscellaneous 
manufacturers not elsewhere classified, and conglomerates categories.
Labor Unions and Firm Profitability 67
11. In results not shown, the corresponding figure for the rate of return on sales is 12 percent. 
Mean ir^ is . 103 for nonunion companies. Letting i/- represent the estimated coefficient on union 
coverage, the average percentage effect of union coverage on profitability is calculated by 
(.423^7.103) 100 for irk , and by [exp(.423^)-l]100 for q.
12. The evidence suggests that union firms in the relatively high-tech computing and communica 
tion equipment industry categories do not have significantly lower current earnings than other 
wise similar nonunion firms, but market valuations of the unionized firms© assets, as measured 
by Tobin©s q, are significantly lower. In contrast, union companies in the relatively mature tex 
tile and apparel and petroleum industries display significantly lower current earnings, but little 
difference in market valuation of assets.
13. Interestingly, Clark (1984, p. 912) reports an interindustry pattern of union productivity ef 
fects not dissimilar from the profitability pattern reported above. Broad industry categories reported 
here to have weak or uncertain profit effects tended to have positive estimated productivity ef 
fects in Clark©s analysis, whereas industries found here to have sharply lower profits were reported 
by Clark to have negative productivity effects. We examine empirically the links between the 
profitability and productivity evidence more directly in a subsequent chapter.
14. A firm with higher than predicted profitability in one year (i.e., a positive error term) is like 
ly to have higher than predicted profitability the following year. Standard errors in the pooled 
model, therefore, will be biased downward. A two-step estimation procedure is employed below 
that utilizes data for all years, but avoids the problem of correlated firm error terms across years.
15. Some variability in estimated coefficients results because the sample of firms changes slightly 
across years.
16. An omitted variable we can identify is company age, which is positively related to union coverage 
and negatively related to profitability. Subsequent research incorporating company age into the 
analysis reveals that it is a significant determinant of profitability, but that its inclusion causes 
the UN coefficient estimate to decline (in absolute value) by a rather small amount. For an analysis 
including an age variable, see Hirsch (1991).
17. For an interpretation of this literature, see Addison and Hirsch (1989).
18. Collinearity among the union interaction terms, however, causes some degradation in statistical 
results and makes precise estimation of the union interaction coefficients difficult. An alternative 
specification would be to estimate a nonlinear model in which a single union tax parameter is 
estimated (Salinger 1984; Hirsch and Connolly 1987). Such a model, however, provides little 
insight as to the sources from which union gains are captured.
19. Ravenscraft (1983) has argued that industry concentration has acted as a proxy for firm market 
shares, and that it is the latter rather than the former that is positively associated with profitabili 
ty. In industry-level studies, concentration is almost always positively related to industry price- 
cost margins.
20. Hirsch (1990b) provides evidence on unions, profitability, and market structure using a smaller 
sample of companies for which measures on firm market share and industry concentration, weighted 
to reflect firm sales across industry categories, are available. He finds no evidence to support 
the proposition that either industry concentration or firm market share provides a source for union 
rents. Union effects on profitability appear to be most detrimental among companies with low 
market shares in highly competitive industries.
21. Similar evidence recently has been presented in Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1989) and Becker 
and Olson (1990).
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22. In work not reported here, we confirm with these data the Becker-Olson result of a negative 
correlation between beta and union coverage in 1977.
23. Use of weighted least squares (WLS) estimation, where observations are weighted by the 
inverse of the standard error of the firm dummy coefficients, produces similar results.
24. Because UN is bounded below by zero (and above by one), a Tobit rather than OLS reduced- 
form estimate would be more appropriate. It is unlikely that this approach would alter our qualitative 
results.
25. Hirsch and Connolly (1987), using a 1977 firm sample and a union variable measuring the 
extent of industry coverage, find an identical pattern.
26. Inclusion of a constant in a difference equation accounts for changes in the intercept of the 
levels equations over the two periods. Note that a difference model is similar to a model in which 
variables are expressed as deviations from means.
27. Industry dummies fall out since they do not change over the period. They can be included 
on empirical grounds to account for industry-level difference in profitability change, holding constant 
changes in other independent variables. The changes in union coverage coefficients are not significant 
with or without industry dummies.
28. The conclusion here that large union-nonunion profitability differences help explain declin 
ing unionization is complementary to the conclusion reached by Freeman (1988), Linneman, 
Wachter, and Carter (1990), and others that high union wage premiums have accelerated unionism©s 
decline. It is worth noting that direct evidence linking changes in unionization to changes in prof 





In the previous chapter, union rent-seeking has been shown to reduce 
current earnings and the stock market valuation of company assets. In 
response to the union appropriation of some portion of quasi-rents, 
unionized companies are expected to reduce investment in tangible and 
intangible capital relative to their nonunion counterparts. Differences 
in investment behavior between union and nonunion companies are 
predicted even where there are strongly efficient contracts maximizing 
the joint present value of union plus shareholder wealth. As developed 
in chapter 2, union myopia, owing to the political structure of the union 
and the nontransferability of union membership, may cause the union 
to press for current contract gains at the expense of investment and future 
employment growth. Evidence of differences in investment behavior 
would indicate that union representation and contract coverage provi 
sions are distortionary, with real effects on resource allocation.
In this chapter, primary attention is focused on estimation of the ef 
fects of union coverage on investment in physical capital and in research 
and development (R&D). l In each section, previous literature is review 
ed, prior to turning to new estimates drawn from the empirical analysis 
of the data set assembled for this study. The robustness of the 
econometric results are probed in some detail. Additional evidence is 
used to examine the relationship of union coverage with firms© capital- 
labor ratios, patent propensity, advertising intensity, and debt-equity 
ratios.
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Union Effects on Capital Investment
The union rent-seeking model developed in chapter 2 explains how 
a union tax on the returns emanating from relation-specific capital stocks 
can deter company investment in tangible and intangible capital. The 
union tax effect (plus scale effects associated with higher wage costs) 
may offset the substitution effect owing to higher relative labor costs. 
The net effect of union coverage on firm investment behavior is therefore 
an empirical question. Surprisingly, there is only scant empirical 
evidence exploring union investment effects. Bronars and Deere (1989) 
match industry union coverage data to firm observations and find that 
firms in highly unionized industries have lower capital investment, 
capital-to-labor ratios, R&D investment, and advertising expenditures. 
Hirsch (1990a) utilizes 1972 union coverage data for 315 companies 
and provides evidence showing that union companies have lower physical 
capital investment than do similar nonunion firms. And Clark©s (1984) 
evidence from lines of business suggests that union coverage has little 
effect on capital-labor ratios.
Union rent-seeking is likely to affect firm investment behavior both 
directly and indirectly. The union tax on the returns or quasi-rents to 
nontransferable capital will directly decrease investment as firms decrease 
investment in order to equate their marginal post-union tax rate of return 
with their marginal financing cost (see chapter 2). In addition, union 
rent-seeking will have an indirect effect on investment. Lower current 
earnings due to the union tax will typically produce higher marginal 
financing costs, thus leading to a further decrease in investment. In this 
chapter, differences between union and nonunion firms in their in 
vestments in physical capital and R&D are examined, with more limited 
attention given to union effects on other aspects of firm behavior. Because 
we are interested in how unionism affects current investment, we focus 
on investment flows or, in other words, additions to the stock of capital 
and innovative activity (capital stocks are controlled for on the right- 
hand side of the equation).
Profit-maximizing levels of investment are determined by, among 
other things, firm output and relative factor prices. We estimate dou 
ble log models in which input variables measuring employment and the
Labor Unions and Firm Investment Behavior 71
capital stock are included on the right-hand side. Output is some linear 
combination of these included input variables. Alternatively, output (or 
scale) can be accounted for by estimating investment intensity equa 
tions in which both sides of the equation are divided by sales (estimates 
of intensity equations are provided in table 5.5).
We are unable to construct a variable measuring directly capital costs 
facing the individual firm. Firms within the same industry should face 
largely similar capital costs. To the extent that capital costs differ among 
firms with equivalent measured characteristics, we have no reason to 
expect these differences to be correlated with union coverage. Therefore, 
an explicit measure of capital costs is not essential, given adequate control 
for industry and selected firm characteristics. Year dummies will ac 
count for economy wide cost differences over time. Because retained 
earnings may provide a lower cost source of funds, we include current 
firm profitability as a regressor.
A direct measure of labor costs facing the firm is available only for 
a small number of our firms, but we are able to include a measure of 
industry labor costs. Although necessitated by data availability, the in 
clusion of an industry rather than firm wage rate may be appropriate. 
To the extent that unions affect investment through changes in wage 
costs, inclusion of a firm-specific wage would be misleading since it 
would capture much of what is in fact a union effect. Moreover, bargain 
ing models predict that the output and factor mix of union companies 
is a function of the opportunity cost (industry) wage rather than the 
"own" wage (chapter 2).
Capital investment equations take the general form:
(5.1) log(INV),, = Eft^ + rUN + eit.
INy, represents investment in physical capital by firm i in year t, Xkit 
includes k independent variables (including a constant) affecting invest 
ment, and eit is an error term with assumed zero mean and constant 
variance. Included in X are firm-level variables measuring current earn 
ings, firm size, capital and R&D stocks, and firm sales growth; industry 
variables measuring concentration, sales growth, import penetration, 
the wage level, and industry union density; and industry and year 
dummies.
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Regression results for capital investment equations, with the log of 
annual real investment expenditures, log(INV), as the dependent 
variable, are presented in table 5.1. Results are presented for specifica 
tions with and without industry dummies and the profitability measure, 
irk . The direct union effect on investment is measured by T, the coef 
ficient on UN in eq. (5.1). As shown below, the indirect union effect, 
operating through a reduced profit rate, is estimated by combining the 
UN coefficient previously estimated in a profits equation (chapter 4) 
and the coefficient on the profit measure estimated in eq. (5.1).
The empirical evidence presented in table 5.1 indicates that firm- 
level union coverage, measured by UN, is negatively and significantly 
related to capital investment. In addition to the full regression results 
presented for the three specifications including UN, the note to the table 
presents the coefficients attaching to categorical union variables in a 
specification where three dummies are substituted for a continuous 
coverage variable (UN-LOW = 1 if [0<UN<.30], UN-MED = 1 if 
[.30<UN<.60], UN-HIGH = 1 if [UN >.60], and nonunion is the omit 
ted reference group). Focusing on column (3), the estimated coefficient 
(1 1 1) on UN is -0.142 (4.41), implying that an average unionized firm, 
which in our sample has UN=.423, has annual capital investment about 
6 percent lower than a similar nonunion firm.
Coefficients on the categorical variables in the note to table 5.1 sug 
gest a more negative union effect on investment, ranging from 7 to 14 
percent. Surprisingly, investment is not found to decrease continuous 
ly with respect to union coverage. Rather, deleterious union effects are 
found to be largest among companies with medium coverage, and 
somewhat smaller among companies with low and high coverage.
The union coefficients provide estimates of the direct effect of 
unionization on capital investment, resulting from the union tax on quasi- 
rents that make up the normal return to investment. In addition, unions 
have an indirect effect on investment by decreasing the earnings which 
provide what may be a lower cost source for funding investment than 
reliance on the capital market. 2 The direct plus indirect effect of unions 
on annual capital investment can be estimated by:
(5.2) cfloglNV/JUN = aiogINV/aUN| 7r +(aiogINV/air)UN(a7r/aUN) 
= -.142 + (5.212)(-.033) = -.314
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Table 5.1 

































































































NOTES: Dependent variable is log(INV). 1 1 \ in parentheses. Below are coefficients (| /1) obtain 
ed substituting union dummies for UN in equation (3), with nonunion the omitted reference group 
and where UN-LOW = 1 if (0<UN<.30);UN-MED = 1 if (.30<UN<.60); and UN-HIGH = 1 
if (UN>.60).
(3): - 0.073 UN-LOW - 0.145 UN-MED - 0.091 UN-HIGH 
3.15) (5.92) (3.49)
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where dloglNV/dUN^ and dlogINV/d7TUN are obtained from the coef 
ficients on UN and Trk in table 5.1, column (3), and the estimate of 
dTT/dUN is obtained from the UN coefficient in table 4.1, column (4©). 
The estimates imply that a typical unionized firm (UN = .423) will have 
capital investments about 13 percent lower than an otherwise similar 
nonunion firm. Approximately 45 percent of this total is a direct union 
effect, while 55 percent is an indirect effect owing to unionism©s im 
pact on the firm©s current profitability. 3 Note that the total differential 
of -0.314 corresponds closely to the estimated union coefficient of 
-0.299 (8.75) in the investment equation specification with irk exclud 
ed (column (2) of table 5.1). Thus, comparison of investment equa 
tions estimated with and without irk included (columns (2) and (3)) pro 
vides a relatively simple way to differentiate between unionism©s direct 
and indirect effects.
Results other than those concerning union coverage can be briefly 
examined. The lagged capital stock variable, log(£)(-l), acts as a scale 
variable, with a coefficient close to unity (the log of INV/K could alter 
natively have been employed as the dependent variable). The positive 
coefficient on log(L) indicates that larger companies have higher in 
vestment rates, ceterisparibus, while no relationship is found between 
capital investment and the R&D stock. Both firm and industry sales 
growth, intended to proxy demand shifts, are positively and significantly 
related to current capital investment. The variable I-log(EARN), measur 
ing average industry labor compensation in a firm©s principal 2-, 3-, 
or 4-digit industry, is a crude proxy for differences in per unit labor 
opportunity cost facing the firm, independent of company-specific union 
coverage. As expected, capital investment is positively related to labor 
costs. Industry concentration is negatively related to firm investment, 
while limited import penetration (a high I-DOMSH) is associated with 
greater company investment. Industry union density (I-UN) is positively, 
but weakly, related to company investment levels in specifications in 
cluding industry dummies.
The robustness of the union-investment results is probed in several 
ways. These include the addition of 105 2-, 3-, and 4-digit industry 
dummy variables to the pooled investment equation, by estimation of
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investment equations disaggregated by 2-digit industry, and through use 
of a two-step estimating procedure that purges within-firm serial cor 
relation and its accompanying standard error bias. 4
Because investment varies significantly across industries, indepen 
dent of union coverage, highly detailed industry dummies are included 
to examine the robustness of union coefficient estimates. Inclusion of 
105 2-, 3-, and 4-digit industry dummies has little effect, however, 
changing the coefficient (|f|) on UN from -0.142 (4.41) in column 
(3) of table 5.1, to -0.148 (4.38) (the latter result is not shown in the 
table). The insensitivity of the union coverage coefficient to the addi 
tion of detailed industry increases one©s confidence in the robustness 
of the previously presented results. Because of the relative insensitivi 
ty of estimates to inclusion of the detailed dummies, subsequent regres 
sions only include dummies corresponding to the broader 2-digit in 
dustry categories.
Table 5.2 presents union effects estimates from investment equations 
disaggregated for 19 2-digit industry groupings (the category 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing and Conglomerates combines three 
categories miscellaneous consumer goods, miscellaneous manufac 
turers, and conglomerates for which separate 2-digit dummies are in 
cluded in regression estimates). Because industry sample sizes are small 
and the distribution of union coverage differs enormously across in 
dustry categories, estimates are provided with alternative union coverage 
measures, the continuous coverage variable UN and a union dummy 
variable, UN-DUM, equal to 1 if UN>.10. Separate coefficient 
estimates are provided for UN and UN-DUM, and for specifications 
with and without the inclusion of irk . Our expectation is that union in 
vestment effects vary considerably across industries, just as do union 
effects on wages, profitability, and productivity. The results in table 
5.2 confirm that expectation. Union coverage has negative effects on 
investment in most industries, but there are substantial differences across 
industry groupings. Estimates are sensitive to the measure of union 
coverage (UN versus UN-DUM) and there is variability in the relative 
importance of direct and indirect union effects. Although some union 
coefficients are positive and several are close to zero, in no industry
Table 5.2 
Union Effects on Investment by Industry, 1968-1980
Industry
All manufacturing
Food & kindred products
Textiles & apparel
Chemicals, excluding drugs
Drugs & medical instruments
Petroleum refining
Rubber & miscellaneous plastics
Stone, clay & glass
Primary metals
Fabricated metal products
Engines, farm & construction equip.
Office, computers & acct. equip.
Other machinery, not electric
Electrical equip. & supplies
Communication equipment
Motor vehicle & trans. equip.
Aircraft & aerospace
Professional & scientific equip.
Lumber, wood & paper






















log(INV) equations w/irfc 

















































































log(INV) equations w/o irk



















































































NOTES: Industry regressions include logCR&D-STK)651, log(K)(-l), GROWTH, I-log(EARN), I-Growth, I-CR4,1-DOMSH, and year dummies. Variable 
wk included where noted. All manufacturing regressions include these controls, I-UN, and industry dummies. UN-DUM = 1 if UN>.10.
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is evidence found for a positive and significant relationship between 
union coverage and capital investment.
Among those industries where union effects on capital investment ap 
pear particularly detrimental are drugs and medical instruments; 
petroleum refining; rubber and plastics; stone, clay, and glass; com 
munication equipment; motor vehicle and transportation equipment; and 
professional and scientific equipment. Those industry groups previously 
found (chapter 4, table 4.2) to have the largest gap between union and 
nonunion rates of return on capital are here found most likely to have 
large negative union coverage coefficients in investment regressions ex 
cluding irk . There is little extant evidence with which these results can 
be compared. 5 Nor do we possess sufficient industry-specific knowledge 
that might enable us to identify and interpret patterns in the industry 
findings. Future research providing additional evidence on differences 
in within-industry union effects on investment behavior, coupled with 
a systematic explanation for these differences, is essential.
An attempt is next made to account for positively correlated firm- 
specific error terms across time through the use of a two-step estima 
tion procedure (see chapter 4 for discussion). In a first-step regression, 
log(INV) is regressed on all firm and industry variables that vary from 
year-to-year, year dummies, and dummies for each firm (571 dummies 
corresponding to 572 firms in the estimating sample). Excluded are 
variables fixed over time in our data set UN, I-UN, and industry dum 
mies. The coefficients of the dummies are then used as the indepen 
dent variables in second-step regressions (the excluded reference firm 
is assigned a value of zero), in which the fixed variables UN, I-UN, 
and IND are included (n=572). Second-step regression results provide 
estimates of the union investment effect with unbiased standard errors.
Results from the second-step regression, as presented below in the 
text, with the firm coefficients from the first step as the dependent 
variable, can be compared to previous estimates presented in table 5.1, 
column (3). The union coefficient (\t\) in the second-step equation, 
which includes UN, I-UN, and IND on the right-hand side, is -0.119 
(1.23), as compared to -0.142 (4.41) in the single-step pooled model. 
The coefficient (|r|) on industry density, I-UN, is -0.273 (1.06).
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Regressing firm effects on union categorical dummies (with I-UN and 
IND included) produces the following results:
-0.046 UN-LOW - 0.084 UN-MED - 0.125 UN-HIGH. 
(0.68) (1.18) (1.64)
These results, suggesting direct negative effects of unions on capital 
investment in the neighborhood of 4 to 12 percent for companies with 
various levels of coverage, are similar in magnitude to the single-stage 
pooled estimates presented previously in table 5.1 (weighted least squares 
(WLS) estimation, with the inverse of standard errors of the firm coef 
ficients as weights, produced highly similar results). Although the large 
standard errors associated with the second-step estimates make us 
cautious in placing too much confidence in the precision with which 
we are able to estimate such union effects, the results do reinforce the 
general conclusions reached previously.
Union Effects on Research and Development
The union rent-seeking model predicts that unionized firms should 
invest less in highly taxed investment paths than do similar nonunion 
firms. Only recently has there been much attention given to possible 
effects of unions on investment in forms of intangible capital such as 
R&D. Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey (1986) find lower R&D invest 
ment intensities (i.e., R&D/sales) among firms in highly unionized in 
dustries. More recently, Hirsch (1990a, forthcoming) has provided 
evidence showing that union companies have lower R&D investment 
than do similar nonunion firms, a result confirmed by Bronars, Deere, 
and Tracy (1989), who also use firm union coverage data. Acs and 
Audretsch (1988) find fewer innovations in highly unionized industries, 
while Hirsch and Link (1987) find product innovative activity to be less 
important among a sample of union businesses than among similar non 
union businesses.
Based on theory and past evidence, union rent-seeking is expected 
to have significant effects on company investments in R&D and other
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forms of innovative capital. R&D investment equations here take the 
general form:
(5.3) log(R&D),v = EftfcX^ + TUN + eir
R&D/r represents annual investment in R&D by firm i in year t, Xkit 
includes k independent variables (including a constant) affecting R&D, 
and eit is an error term with assumed zero mean and constant variance. 
Included in X are firm-level variables measuring current earnings, firm 
size, capital and R&D stocks, and firm sales growth; industry variables 
measuring concentration, sales growth, import penetration, wage level, 
and industry union density; and industry and year dummies. 6 The direct 
union effect on R&D is measured by 7, the coefficient on UN in eq. 
(5.3), while the indirect union effect, operating through a reduced prof 
it rate, is estimated by combining the UN coefficient previously estimated 
in a profits equation (chapter 4) and the coefficient on the profit measure 
estimated in eq. (5.3).
Table 5.3 presents pooled regression results for R&D investment equa 
tions, based on the sample of firms for which R&D expenditure data 
are reported directly. The dependent variable is the logarithm of real 
annual expenditures on R&D. 7 Specifications are presented with and 
without inclusion of industry dummies and irk .
The coefficients associated with firm union coverage (UN) measure 
the direct union effect and indicate that unionization significantly 
decreases R&D investment. The UN coefficient in column (3) implies 
that a typical unionized company with 42.3 percent union coverage will 
have R&D investment about 15 percent lower than a similar nonunion 
company, holding constant Trk and other R&D determinants. There is 
evidence, however, that the negative union effect on R&D investment 
varies little with the extent of union coverage. Using categorical coverage 
dummies (seen in the note to table 5.3), even low levels of coverage 
are associated with significantly lower R&D investment, but the marginal 
impact of higher levels of coverage is modest. Based on the categorical 
coverage variable coefficients, unionized companies are found to have 
R&D investment 23 to 30 percent lower than nonunion companies 
(calculated by [exp(a/)-l]100, where a, are the union dummy 
coefficients).
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Table 5.3 

































































































NOTE: Dependent variable is log(R&D). | /1 in parentheses. Below are coefficients (1 1 \) obtain 
ed substituting union dummies for UN in equation (3), with nonunion the omitted reference group 
and where UN-LOW=1 if (0<.30); UN-MED=1 if (.30<UN<.60); and UN-HIGH = 1 if 
(UN>.60).
(3): - 0.261 UN-LOW - 0.313 UN-MED - 0.351 UN-HIGH. 
(8.60) (9.66) (9.82)
Labor Unions and Firm Investment Behavior 81
The coefficient on UN in column (3) (or on the categorical coverage 
variables) may understate the true direct effect of unionism, since past 
unionization has lowered the size of the R&D stock, which in turn lowers 
current investment. In addition, unions decrease investment indirectly 
via their effects on the firm profitability, measured here by irk . The 
total effect of unionism on R&D investment can be measured by:
(5.4) JlogR&D/JUN=dlogR&D/dUN (T +(dlogR&D/dTr), UN(d7r/aUN) 
=-.378+2.031(-.033)=-.445
where dlogR&D/dUN | T and dlogR&D/d7T| UN are obtained from the 
coefficients on UN and Trk in table 5.3, column (3), and the estimate 
of d-Tr/dUN is obtained from the UN coefficient in table 4.1, column 
(4©). These results indicate that most (about 85 percent) of unionism©s 
effect on R&D investment is direct; indirect effects via changes in firms© 
earnings are relatively small. Note that the union coefficient from a 
regression without irk included (column (2) of table 5.4) provides a 
good approximation of the direct plus indirect union effect.
Coefficient estimates on variables other than union coverage are also 
of interest. The lagged R&D stock variable, log(R&D-STK)(-l), in con 
junction with the capital stock and log of employment variables, acts 
to control for scale and firm size. All three have positive and signifi 
cant coefficients, although that on log(R&D-STK)(-l) is well below 
unity. 8 Industry, but not firm, sales growth is positively related to cur 
rent R&D investment. As expected, R&D investment is positively related 
to labor costs, proxied by I-log(EARN). R&D investment appears to 
be stimulated by competition. R&D investment is negatively related to 
industry concentration, while vigorous foreign competition (a low 
I-DOMSH) is associated with larger investments in R&D. Industry union 
density (I-UN) is negatively related to company R&D investment.
The robustness of the union-R&D results is investigated in a manner 
analogous to that employed previously for capital investment. Results 
are examined following the addition of 105 2-, 3-, and 4-digit industry 
dummy variables to the pooled investment equation, by estimation of 
R&D investment equations disaggregated by 2-digit industry, and 
through use of a two-step estimating procedure that purges within-firm 
serial correlation and standard error bias. As in the case of capital
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investment, inclusion of detailed industry dummies has little effect on 
estimated union effects on R&D, changing the coefficient (1 1 \ ) on UN 
from -0.378 (8.36) in table 5.3, column (3), to -0.365 (7.90) (not shown 
in the table). The relative insensitivity of estimated union effects to in 
clusion of detailed industry dummies is noteworthy, since R&D oppor 
tunities and investment intensities vary so significantly across industry. 9
Table 5.4 presents union coefficient estimates from R&D investment 
equations disaggregated for 19 2-digit industry groupings. Separate coef 
ficient estimates are provided for UN and UN-DUM, since the range 
of firm-level union coverage within some of the industry categories is 
limited (there are no firms in the stone, clay, and glass category with 
both positive R&D and union coverage less than 10 percent). Union 
effects on R&D vary considerably across industries, just as do union 
effects on capital investment (and wages, profitability, and productivi 
ty). Although union coverage has negative effects on R&D in most in 
dustries, several positive union coefficients are obtained, including 
significant estimates in the food, petroleum refining, and rubber and 
miscellaneous plastics industry categories. Large negative (and signifi 
cant) estimates of union effects on R&D are found in the chemicals, 
drugs, office and computing equipment, nonelectric machinery, com 
munication equipment, and lumber, wood, and paper industries. 
Research providing further evidence on, and explanation for, interin 
dustry differences in union effects on R&D investment is needed.
A two-step procedure is used next to estimate the union-R&D rela 
tionship after accounting for positively correlated firm-specific error 
terms across time. A first-step estimating equation regresses log(R&D) 
on dummies for each firm (451 dummies corresponding to 452 firms 
in the estimating sample), year dummies, and all firm and industry 
variables that vary from year-to-year. Variables fixed over time in our 
data set UN, I-UN, and industry dummies are excluded. The coef 
ficients of the dummies are subsequently employed as independent 
variables in second-step regressions (the excluded reference firm is 
assigned a value of zero), in which the fixed variables UN, I-UN, and 
IND are included. Coefficients on UN provide estimates of the union 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































84 Labor Unions and Firm Investment Behavior
Results from the final or second-step R&D regression, with the firm 
coefficients from the first step as the dependent variable, indicate a 
nonlinear relationship between log(R&D) and union coverage (these 
results are presented below in the text). The union coefficient (1 1 \ ) in 
the second-step equation, which includes UN, I-UN, and IND on the 
right-hand side, is effectively zero, 0.027 (0.11). By contrast, the coef 
ficient on a single union dummy variable UN-DUM (equal to 1 if 
UN >.10) is estimated as -0.168 (1.16). Regressing firm effects on 
three union categorical dummies (with I-UN and IND included) pro 
duces the following results:
-0.160 UN-LOW - 0.192 UN-MED - 0.057 UN-HIGH. 
(0.92) (1.06) (0.29)
The second-step estimates, suggesting direct negative effects of unions 
on R&D investment in the neighborhood of 5 to 17 percent for com 
panies with various levels of coverage, are somewhat lower than single- 
stage pooled estimates presented previously (WLS results are similar 
to the two-step OLS). Moreover, the large standard errors associated 
with the second-step estimates produce concern about the precision with 
which the union-R&D relationship can be measured. The coefficient 
on industry union density, I-UN, is approximately -1.0 (with t s of 
about 1.3) in all second-step regressions. Although the overall evidence 
for the hypothesis that union rent-seeking deters investment in innova 
tion capital remains strong, the fragility of the two-step results is troubl 
ing. 10
Further Results: Union Effects on Investment Intensity, 
Factor Mix, Patent Propensity, Advertising, and Debt
The results presented in this chapter support the proposition that 
unionized companies invest significantly less in physical capital and R&D 
than do similar nonunion companies. The union effect appears to result 
primarily from a union tax on returns from such investments and, to 
a lesser degree, from lower earnings in unionized firms. In this sec 
tion, the partial correlations between union coverage and alternative
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measures of capital investment, R&D, and other behavioral variables 
are examined briefly. In table 5.5, we present partial regression results 
providing estimates of union effects on R&D intensity (R&D/S), 
measured by R&D expenditures divided by sales; capital investment 
intensity (INV/S), measured by investment divided by sales; capital in 
tensity (K/L), measured by the ratio of the net capital stock to employ 
ment; patent propensity (PAT/R&D-STK), measured by the annual 
number of patents granted per (million) dollar of R&D stock; advertis 
ing intensity (ADV/S), measured by the ratio of advertising expenditures 
to sales; and the debt-equity ratio (DEBT/EQUITY), measured by the 
ratio of the age-adjusted book value of debt (Cummins et al. 1985) divid 
ed by the market value of the firm (for related evidence on several of 
these relationships, see Bronars and Deere 1989, 1991).
Table 5.5 presents coefficients on firm union coverage variables 
measured, alternatively, by the single coverage variable, UN, and by 
the categorical dummy variables UN-LOW, UN-MED, and UN-HIGH. 
Some of the behavioral variables treated here as dependent variables 
may be determined simultaneously with right-hand side explanatory 
variables. We are reluctant, therefore, to interpret the union coefficient 
as estimates of unionism©s causal effects but, rather, interpret these as 
partial correlations.
Consistent with the R&D and investment level equation results 
presented above, R&D intensity (R&D/S) and capital investment in 
tensity (INV/S) are found to be significantly lower in union than in non 
union firms. The magnitude of the estimated union-nonunion differen 
tial in R&D intensity is particularly large, suggesting union firms have 
ratios of R&D to sales .015 to .022 lower than nonunion firms, relative 
to a mean R&D/S of .024 for this sample of R&D-active firms. Point 
estimates of union-nonunion differences in capital investment intensi 
ty, ranging from -.004 to -.009, are relatively small compared to mean 
INV/S of .062 for this sample of companies. Further examination of 
the relationship between unionization and physical capital produces in 
teresting results. Although unionized firms invest less in physical capital 
than do similar nonunion firms, they are more likely than nonunion firms 
to be capital intensive, as demonstrated by the positive relationship of
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Table 5.5 


































































































NOTES: All regressions include irk , log(L), GROWTH, I-CR4, I-GROWTH, I-log(EARN), I- 
DOMSH, year dummies, and industry dummies. Other firm-level variables included differ slightly 
across equations. Dependent variables are defined as: R&D/S=annual R&D expenditures divid 
ed by sales (defined for R&D-active firms only); INV/S=annual investment expenditures divid 
ed by sales; K/L=net inflation-adjusted capital stock divided by employees (thousands 1972$); 
PAT/R&D-STK=patents granted per year, divided by the R&D stock (in millions of 1972$); 
ADV/S=annual advertising expenditures divided by sales (defined for advertising-active firms 
only); and DEBT/EQUITY=value of long-term debt adjusted for age structure, divided by equi 
ty value.
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union coverage with K/L. Coefficients on the categorical union dum 
mies indicate this relationship is nonlinear; it is only highly unionized 
firms that are more capital intensive than nonunion firms. 11
We find evidence from the categorical union coefficients supporting 
the proposition that unionized firms have a higher propensity to license 
or patent than do nonunion firms, given levels of the innovative capital 
stock (PAT/R&D-STK). This evidence was examined to test the con 
jecture by Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey (1986) that returns from 
licensable or transferable innovative activities are less vulnerable to the 
threat of strike and union appropriation. The relationship between pa 
tent propensity and union coverage is highly nonlinear, however, mak 
ing us cautious in reading much into these results. 12
Evidence of lower advertising intensity (ADV/S) in high union firms 
is also found, despite the contention by Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey 
that advertising capital is relatively short-lived and not highly vulnerable 
to union appropriation (ADV/S results display some sensitivity to 
specification). Point estimates indicate that companies with medium and 
high union coverage have advertising intensity ratios about .5 percent 
age points lower than nonunion companies, relative to a mean of 2 per 
cent for the estimation sample. Finally, we find mixed evidence for a 
significant relationship between DEBT/EQUITY and union coverage 
(the debt equation is not well specified and has an R2 of .024). The 
debt-to- equity ratio does not increase with the extent of union coverage, 
but is significantly larger among union firms than among nonunion firms 
(as seen by coefficients on the union categorical dummies). The coeffi 
cient estimates are also large, relative to the mean DEBT/EQUITY of 
.43 for this sample of firms. These results provide only limited support 
for the theoretical and empirical evidence in Bronars and Deere (1991), 
where it is argued that union firms maximize shareholder wealth by 
engaging in relatively higher levels of debt financing than do nonunion 
firms.
Conclusions
Union appropriation of quasi-rents, which include the normal returns 
to investment in long-lived fixed capital, significantly affects the
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investment behavior of unionized companies relative to their nonunion 
counterparts. Although strongly efficient bargaining outcomes may ob 
tain, implying that unions have no real allocative effects given existing 
stocks of tangible and intangible capital (Abowd 1989b), long-run 
resource allocation is affected. Efficient bargaining outcomes maximizing 
the sum of union and shareholder wealth imply lower rates of long- 
lived capital investment among unionized companies, owing to the 
relatively high discount rate placed on future returns by current union 
members who cannot recoup the value of future union membership. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that long-run efficient bargaining outcomes are 
realized in most industrial settings. To the extent that bargaining par 
ties engage in short-run opportunistic behavior rather than long-run joint 
ly maximizing behavior, current investment in tangible and intangible 
capital is likely to be further reduced.
The results presented in this chapter provide evidence of union- 
nonunion differences in physical capital and R&D investment. It ap 
pears that union rent-seeking has significant effects on firm investment 
behavior. Unionized companies invest roughly 20 percent less in physical 
capital than do similar nonunion companies. Approximately half of this 
impact appears to be a direct union effect (holding constant current earn 
ings), owing to the union tax on the future earnings stream emanating 
from the capital stock, while about half is an indirect effect resulting 
from the significantly lower current earnings among unionized com 
panies. Union investment effects vary considerably, however, across 
broad industry categories.
Union companies also invest significantly less in R&D than do their 
nonunion counterparts. Point estimates of the union effect are sensitive 
to the measurement of union coverage, but the average effect on unioniz 
ed companies appears to be at least 20 percent. Most of the union ef 
fect on R&D investment is a direct effect; indirect effects resulting from 
lower earnings among union companies are modest. As is the case for 
physical capital, union effects on R&D investment vary considerably 
across industry categories. Besides investing less in R&D and physical 
capital than do nonunion companies, further analysis shows that union 
companies have a higher propensity to patent given the level of innovation
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(R&D) capital, lower advertising intensity, and higher debt-equity ratios. 
Each of these relationships provides further support for the union rent- 
seeking model and the implication that unionization has real effects on 
investment behavior. 13
NOTES
1. Hirsch (forthcoming) extends parts of the analysis contained in this chapter.
2. A profitability variable can also be included in an investment equation on the grounds that 
it proxies product demand shifts. Note that the specifications estimated here already include four- 
year industry sales growth and two-year firm sales growth variables intended to capture demand 
shifts.
3. The estimate ofdir/dUN using a two-step process described in chapter 4 was -0.025, as com 
pared to -0.033 cited above. Using this lower estimate of the union profit effect, the total dif 
ferential (eq. (5.2)) equals 0.272, with the indirect effect contributing just under half of the total 
effect.
4. Results from annual regressions for the years 1968-1980 are not presented. They reveal con 
siderable year-to-year variability in point estimates of union effects on capital investment, along 
with considerable imprecision in estimating these effects. No secular trend is discernible. A fixed- 
effects model was estimated for 117 firms with union coverage information for 1972 and 1977. 
No relationship was found between changes in investment and changes in union coverage. For 
reasons stated in chapter 4, we have little confidence in coefficient estimates from the fixed-effects 
model.
5. Hirsch (forthcoming) provides closely related evidence using an expanded sample of companies 
and alternative specifications, and Abowd (1989a) provides industry-specific estimates of union 
investment effects. Despite large differences in data and methodology, these two papers report 
broadly similar results.
6. See the discussion above on inclusion of factor prices in an investment equation. The role of 
union rent-seeking on R&D investment is discussed extensively in chapter 2.
7. Estimates of union effects on R&D based on a larger sample of firms for which a predicted 
R&D expenditure variable is the dependent variable, are somewhat lower.
8. The sum of the coefficients on the logs of the R&D stock, capital stock, and employment is 
about one, indicating that, say, a 10-percent increase in labor, the R&D stock, and the physical 
capital stock, is associated with about a 10-percent increase in current R&D expenditures.
9. In results not shown, separate annual R&D investment equations for the years 1968-1980 are 
estimated. The coefficients demonstrate a reasonable degree of year-to-year stability, but are 
somewhat larger (in absolute value) during 1976-1979.
10. Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1989) examine the union-R&D relationship, and conclude that 
firm and industry union coverage have negative and significant effects on R&D investment inten 
sity, supporting the previous finding by Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey (1986).
11. Causation between capital intensity and unionization may run more from capital intensity to 
union coverage than the other way around, since unions are more successful at organizing capital- 
intensive firms (Hirsch and Berger 1984). An analysis of this simultaneous relationship is beyond 
the scope of this study.
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12. The literature on patents and R&D typically treats the patent-to-R&D ratio as a measure of 
R&D efficiency; that is, innovative output for given levels of R&D input.
13. An important variable omitted from the analysis in this chapter is company age. It is likely 
that older companies invest less, ceteris paribus, and are more likely to be unionized. Hirsch 
(forthcoming) includes a variable measuring company age (years since incorporation) and finds 
it to be negatively related to capital and R&D investment. Estimates of union effects on invest 
ment, however, are affected relatively little. Preliminary analysis (whose results are not shown) 
did not provide clear-cut evidence of union effects on employment or the mix between changes 
in employment and capital investment, although results were sensitive to specification. (Bronars 
and Deere (1990) have found that firms respond to union representation elections by lowering 
employment.) Employment is higher in union than in nonunion firms, but then appears to decrease 
moderately with the extent of coverage. No evidence was found of a significant relationship be 
tween union coverage and a dependent variable measuring the four-year change in the log of employ 
ment minus the change in the log of the real capital stock. The possible neutrality of changes 
in the factor mix between capital and labor with respect to union coverage is, of course, consis 
tent with the proposition of strongly efficient bargaining outcomes. But it is also consistent with 
the union rent-seeking model presented here. High union wages reflect in part the ability to ap 
propriate some portion of the firm's quasi-rents accruing to long-lived capital. Hence, shifts in 
the factor mix away from labor and toward capital, as suggested by conventional theory, need 
not be profit-maximizing.
Labor Unions, Productivity, 
and Productivity Growth
Sizable differences exist among U.S. companies in their earnings, 
market value, and investment behavior. Previous chapters in this 
monograph have examined the extent to which these differences are 
accounted for by the variation in union coverage among firms. The 
results have been interpreted within the context of a union rent-seeking 
model in which unions appropriate a portion of the returns accruing 
from market power and long-lived tangible and intangible capital assets.
In this chapter, differences in productivity and productivity growth 
among U.S. companies are examined. Neither theory nor previous 
evidence provides unambiguous predictions as to how collective bargain 
ing affects these crucial dimensions of firm performance. Relatively 
little evidence has been provided, however, on productivity and pro 
ductivity growth among wide cross-sections of U.S. companies using 
firm-level measures of union coverage. Below, a brief development of 
past theory, methodology, and evidence is presented, prior to turning 
to new evidence on union effects on productivity and productivity 
growth.
Union Effects on Productivity and Productivity Growth
There exist widely divergent opinions about unionism's effect on pro 
ductivity. Recent empirical research on productivity and other union 
effects in the workplace has been inspired in large part by Freeman 
and Medoff s collective voice/institutional response view of unions 
(Freeman 1976; Freeman and Medoff 1984) and the seminal article by 
Brown and Medoff (1978) concluding that union establishments are 
significantly more productive than nonunion establishments. 1 The 
voice/response view emphasizes the potential positive role of unions on
91
92 Labor Unions, Productivity, and Productivity Growth
productivity in environments characterized by internal labor markets 
with long-run attachment of workers and firms (typically associated with 
extensive firm-specific training), worker complementarities or team 
work in training and production, and workplace "public" goods such 
as safety, personnel policies, and hours of operation. Unions provide 
a potential mechanism for correcting the "market failure" deriving from 
public goods in the workplace. Unionization does this through increas 
ed reliance on collective voice, reflecting the preferences of average 
workers, as opposed to nonunion reliance on individual voice express 
ed through entry and exit behavior of marginal workers. 2 A union, it 
is argued, provides a collective voice that more accurately identifies 
and communicates worker preferences to the firm and establishes 
grievance procedures and other formalized governance structures that 
help to reduce exit (quits) and improve employee morale. Cooperative 
labor-management relations are a necessary but not sufficient condi 
tion for positive productivity effects in union establishments.
The voice/response view of unions stands in marked contrast to the 
traditional view of economists, portraying unions as a labor market 
monopolist retarding productivity and productivity growth. Negative 
union effects are believed to result from wage-induced allocative inef 
ficiency, union work rules, limitations on management discretion and 
flexibility in promotions and job assignments, and decreased worker 
incentives due to limitations on merit-based wage dispersion. Despite 
a litany of anecdotal evidence, careful empirical analyses of the effects 
of work rules are few; and many that exist are industry-specific. Evidence 
from the construction industry, where much work has been done, sug 
gests that union work rules reduce productivity rather modestly (Alien 
1986). In one of the few economy wide estimates, Ichniowski (1984) 
concludes that union work rules, as proxied rather crudely by contract 
length, are negatively related to productivity. The considerable atten 
tion given to work rules by firms and unions during contract negotia 
tions suggests that their effects are not trivial. Yet in the absence of 
empirical evidence, little can be said about the direct negative effects 
of union work rules and limitations placed on management.
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The empirical debate has centered not on union effects on allocative 
efficiency but, rather, whether there is a productivity differential be 
tween union and nonunion establishments, given equivalent labor and 
nonlabor inputs (i.e., technical efficiency). Most studies have follow 
ed Brown and Medoff (1978) in employing a variant of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function
(6.1) Q = AK«(Ln + cLM)'-«,
where Q is output, Lu and Ln are union and nonunion labor respectively, 
K is capital, A is a constant of proportionality, and a and (1-a) are the 
output elasticities with respect to capital and labor. The parameter c 
measures productivity differences between union and nonunion labor. 
A c greater (less) than unity implies union labor is more (less) produc 
tive than nonunion labor. Letting P equal union density (LU/L), Brown 
and Medoff approximate eq. (6.1) by:
(6.2) log(0/L) = logA + a\og(K/L) + (l-a)(c-l)P.
Eq. (6.2) assumes constant returns to scale, an assumption relaxed by 
including a logL variable as a measure of establishment size. The pro 
ductivity differential of unionized establishments is estimated by the 
coefficient on P (the coefficient on P divided by 1-a provides an estimate 
of c if the union productivity effect solely reflects the differential effi 
ciency of labor inputs).
Using state-by-industry data for 1972, Brown and Medoff (1978) con 
clude that union establishments are significantly more productive than 
nonunion establishments. And subsequent industry-specific studies have 
provided some additional evidence of positive union productivity ef 
fects (see Freeman and Medoff 1984). Addison and Hirsch (1989), 
however, evaluate extant evidence and conclude that no compelling case 
exists for a statistically or quantitatively significant positive or negative 
union productivity effect. Previous estimates, they point out, vary con 
siderably across firms and industries and positive productivity effects 
appear to be in response to decreased profit expectations. This is broadly 
consistent with a "shock effect" and selectivity interpretation (Addison 
and Hirsch 1989). Productivity gains are largest where unions acquire 
sizable wage gains and where there are significant competitive pressures,
94 Labor Unions, Productivity, and Productivity Growth
thus shocking management into increasing productivity. Little evidence 
is found for positive union productivity effects in the public and not- 
for-profit sectors. Moreover, union firms whose productivity and prof 
its decrease are most likely to contract in size or go out of business 
and, therefore, are underrepresented in available data samples. Final 
ly, large positive productivity effects are inconsistent with the evidence 
on profitability and employment (see Addison and Hirsch 1989, and 
Wessels 1985, respectively).
There have been few productivity studies using both firm (or line of 
business) observations from multiple industries and firm (or business- 
level) measures of unionization. Clark (1984) finds little difference be 
tween productivity (sales per unit of labor input) in union and non 
union lines of business. Hirsch (1990a) uses a sample of Compustat 
companies and a 1972 measure of collective bargaining coverage. He 
finds productivity to be lower among union companies, but estimates 
are highly sensitive to the inclusion of industry control variables. Recent 
ly, Kruse (1988, chap. 3) has estimated production functions for a sample 
of Compustat companies, employing a firm-level union status dummy 
equal to one if the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has reported any 
collective bargaining contract settlements involving the company. He 
reports moderately higher productivity among manufacturing companies 
with some union coverage (and substantially higher productivity among 
unionized nonmanufacturing companies). 3
There are a number of limitations to the production function test 
(Brown and Medoff 1978; Addison and Hirsch 1989). The use of value 
added as an output measure may confound price and quantity effects, 
since part of the measured union productivity differential can result from 
higher prices in unionized sectors. In this case, the union coefficient 
in the production function may crudely track the union-nonunion wage 
differential. 4 Data limitations may also necessitate the assumption of 
identical production function parameters in the union and nonunion sec 
tors. And the reliability of the production function test also may de 
pend on the ability to control for all important inputs in the production 
process, since unmeasured "firm effects" may not be independent of 
union status.
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A serious concern surrounding the union productivity test is that of 
selectivity. Since union firms (or units of firms) facing higher wage 
rates must be more productive to survive in the very long run, the pro 
ductivity effect is not being measured across a representative sample 
of firms. Rather, only surviving union firms with sufficient produc 
tivity increases are likely to be observed, thus causing the union pro 
ductivity effect on a representative firm to be overstated. Additional 
concerns are the overly restrictive assumption of Cobb-Douglas 
technology, and the* simultaneity problem between inputs and outputs 
in OLS estimation of any production function. While these limitations 
are not addressed here, one response to these latter concerns has been 
to directly estimate (translog) cost and profit functions (e.g., Alien 1987).
The limitations discussed above will make it necessary to qualify 
carefully the conclusions based on subsequent productivity evidence. 
Because several of our reservations apply to omitted or unmeasured 
determinants of productivity levels, analysis of productivity changes 
(growth) may purge empirical analyses of fixed effects. Hirsch and Link 
(1984) show that changes in total factor productivity, Q, derived by sub 
tracting a\og(K/L) from both sides of eq. (6.2) and differencing, is a 
function of changes in union density, </UN. Following the productivity 
growth literature emphasizing the role of R&D on growth, Hirsch and 
Link employ a three-factor Cobb-Douglas function that includes technical 
capital, T. Their total factor productivity growth equation (ignoring con 
trol variables) is
(6.3) Q = y + <t>(dT/dt)/Q + (l-a)(c-l)rfUN,
where Q is total factor productivity growth, y is the rate of disembodied 
growth (the time derivative of [log£ - otlogK - (l-a)logL]), <f> is dQ/dT 
(the marginal product of technical capital), dT/dt approximates net in 
vestments into stock T, and (dT/dt)/Q is proxied by R&D intensity. A 
positive coefficient on the change in union density, d\JN, implies c> 1 
and supports the voice/response view. Estimating the production func 
tion in difference form has the advantage of netting out unmeasured 
fixed effects, but in this context requires a measure of changes in 
unionization over a suitably long time period. 5 As seen below, we 
estimate productivity growth equations,including a union-level variable 
but not a change variable.
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Union Effects on Productivity: Empirical Evidence
In order to examine union effects on productivity, a variant of the 
Brown-Medoff model is estimated, with labor productivity a function 
of capital intensity and unionization. We estimate:
(6.4) \og(VA/L)i( = EftJfe, + alog(AT/L)ft + (l-a)(c-l)UNf. + cu,
where \og(VA/L) is the log of value added per employee in firm / and 
year t, \og(K/L) is the log of the capital-to-labor ratio, UN is firm-level 
union coverage, and X includes k firm and industry determinants of pro 
ductivity (including an intercept). A positive (negative) coefficient on 
UN implies that union firms have c> 1 (c< 1) and have higher (lower) 
technical efficiency. Among the variables in X will be the log of labor, 
log(L); the log of the R&D stock per employee, log(R&D-STKest/L); 
the two-year firm-specific growth rate in real sales, GROWTH; the four- 
year industry growth rate of real sales, I-GROWTH; industry concen 
tration, I-CR; industry share of sales by domestic firms, I-DOMSH; 
industry union coverage, I-UN; and year and industry dummies. The 
industry variables and dummies are potentially important since labor 
productivity varies considerably across industries and time, and unioniza 
tion is not randomly distributed across industries.
Variables measuring firm and industry growth, industry concentra 
tion, import competition, and industry union density are not variables 
normally included in production function equations. Variables affect 
ing demand growth, product market competition, and union density are 
likely to affect product price, however, so their inclusion is important 
in studies using a value added rather than physical output measure of 
productivity. If these control variables were absent, it is likely that some 
of the measured differences in value added would result from price rather 
than output differences. This is particularly critical for measurement 
of union-nonunion differences in productivity, since union coverage is 
correlated with growth and product market structure variables.
All variables used in regressions in this chapter are defined in Data 
Appendix 2. Productivity is measured by value added per worker, where 
value added represents the approximate difference between company
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sales and the costs of materials (inventory changes are ignored). Value 
added is measured with error, however, owing primarily to the absence 
of data in Compustat on the cost of materials. The Compustat item "cost 
of goods" measures materials and production costs, including all labor 
costs. In order to approximate value added, firm labor costs must be 
added back in. Approximately a quarter of the firms in our sample had 
direct measures of labor compensation and pension costs available in 
Compustat, thus allowing a relatively accurate approximation of value 
added. For the remaining firms, labor costs were estimated by multiply 
ing firm employment times average industry compensation, the latter 
being inflated by 1.25 times UN in order to reflect the higher labor 
costs in union firms (were this adjustment not made, there would have 
been spurious negative correlation between unionism and value add 
ed). The 1.25«UN adjustment factor is consistent with a 25-percent labor 
cost differential and was arrived at through experimentation on the sam 
ple of firm-years with actual labor and pension costs. For these firms, 
mean measurement error (defined as the difference between "actual" 
value added and "estimated" value added) was less than 1 percent and 
uncorrelated with union coverage (the simple correlation coefficient is 
.001). Thus, measurement error in value added should not result in coef 
ficient bias in the productivity level or productivity growth equations. 
Production function estimates are presented in table 6.1 for specifica 
tions with and without inclusion of industry variables and dummies. 6 
The coefficient on UN is found to be negative and significant in all 
specifications. The magnitude of the union coefficient, however, is sen 
sitive to the inclusion of industry-level variables and dummies. In col 
umn (1), the coefficient (|f|) is -0.186 (13.76), but falls in absolute 
value to -0.131 (9.07) when industry variables are included (column 
(2)). The further addition of 2-digit industry dummies changes the union 
coefficient to -0.082 (6.10). For a typical unionized company with 
UN = .423, the point estimate in (3) indicates that factor productivity 
is about 3.5 percent lower than in a nonunion company. Use of separate 
union coverage dummies (see the note to table 6.1) indicates a nonlinear 
union effect, with the most negative effect on productivity being for 
firms with medium coverage (.30 < UN < .60). These results indicate that


















































































NOTES: Dependent variable is log(K4/L). |/| in parentheses. Below are coefficients (|r|) ob 
tained substituting union dummies for UN in equation (3), with nonunion the omitted reference 
group and where UN-LOW = 1 if (0<UN<.30); UN-MED = 1 if (.30<UN<.60); and UN- 
HIGH =1 if (UN>.60).
(3): - 0.020 UN-LOW - 0.065 UN-MED - 0.49 UN-HIGH. 
2.04) (6.49) (4.50)
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low-, medium-, and high-union coverage firms have factor productivities 
2.0, 6.5, and 4.9 percent lower, respectively, than their nonunion 
counterparts.
As further evidence of the sensitivity of union coefficient estimates 
to the addition of industry controls, 105 2-, 3-, and 4-digit industry dum 
mies are added to the labor productivity equation, in lieu of the 2-digit 
dummies and I-UN, which is measured at the 3-digit level (these results 
are not shown in the tables). Inclusion of these dummies causes the union 
coefficient (1 1 \ ) to fall in absolute value from -0.082 (6.10) to -0.030 
(2.38). Coefficients (|f|) on the coverage dummies become -0.026 
(2.90), -0.054 (5.78), and -0.026 (2.58) for the low-, medium-, and 
high-union dummies, respectively. These estimates, indicating that 
unionized companies have factor productivities roughly 2.5 to 5 per 
cent lower than nonunion companies, are consistent with dark's (1984) 
finding of negative but small (2 to 3 percent) union productivity effects 
among U.S. lines of businesses during the 1970-1980 period. Our results, 
in conjunction with the finding that profitability is significantly lower 
among union companies, provides strong evidence that the frequently 
cited finding by Brown and Medoff (1978) of large positive union pro 
ductivity estimates is unique to their data set and should not be generaliz 
ed. Nor can a compelling case be made from the data assembled here 
that there exists a large and statistically robust negative effect of unions 
on productivity.
Coefficients on other variables in the productivity equations are largely 
as predicted. The coefficient a, on \og(K/L), which provides a crude 
proxy for capital's share in value added, is 0.29. The coefficient on 
the R&D stock per employee is about 0.04, in line with (or a little lower 
than) estimates from previous studies (Griliches 1986). There exists weak 
evidence of diseconomies of scale, based on the negative coefficient 
on log(L), although measurement error in Compustat's variable measur 
ing number of employees may produce a spurious negative correlation 
between log(K/4/L) and log(L). Firm- and industry-specific growth rates 
in sales, intended to proxy demand shifts, are positively associated with 
factor productivity. This relationship may result either from high capacity 
utilization rates among firms facing strong sales growth (and labor hoard 
ing during downturns), or the presence among growing firms of newer
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and more productive capital which is not fully reflected in our measures 
of the capital stock. The variables I-CR and I-DOMSH appear to cap 
ture industry effects (e.g., product price effects on value added); the 
coefficient on each changes from a positive to negative value when 3-digit 
industry dummies are included (results not shown).
Finally, the positive coefficient on industry union density, I-UN, is 
consistent with the hypothesis of a positive price effect in industries 
with high union density. That is, to the extent that a high level of in 
dustry union coverage increases product price, measured productivity 
or value added is higher for both union and nonunion companies. The 
magnitude of the coefficient is surprising, however, suggesting that I- 
UN is correlated with (i.e., capturing) omitted determinants of produc 
tivity. This increases further our caution in attaching much weight to 
coefficient estimates on the firm-level union measures.
In addition to examining economy wide union-nonunion productivity 
differences, we also disaggregate results by industry. Although the 
overall union productivity effect appears to be small, union effects across 
industries should vary considerably. This expectation is based in part 
on the considerable interindustry variation observed for union-nonunion 
differences in wages, profitability, and investment. Union wage and 
profit effects, for example, should provide a major impetus to manage 
ment to reduce X-inefficiency and increase measured productivity (Ad- 
dison and Hirsch 1989). The expectation of highly variable union pro 
ductivity effects is based as well on the belief that union-nonunion pro 
ductivity differences result from differences across firms in labor rela 
tions and the "institutional response" by management to union represen 
tation (Freeman and Medoff 1984).
Table 6.2 provides estimates of union productivity effects by industry 
category, based on specifications including a single union coverage 
variable, UN, and the three categorical coverage variables. A considerable 
degree of variation in union productivity effects across industry categories 
is found. Note that some of the variation results from the very small 
number of companies within each industry-by-union category cell. In 
cases where there are less than two companies in a nonunion or high- 
union cell (each company is of course observed for multiple years), the 
dummy variable is collapsed into the next union category variable.
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Positive union productivity effects are observed for several industries 
(we ignore the miscellaneous manufacturing and conglomerate category). 
As previously found by Clark (1984), union companies in the textile and 
apparel industry have higher productivity than do nonunion companies. 
Productivity effects are not large enough, however, to prevent somewhat 
lower profitability among these companies (chapter 4, table 4.3).7 Positive 
union productivity effects are found as well among companies in the 
following industries: fabricated metal products; engines, farm and con 
struction equipment; and motor vehicle and transportation equipment. 
The latter results must be discounted somewhat since there are a small 
number of firms in both the nonunion and low-union categories. The 
other two industries, however, were previously found to have similar 
earnings and market valuation of union and nonunion firms, indicating 
that positive productivity effects are sufficient to offset union wage 
premiums. There is also weak evidence of higher union productivity 
among companies in the stone, clay, and glass, communication, and air 
craft and aerospace industries. The small number of nonunion firms in 
these industries, however, makes such comparisons difficult.
More widespread evidence is found for negative union productivity 
effects, although the magnitude and statistical significance of these 
estimates are small in many of the industry categories. A relatively clear- 
cut union disadvantage in productivity is found in the following industries: 
chemicals; drugs; petroleum refining; primary metals; nonelectric 
machinery; electrical equipment; professional and scientific equipment; 
and lumber, wood, and paper. This list of industries corresponds close 
ly to the industry categories for which companies are found to have lower 
profitability and market value (chapter 4, table 4.3). In short, union ef 
fects on company profits are most severe in those industries where 
negative union productivity effects reinforce (or do not offset) union ef 
fects on labor compensation.
The productivity equations estimated above assume common slope 
parameters or output elasticities with respect to capital, R&D, and labor 
among union and nonunion firms. But as shown by Brown and Medoff 
(1978), union productivity estimates may be highly sensitive to viola 
tions of this assumption. In order to examine the possibility of varying
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slope parameters, the right-hand variables log(£/L), logCR&D-STK^VL), 
log(L), and I-UN are interacted with UN. The interaction variables permit 
the effects of these inputs and industry union density to vary systematically 
with the extent of firm-level union coverage, and allow us to identify 
the routes through which union-nonunion productivity differences take 
place. In results not shown, significant negative coefficients are found 
on the interaction terms of UN with log(£/L), log(R&D-STKest/L), and 
log(L). A positive coefficient is found on the interaction of UN with I-UN.
The lower output elasticities with respect to physical capital and R&D 
found for highly unionized companies are consistent with Baldwin's (1983) 
union expropriation model in which union companies rationally invest 
in "second-best" capital as a means of mitigating union wage demands. 
The reasoning here is that unions will tend to have a standard rate across 
establishments within the same company. By maintaining inefficient 
capital or plants, union demands for wages above the marginal revenue 
product at the inefficient plants will result in employment losses for the 
union. What appears clear is that union companies are more likely to 
be in mature industries and establishments, with older and less produc 
tive capital stocks. Although the R&D and physical capital variables are 
age-adjusted measures, they may not reflect fully quality differences in 
the capital stocks between union and nonunion companies. The positive 
coefficient on the interaction of UN with I-UN suggests that produc 
tivity or price increases are more likely among union than among non 
union companies in highly unionized industries.
The robustness of the union productivity results are examined fur 
ther by using a two-step estimation process intended to account for 
positively correlated firm-specific error terms across time. In a first- 
step regression, log(P£4/L) is regressed on all firm and industry variables 
that vary from year-to-year, year dummies, and dummies for each firm 
(571 dummies corresponding to 572 firms in the estimating sample). 
Excluded are variables fixed over time—UN, I-UN, and industry dum 
mies. The coefficients of the dummies are then used as the dependent 
variables in second-step regressions (the excluded reference firm is 
assigned a value of zero), in which the fixed variables UN (or, alter 
natively, union category dummies), I-UN, and IND are included
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(n=572). Second-step regression results provide estimates of the union 
productivity effect with unbiased standard errors.
Results from the second-step regression (shown in text below), with 
the firm coefficients from the first step as the dependent variable, cast 
further doubt on the robustness of the results presented previously. The 
union coefficient (1 1 \ ) in the second-step equation, which includes UN, 
I-UN, and IND on the right-hand side, is -0.014 (0.23), as compared 
to -0.082 (6.10) in the single-stage pooled model. The coefficient (1 1 \ ) 
on industry density, I-UN, is 0.537 (3.30). Regressing firm effects on 
union categorical dummies (with I-UN and IND included) produces the 
following results:
0.082 UN-LOW + 0.041 UN-MED + 0.030 UN-HIGH. 
(1.90) (0.92) (0.63)
These results suggest that productivity is somewhat higher among com 
panies with relatively low levels of union coverage than among non 
union and highly organized companies (results using weighted GLS 
regressions are similar). This pattern is exactly the opposite of that 
previously found. The positive and significant coefficient on industry 
union density, I-UN, is relatively insensitive to the measurement of firm 
union coverage.
The large standard errors associated with the second-step estimates 
prevents us from placing weight on these specific results. But, likewise, 
our earlier results must also be discounted owing to the sensitivity of 
the union coefficient estimates to the addition of detailed industry dum 
mies, the considerable diversity of productivity estimates across in 
dustries, the different pattern of union effects found using the two-step 
estimation procedure, and the known biases and difficulties inherent in 
the production function methodology (Addison and Hirsch 1989).
In short, the econometric evidence on productivity is simply too fragile 
to draw strong inferences about union effects in the workplace. That 
being said, there is no evidence to support the contention of large and 
statistically significant positive union productivity effects. Based on the 
relatively clear-cut evidence of lower profits and market values in union 
companies, we also know that positive union productivity effects are 
not sufficiently large in general to offset cost increases owing to union
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wage premiums. Based on the evidence from this study, it can be con 
cluded that union productivity effects are small on average, vary con 
siderably in sign and magnitude across industries and individual 
workplaces, and cannot be estimated precisely with existing techniques 
and data bases.
Union Effects on Productivity Growth: Empirical Evidence
The effects of unionization on productivity growth are examined us 
ing a variant of eq. (6.3). Rather than compute changes in total factor 
productivity, "partial" productivity growth rates (Griliches 1986) are 
calculated. The variable Q it ,_4 is defined as the annualized logarithmic 
growth between years t and t-4 in deflated value added, minus the growth 
of employment times labor's share of total cost. The growth rate of capital 
is included on the right-hand side of the equation. Such a specification 
is appealing in data sets where capital's share is difficult to estimate ac 
curately. The productivity growth equation takes the following general 
form:
(6.5) e ,x ,_4 = E0QkXkit>t_4 + 5UNf. + £>,,,_4 ,
where e,,,_4 is the growth rate in productivity (as defined above) by firm 
/ between years t and t-4, and UN is firm-level union coverage in 1977 
with coefficient 6. The vector X includes a constant and firm-level 
measures of the growth rate of physical capital (d\og,(K)), the growth 
rate of the R&D stock or estimated R&D stock (dlog(R&D-STKest)), 
the average level of the R&D stock in years t and t-4 (log(R&D- 
STKest)), the growth rate and average level of employment (d[og(L) and 
log(L)), and 2-digit industry dummies. Industry-level variables include 
union density in 1977 (I-UN), average annual sales growth over the four- 
year period (I-GROWTH), the average share of sales by domestic firms 
in an industry during years t and t-4 (I-DOMSH), and the average share 
of energy in total cost during years t and t-4 (I-ENERGY/Y\). Because 
we measure firm unionization only at a single point in time, we are unable 
to estimate the relationship between changes in productivity and changes 
in unionism.
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Table 6.3 presents regression results for the productivity growth equa 
tions, with and without inclusion of industry level variables and dum 
mies. In regression models without industry variables, we find that pro 
ductivity growth is positively and significantly related to the growth rate 
of physical capital and the level of (but not change in) R&D stocks, but 
significantly lower among union firms.8 The UN coefficient in column 
(1) suggests that unionized firms realize productivity growth substan 
tially lower than do nonunion firms (mean Q is .023 for this sample of 
firms and four-year periods). Once industry-level variables and 2-digit 
dummies are included, however, the estimated direct union effect on 
productivity growth falls, from a point estimate of-0.027 in column (1), 
to -0.011 when industry-level variables (but not industry dummies) are 
added in (2), and to -0.007 with the further addition of industry dum 
mies in (3). Replacing the continuous union coverage variable, UN, with 
three categorical variables corresponding to low, medium, and high levels 
of coverage (see the note to table 6.4), coefficient (1 1 \ ) estimates of -0.004 
(1.96), -0.006 (2.86), and -0.005 (2.30) are obtained for low-, medium-, 
and high-union coverage firms, respectively. These results indicate that 
even small levels of coverage are associated with slower productivity 
growth, but that growth varies little with the extent of coverage among 
unionized companies.
The results strongly suggest that much of the slower productivity 
growth of union firms during the 1970s was due to industry-level ef 
fects independent of unionization. This conclusion is based on the fact 
that estimated union coefficients become closer and closer to zero as 
industry control variables are added to the regressions. Yet even in a 
regression with detailed controls, we find that unionized companies had 
productivity growth about a half of a percentage point lower than nonu 
nion firms, not a trivial amount relative to a sample average Q of 2.3 
percent. To check the sensitivity of the estimates to a more detailed 
control for industry, the productivity growth model is estimated with 
the inclusion of 105 industry dummies measured at the 2-, 3-, and 4- 
digit level (these results not shown in tables). It is interesting that the 
union coefficients do not further decrease (in absolute value) following 
the addition of detailed dummies, the coefficient (1 1 \ ) on UN changes
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Table 6.3 




















































































NOTES: Dependent variable is gf f_4 . \t\ in parentheses. Below are coefficients (\t\) obtained 
substituting union dummies for UN in equation (3), with nonunion the omitted reference group 
and where UN-LOW = 1 if (0<UN<.30); UN-MED=1 if (.30<UN<.60); and UN-HIGH = 1 
if (UN >.60).
(3): - 0.004 UN-LOW - 0.006 UN-MED - 0.005 UN-HIGH. 
(1.96) (2.86) (2.30)
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to -0.008 (2.97), and those on UN-LOW, UN-MED, and UN-HIGH 
change to -0.005 (2.57), -0.007 (3.53), and -0.006 (2.95), respectively. 
Thus, the results appearing in table 6.3 appear to provide sufficient con 
trols for industry-specific effects on productivity growth.
Estimates of union effects on productivity growth by industry category 
are provided in table 6.4. As expected, considerable variability exists 
and standard errors are relatively large in most cases. In no industry 
is evidence found for a significant positive relationship between union 
coverage status and productivity growth. There is at least moderately 
strong evidence of a negative union effect on growth in the chemicals, 
drugs and medical instruments, communication equipment, motor vehicle 
and transportation equipment, and professional and scientific equipment 
industries. Interestingly, these industries tend to be technologically ad 
vanced and have higher than average productivity growth rates and in 
vestments in R&D. And although the correlation is not perfect, these 
industries also tend to be ones where union coverage was previously 
found to impact negatively on profitability, investment in capital and 
R&D, and productivity.
Finally, robustness of the productivity growth results is examined by 
using the two-step estimation process designed to account for positive 
ly correlated firm-specific error terms across time. In the first step, Q 
is regressed on firm and industry variables that vary from year-to-year, 
year dummies, and dummies for each firm (530 dummies correspond 
ing to 531 firms in the estimating sample). The coefficients on the firm 
dummies then form the dependent variable in second-step regressions 
in which the fixed variables UN (or, alternatively, union category dum 
mies), I-UN, and IND are included. These second-step regression results 
(n=531) provide estimates of the union growth effect with unbiased 
standard errors.
Results from the second-step regression (not shown in tables) indicate 
a sizable negative relationship between productivity growth and union 
coverage when industry dummies are excluded. When industry dum 
mies are included, however, the negative relationship between firm pro 
ductivity growth and union coverage vanishes (weighted GLS regres 
sion results are similar). For example, the coefficient (|f |) on UN in
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a second-step equation with I-UN and industry dummies excluded is 
-0.009 (1.60), but changes to 0.003 (0.51) in the second-step model 
that includes I-UN and IND on the right-hand side. The evidence 
presented in this chapter supports the proposition that most of the slower 
productivity growth associated with union coverage is accounted for 
by the disproportionate presence of unionization in industries with slower 
growth. And given the relative fragility of the productivity growth 
evidence following econometric probing, we are unwilling to reject the 
proposition that union effects on productivity growth are, on average, 
close to zero.
Conclusions
Results presented previously in this monograph have shown rather 
clearly that union coverage in the workplace has significant negative 
effects on firm profitability and investment behavior. These relation 
ships are interpreted within the context of a rent-seeking model in which 
unions appropriate some share of the quasi-rents that make up both nor 
mal and supra-competitive returns to fixed, long-lived, tangible and in 
tangible capital. In this chapter, we explore differences in productivity 
levels and productivity growth between union and nonunion companies, 
given their stocks and investments in capital, R&D, and labor.
Neither theory nor previous evidence provides unambiguous predic 
tions as to union effects on productivity levels and growth. Although 
the initial evidence in this chapter indicates that union coverage is 
associated with lower productivity levels and slower productivity growth, 
further probing indicates that these relationships are anything but clear- 
cut. Much of the union-nonunion difference in performance results from 
the fact that unions are organized disproportionately in companies and 
industries with characteristics leading to lower productivity and slower 
growth, independent of any direct union effects.
Moreover, estimated union effects exhibit tremendous variability 
across and within industries, not only in magnitude and statistical 
significance, but also in sign. Admittedly, sample sizes of companies
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within industry categories are small, but much of the interindustry 
variability appears to result from real differences in unionism's impact 
across sectors. While explanation for these differences lies beyond the 
scope of this research, differences in competitiveness, management and 
labor relations, financial conditions, and technological opportunities are 
likely to be important. A final caveat emerges from the fragility of the 
estimates found when using a two-step estimation process designed to 
purge firm-specific correlation of error terms across years. Negative 
relationships of union coverage with productivity and productivity growth 
are no longer found using this two-step process.
Based on the evidence presented here, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that unions, on average, have little direct effect on productivity and pro 
ductivity growth. Note that this conclusion does not imply that unions 
do not matter in the workplace. Rather, it implies that unionism's net 
impact, comprised of both positive and negative effects on performance, 
is generally small. Moreover, attention in this chapter has focused ex 
clusively on unionism's direct impact on economic performance or, more 
explicitly, on union-nonunion differences in productivity levels and 
growth for given inputs and characteristics. Indirect effects resulting 
from the union impact on profits, market value, and investments in capital 
and R&D may be of consequence. That is, even though the union im 
pact on technical efficiency (i.e., output obtained from given inputs) 
is apparently small, the financial and investment impact of unionism 
leads to lower levels and slower growth in productivity-related inputs. 
As discussed previously, absent positive productivity effects that off 
set union wage increases, decreased profitability leads predictably to 
lower investment and retrenchment in the unionized sectors of the 
economy.
NOTES
1. Surveys and interpretations of the unions and productivity literature are available in Freeman 
and Medoff (1984), Hirsch and Addison (1986, chap. 7), and Addison and Hirsch (1989).
2. While they do not explicitly discuss unions, Williamson, Wkchter, and Harris (1975) analyze 
a similar workplace environment, which they characterize as one of "idiosyncratic exchange." Fbulkes 
(1980) examines personnel policies in large nonunion companies. Freeman and Medoff are skep 
tical, however, about the possibility of a nonunion solution to the public goods problem.
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3. Recent firm- and industry-level studies from the U.K. suggest that British unions (and, in par 
ticular, the closed shop) have even more negative productivity effects (for a survey, see Metcalf 1988).
4. Evidence of lower profitability by union firms, however, indicates that firms are limited in their 
ability to pass price increases forward to consumers.
5. Hirsch and Link find both union level and change variables to be negatively related to produc 
tivity growth among 2-digit manufacturing industries. Besides having an extremely small sample 
size, industry-level analyses do not allow disentangling of union and industry effects on growth.
6. These specifications also were estimated for two smaller samples—those companies with directly 
measured (i.e., not estimated) R&D stocks, and the sample of companies for which labor com 
pensation, used in the calculation of value added, is reported directly. In the first case, results 
from the alternative samples were highly similar. In the latter case, estimated union effects on 
productivity were somewhat larger (more negative) than those reported in this chapter.
7. Addison and Hirsch (1989) conclude that a competitive environment (as in textiles and apparel) 
is a necessary condition for positive productivity effects to result in response to union wage and 
profit effects. Kazis (1989) documents how unions and large manufacturers have worked together 
to modernize and improve productivity in the textile and apparel industries.
8. Results with respect to union coverage are not affected when the equation is estimated for the 
smaller sample with complete R&D stock information. The coefficients on the R&D variables, 
however, are larger and more significant than those presented in table 6.4.
7 
Summary and Evaluation
This monograph examines the impact of collective bargaining coverage 
on the economic performance of publicly traded U.S. manufacturing 
companies during the 1970s. It develops a union rent-seeking model 
which posits that unions appropriate a share of the returns from market 
power and from quasi-rents accruing to long-lived capital. Among the 
performance measures examined are company profitability, market 
value, investment behavior, productivity, and productivity growth.
As part of this study, a survey of companies was conducted to col 
lect firm-level information on the extent of collective bargaining coverage 
during 1977 and 1987. Coverage data from this survey are combined 
with more limited information obtained from a 1972 Conference Board 
study to create a single firm-level union variable approximating collec 
tive bargaining coverage in 1977. Firm union coverage information is 
then combined with detailed company data for the 1968-1980 period 
on market value, earnings, sales, capital investment flows and capital 
stocks, R&D expenditure flows and R&D stocks, patents, employment, 
advertising, and debt, as well as industry data on concentration, im 
port competition, sales growth, payroll, and union density.
Data collected from the survey indicate substantial interindustry and 
intraindustry variability in the proportion of workers covered by col 
lective bargaining agreements. Among the 452 companies reporting 
figures for both 1977 and 1987, collective bargaining coverage averages 
30.5 percent in 1977, but declines to 25.0 percent by 1987 (table 3.2). 
The decline in unionization is widespread, coverage decreasing in all 
but one of 19 broad industry categories (there is virtually no change 
in average coverage among companies in the electrical equipment and 
supplies group). Substantial intraindustry variation in collective bargain 
ing coverage indicates a potentially large benefit from measuring 
unionization at the firm- as well as industry-level in empirical studies 
of economic performance.
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Examination of variable means, cross-classified with union coverage 
status, reveals large differences in economic performance between non 
union and highly unionized companies (Data Appendix 1). The market 
valuation of company assets, measured by Tobin's q, and company prof 
itability, measured by the rate of return on capital, decline sharply with 
respect to union coverage. Investment intensity in innovation capital, 
measured by the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales and the ratio of 
patents to sales, shows particularly steep decreases with respect to union 
coverage. Capital investment intensities, measured by the ratio of an 
nual investment to sales, and advertising intensity, measured by the ratio 
of advertising expenditures to sales, are similar among nonunion com 
panies and companies with low levels of coverage, but decline among 
companies with medium and high levels of coverage. Capital intensi 
ty, on the other hand, measured by the capital stock per employee, is 
substantially lower among nonunion than union companies, but varies 
little with the extent of coverage among union companies. Value add 
ed per worker is similar among nonunion and low-union companies, 
but lower among companies with medium and high coverage levels. 
Productivity growth, by contrast, declines sharply as one moves from 
the nonunion to low-union category, and continues to decline as union 
coverage increases.
In short, descriptive data on variable means for the 1968-1980 period 
show that the economic performance of unionized companies has been 
poor relative to the performance of nonunion companies. But simple 
means cross-tabulated by union coverage category need not match closely 
the partial correlations of union coverage with performance measures, 
controlling for other determinants of performance. Differences in means 
most definitely do not provide evidence as to the causal impact of 
unionization on the economic performance of firms. That is, unions 
may be more highly organized in sectors where economic performance 
is expected to be poorer, independent of any direct role played by col 
lective bargaining coverage. For example, average four-year industry 
sales growth in firms' principal industry is significantly higher for non 
union than for union firms, leading to greater profitability and market 
value, investment, and productivity. The primary purpose of the em-
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pirical analysis contained in chapters 4-6 is to isolate and measure more 
precisely the impact union coverage has on firm economic performance.
Estimated Union Effects on Profitability, 
Investment, and Productivity
Chapter 4 probes in some detail the impact of union coverage on com 
pany profitability and market value. By any measure, the negative union 
impact on each is large. Holding constant detailed firm characteristics, 
industry characteristics, and industry dummies, Tobin's q is estimated 
to be about 20 percent lower in an average unionized company than 
in a similar nonunion company. The corresponding union-nonunion dif 
ferential for the rate of return on capital is about 15 percent. Estimates 
of the union profit effect are smaller using a two-step estimation pro 
cess that corrects for within-firm correlation of error terms across time; 
estimates are larger using instrumental variable estimation attempting 
to account for the possible endogeneity of union coverage. Union prof 
it effects are found to be relatively stable over time, but to vary con 
siderably across industries. The data do not allow us to measure direct 
ly the exact sources from which unions acquire compensation gains, 
but estimation of models with union interaction terms suggests that quasi- 
rents accruing to capital and R&D, profits associated with changes in 
firm and industry demand (disequilibrium returns), and returns from 
limited foreign competition provide the primary sources for union gains. 
No evidence is found for the proposition that monopoly returns associated 
with industry concentration provide a source for union gains.
The impact of labor unions on firm investment behavior is the sub 
ject of chapter 5, with particular attention to investments in physical 
capital and R&D. Unions are found to have both direct and indirect 
effects on investment. The union "tax" on the returns to long-lived 
fixed investment causes a direct decrease in the profit-maximizing in 
vestment level. The lower profitability resulting from union coverage 
reduces investment indirectly by lowering the internal pool of funds 
that provides a preferred source for the financing of investments. Regres 
sion estimates indicate that the average union firm has annual capital
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investment that is about 13 percent lower than a similar nonunion firm. 
Approximately half of this effect is a direct union effect and half an 
indirect effect working through the union impact on profitability. 
Estimates of the union investment effect are insensitive to the addition 
of highly detailed industry dummies to the equation, and relatively in 
sensitive to estimation correcting for serial correlation of within-firm 
error terms. As expected, the union effect on investment varies con 
siderably across industries, although in no industry do we find a positive 
and significant relationship between union coverage and capital 
investment.
Estimates of the union impact on R&D indicate a large negative ef 
fect on R&D expenditures, although the estimated magnitude of the union 
effect displays sensitivity to the estimation method and measurement 
of union coverage. Even low levels of union coverage are associated 
with lower R&D expenditures, while extent of coverage among unionized 
companies has little if any effect. Unionized companies invest about 
15-20 percent less than similar nonunion companies, most of this dif 
ference being a direct rather than an indirect (profitability) effect. 
Estimated union-nonunion differences are not affected by the inclusion 
of detailed industry dummies, but are moderately lower using the two- 
step estimation procedure that corrects for serially correlated within- 
firm errors. Substantial differences across industries are found, including 
positive estimated union effects in two industry categories.
Less detailed analysis is provided for union effects on other behavioral 
variables (table 5.5). In addition to lowering investment intensities in 
physical capital and R&D, union coverage is negatively associated with 
the ratio of advertising expenditures to sales. The propensity to patent 
(the ratio of patents filed to the R&D stock) is larger among union than 
nonunion companies, suggesting that union firms are more likely to 
license innovative capital as a means of protecting quasi-rents from union 
appropriation (but this relationship is not estimated precisely). And the 
use of debt relative to equity is higher among union than nonunion com 
panies, consistent with the hypothesis of Bronars and Deere (1991) that 
efficient contracting between a firm and union leads to a shift toward 
debt financing. The union impact on the capital-labor mix could not
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be estimated precisely. This may result from the fact that unions may 
have a relatively neutral impact on factor mix, reducing both capital 
investment and employment in roughly equal proportions. Alternative 
ly, it may reflect the fact that capital intensity and union coverage are 
simultaneously determined, making estimation of the relationship 
difficult.
In chapter 6, the effects of labor unions on productivity levels and 
growth are examined. Neither theory nor previous evidence provides 
unambiguous predictions as to union effects on productivity and pro 
ductivity growth. Much of the poorer performance by union companies 
results from the fact that unions are more likely to be organized in firms 
and industries with lower productivity levels and growth, independent 
of any direct impact of unionization. Thus, estimates of union produc 
tivity effects are relatively sensitive to the inclusion of detailed industry 
dummies and control variables. In a pooled equation with detailed in 
dustry controls and dummies, value added per worker is estimated to 
be 2 to 5 percent lower in union than in nonunion companies. Evidence 
also is found to support the proposition that capital and R&D, and to 
a lesser extent labor, inputs have lower output elasticities (i.e., are less 
productive) in union than in nonunion companies. But use of a two- 
step estimation process, intended to purge standard error bias, results 
in an estimated positive but insignificant union-productivity relation 
ship. Based on the varied evidence from chapter 6, it is concluded that 
union effects on productivity are, on average, rather small.
As expected, there is large interindustry variability in estimated union 
productivity effects, and large standard errors attach to almost all of 
the estimates. Roughly, union-nonunion productivity differences are 
estimated to be positive in those same industries where negative union 
profit effects are found to be small. Any negative productivity effects 
appear to be more than offset by the positive effects resulting from col 
lective voice aspects of unions and management response to collective 
bargaining and union rent-seeking. In contrast, those industries where 
union firms realize substantially lower earnings and market value ex 
hibit union productivity effects that are negative or close to zero.
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The evidence on productivity growth is likewise mixed. Unionized 
companies exhibit substantially slower four-year productivity growth 
rates than nonunion companies, but most of this slower growth is the 
result of unionized companies having firm and industry characteristics 
that lead to slower growth for union and nonunion firms alike. As was 
the case for productivity level estimates, a negative union effect is no 
longer found when using the two-step estimation process. Within- 
industry differences in productivity growth cannot be estimated with 
precision. Union effects on productivity growth appear most deleterious, 
however, among union companies in relatively high-growth, 
technologically advanced industries.
Interpretation and Qualifications
The evidence presented in this monograph provides broad support 
for the union rent-seeking model presented in chapter 2. It is argued 
there that unions appropriate some portion of the returns from market 
power and from the quasi-rents that make up the normal returns to long- 
lived capital. Because the time horizon for a union (or its rank-and-file 
with median preferences) is shorter than the planning horizon over which 
investors evaluate long-lived capital, "efficient" labor contracts that 
maximize joint (union plus shareholder) wealth imply lower investment 
in fixed tangible and intangible capital than would exist in a nonunion 
company. And if jointly maximizing contractual agreements do not ob 
tain, as is likely, the union tax on quasi-rents and the retardation of 
investment spending are expected to be even larger.
Unionized companies will reduce investment in vulnerable forms of 
capital, due not only to the union "tax" that places a wedge between 
gross and net rates of return, but also because company profits, which 
provide a pool from which investments are frequently financed, are 
lower. Union companies, therefore, are expected to exhibit lower cur 
rent and future profitability, and lower investments in long-lived capital, 
than their nonunion counterparts. Union rent-seeking need not have any 
direct effects in the workplace on productivity (i.e., technical efficiency)
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or productivity growth. But union rent-seeking will reduce output levels 
and sales growth indirectly through its effect on investment behavior 
and the use of productive inputs.
Evidence presented here shows clearly that unions have distortionary 
effects on firm investment behavior that lead to lower input usage and 
output in unionized sectors of the economy. It is more difficult, however, 
to draw inferences about union effects on economy wide efficiency based 
on union-nonunion behavioral differences. Lower capital investment 
among unionized firms can be offset by higher capital investment 
elsewhere in the economy. If resources could costlessly flow to alter 
native uses, and social rates of return were equivalent in nonunion sec 
tors, there would be little effect of unions on economy wide efficiency. 
Increases in union power and rent-seeking would simply cause the 
relative size of the union sector to shrink. But unions could not then 
have the significant long-run effects on firm profitability that are so 
clearly observed. Because unions have some degree of monopoly 
bargaining power, because the shifting of resources from union to non 
union environments occurs slowly, and because social rates of return 
differ across investment paths, union distortions at the firm level 
necessarily translate into some degree of inefficiency economy wide.
Private-sector unionism has declined sharply in recent years, and non 
union work environments have increasingly become the norm for most 
of the workforce and in most sectors of the economy (Kochan, Katz, 
and McKersie 1986; Freeman 1988). It is essential that we better under 
stand the relationship between this transformation in U.S. industrial rela 
tions and past union effects on firm performance. The results presented 
in this monograph strongly suggest that union decline and increased 
management hostility have been in no small part the direct result of 
the significantly worse economic performance of union companies than 
of nonunion companies during the 1970s. 1
An evaluation of this study must consider several important qualifica 
tions about the empirical analyses and results, and it should outline areas 
of future study that may prove fruitful. Evidence presented here and 
elsewhere has established that there are significant differences in 
economic behavior and performance between union and nonunion com-
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panies. What is less clear, however, is the extent to which unionization 
is a causal force, and the exact routes through which union organizing 
and bargaining power affect firm performance. We have provided a 
rent-seeking framework in which union effects on profitability, invest 
ment behavior, and productivity growth can be analyzed jointly. Yet 
reservations about this study's findings remain. The most serious 
statistical and methodological concerns are the possible endogeneity of 
firm-level union coverage (and other variables as well), selectivity bias 
engendered by an inability to observe nonsurviving firms, and the dif 
ficulty in measuring the dynamic effects of union coverage.
In most of the foregoing analysis, firm-level union coverage generally 
is treated as an exogenous variable, even though unionization is not 
randomly distributed across firms and industries, and coverage is af 
fected by profitability and capital intensity (leading to potential 
simultaneity bias). As seen in chapter 4, it is technically feasible to test 
for exogeneity using Hausman-type specification tests to account for 
the endogeneity of key variables, or to estimate a full system of 
simultaneous equations. Given the limitations of available data and 
theory, however, we have little confidence in such results. Firm-level 
information that would help us estimate a reduced-form union equa 
tion is not readily available, although industry-level variables on 
workforce characteristics could be employed. And while all equations 
could be overidentified by excluding selected variables or through the 
estimation of nonlinear relationships (or, for example, through the use 
of stocks in one equation and flows in another), selection of instruments 
would be largely arbitrary since reasonable arguments can be made that 
almost any variable affecting, say, R&D, would also affect profitability.
In short, superficial treatment of union endogeneity is unlikely to be 
helpful, while more detailed treatment is beyond the scope of this study. 
We are confident, however, that the qualitative relationships found are 
correct. Many of the biases that can be identified suggest that union 
effects on economic performance are underestimated. Unions are more 
likely to be successful in organizing firms with the largest potential profits 
or quasi-rents; hence the negative union coefficient in the profit equa 
tions may understate the true negative impact of unions on profits
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(Voos and Mishel 1986). Likewise, simultaneity bias between capital 
and unionization (i.e., unions are more likely to organize in capital in 
tensive industries), may result in an underestimate of the negative ef 
fect of unions on capital investment. 2 Working in the opposite direc 
tion may be a negative relation between opportunities for R&D invest 
ment and union organizing costs. Rapidly growing firms with 
technological opportunities and large white-collar workforces may be 
particularly difficult to organize. Thus, the negative relationship of 
unionization with R&D investment and productivity growth may 
overstate the causal impact of union coverage.
The issue of union endogeneity cannot easily be resolved with available 
data and techniques. Problems emanating from the nonrepresentative 
distribution of union coverage across sectors is largely controlled, 
however, by the inclusion of detailed firm and industry control variables. 
For example, highly unionized firms are more likely to be in less prof 
itable, slower-growing industries with lower rates of new investment 
and productivity growth. In order to avoid overstating the effect of unions 
on firm performance, conclusions expressed in this monograph are based 
on regression results from specifications including 2-digit (and sometimes 
3- or 4-digit) industry dummies, and industry-level variables measur 
ing union density, sales growth, concentration, import penetration, and 
(in the productivity growth model) energy costs. Although the magnitude 
of the union coefficients are often sensitive to inclusion of industry- 
level variables, sizable union effects on profitability and investment 
behavior remain after accounting for measurable firm and industry 
differences.
A potentially serious qualification of the results stems from selection 
bias engendered by the inability to observe firms that do not survive 
over time. If unions decrease profitability, investment, and growth, union 
companies able to partially offset these effects through higher produc 
tivity or special firm advantages are more likely to survive than the 
average company that becomes unionized (moreover, successful firms 
are more likely to be targets of union organizing). For this reason, 
estimated negative effects of unions on profits, investment, productivi 
ty, and productivity growth are likely to understate average union
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effects, since firms most adversely affected by unions are least likely 
to have survived and be included in any sample of firms.
In addition, the absence of data on changes in firm-level union 
coverage over time makes it difficult to analyze the dynamic relation 
ship between outcomes in labor, financial, investment, and product 
markets. And even if such data were available, modeling and measure 
ment of these complex relationships would be difficult owing to the long- 
term employment relation that characterizes internal labor markets, and 
the long-range planning and life span of fixed R&D and physical capital.
A final, albeit rather different, concern is that expenditures on R&D 
and estimated R&D stocks may be inadequate proxies for the much 
broader category of investment—innovative activity—for which we 
would like to make inferences. While evidence in this area is limited, 
that which exists suggests that the union effects we have uncovered apply 
to innovative activity broadly, and not just to R&D. In work not shown 
in this paper, use of patent stock data instead of R&D (i.e., an output 
rather than an input measure of innovative activity) produced highly 
similar inferences about union effects. In other studies, Hirsch and Link 
(1987) analyze survey data from small- and medium-sized firms and 
find that unionized firms rank product innovative activity as being 
significantly less important in their strategy and performance (relative 
to their competitors) than do similar nonunion firms. And Acs and 
Audretsch (1988) find that both small- and large-firm innovations, defin 
ed according to measured outcomes independent of R&D or patents, 
have been significantly lower in more highly unionized industries.
Implications for the Future
The poor economic performance of unionized U.S. companies dur 
ing the 1970s is likely to have played a role in the increased manage 
ment resistance to union organizing and the marked contraction of the 
union sector during the 1980s. As indicated in the previous section, 
however, further study of the relationship of union coverage with 
economic performance is needed. First, analysis of the performance
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of union and nonunion companies during a more current period is essen 
tial. It is certainly possible that negative union effects on firm perfor 
mance have been partially mitigated in the 1980s, owing to manage 
ment and union response both to the forces of domestic and foreign 
competition and to the poor performance outcomes in the past. But to 
date, we know little about current union-nonunion differences in 
economic performance. Such knowledge is a prerequisite for address 
ing intelligently the policy debate over the appropriate role for U.S. 
labor law, and for understanding more clearly the transformation tak 
ing place in the workplace and in labor-management relations.
More specific issues should also be addressed in future research. 
Substantial interindustry differences are found in union effects on wages, 
profits, market value, R&D investment, capital investment, productivity, 
and productivity growth. Explanations for these differences across in 
dustries in relative union-nonunion outcomes, as well as an improved 
knowledge of the integrated relationship among the different outcome 
measures, would mark an important step in improving our understand 
ing of what unions do. Further study of the complex links between labor 
relations, firm governance structures, and economic performance is re 
quired if we are ever to glimpse inside the black box and understand 
the mechanisms through which unions impact the workplace. Finally, 
the dynamic relationship between corporate restructuring (e.g., mergers, 
leveraged buyouts, and downsizing), unionization, and economic per 
formance warrants detailed study, although this topic extends well 
beyond our capabilities given currently available data.
Debate over the appropriate role for U.S. labor law hinges crucially 
on the role of unions in the workplace and union-nonunion differences 
in economic performance. Weiler (1983, 1984) and others have argued 
that changes in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) interpretation 
of labor law, the increased number of unfair labor practices, and strategic 
management behavior intended to avoid union organizing have seriously 
eroded workers' right to organize. Implicit (and sometimes explicit) 
in these analyses is the belief or contention that union effects in the 
workplace are largely benign.
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An alternative interpretation (see Flanagan 1987; Freeman and Kleiner 
1990) is that increased management resistance to unions and the increase 
in labor litigation reflects profit-maximizing behavior by employers and 
is due in no small part to high union wage premiums, rather than to 
explicit changes in labor law or in their interpretation and enforcement. 
The analysis in this monograph lends credence to this latter interpreta 
tion. Evidence of the poor economic performance by union companies 
supports the proposition that the restructuring in industrial relations and 
increased resistance to union organizing have been a predictable response 
on the part of U.S. businesses to increased domestic and foreign com 
petition. In the absence of narrowing union-nonunion performance dif 
ferences, modifications in labor law that substantially enhance union 
organizing and bargaining power are likely to bring about a reduced 
competitiveness of U.S. firms.
Labor unions are at a crucial juncture in their history. Increased foreign 
competition and deregulation of highly unionized domestic industries 
have denied unionized companies access to rents and quasi-rents that 
have traditionally been shared by workers and shareholders. Current 
rates of new union organizing are not sufficient to offset the attrition 
of existing union jobs, leading to a continuing decrease in the extent 
of union coverage in the economy. Faced with new and more severe 
economic constraints, union leaders and rank-and-file have been relative 
ly slow to adjust their expectations, strategies, and wage demands. Stated 
more bluntly, large union concessions would have been necessary to 
maintain union coverage at pre-1980 levels. It is not surprising that such 
substantial changes in union behavior have been slow in coming (for 
evidence, see Freeman 1986; Curme and Macpherson, forthcoming), 
particularly given the importance of senior members in union decision- 
making. It need not follow, however, that substantial changes in union 
behavior and the U.S. industrial relations system will not emerge.
An implication of this study's findings is that if unions are to main 
tain membership at close to current levels, they must provide services 
that workers value, while at the same time not placing companies at 
a disadvantage relative to nonunion competitors (or, stated alternative 
ly, not decreasing rates of return relative to alternative investment paths).
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Union enhancement of workplace communication and labor productivity 
can make possible union compensation increases without concomitant 
decreases in firm market value. But given the rather weak relationship 
that currently exists between unionization and productivity, combined 
with strong management resistance to union organizing, the possibilities 
for substantial union-induced improvements in workplace productivity 
appear meager. It is therefore likely that we will see a continued decline 
in union coverage in the U.S. until a new steady-state is reached at a 
lower but sustainable level of union density. The size of the decline 
will depend on the magnitude of union effects on firm performance. 
If the union-nonunion differences in economic performance found for 
the 1970s have continued during the 1980s and beyond, the size of the 
union sector will continue to decline. On the other hand, a substantial 
diminution of union-nonunion differences in profitability, investment 
behavior, productivity, and growth will allow unions to survive and 
continue to play an important, albeit reduced, role in the U.S. labor 
market.
NOTES
1. Linneman and Wachter (1986), Freeman (1988), and, most convincingly, Linneman, Wachter, 
and Carter (1990) argue that part of the decline in union employment resulted from an increasing 
union wage premium in the late 1970s (see Blanchflower and Freeman, forthcoming, for interna 
tional evidence). This explanation is, of course, complementary to the one offered here. An in 
creasing wage differential, if not offset by a price or productivity increase leads to a lower profit 
rate. Ultimately, employment, investment, and output decisions will be based on comparative 
profitability or expected rates of return, and not on the wage differential per se. In work not shown, 
the change in company union coverage between 1977 and 1987 was found to be positively, but 
insignificantly, related to 1968-1980 company profitability, measured by the coefficients on firm 
dummies obtained in the first-step irk equation (see chapter 4).
2. Unions may be more likely to organize in capital-intensive firms owing to greater benefits 
associated with collective voice in highly structured team production settings with long-lived 
employer-employee relationships. For fuller discussion and evidence on unionization and capital 
intensity, see Hirsch and Berger (1984) and Duncan and Stafford (1980).
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Nonunion (UN=0); Low Union (0<UN<.30); Medium Union (.30<UN<.60); High Union (UN; 
UN Proportion of firm's workforce covered by collective bargaining agreement, 
q Tobin's q\ firm market value divided by replacement cost of tangible assets.
TT^ Gross rate of return to capital; gross cash flows divided by the value of the gross inflation-adjusted capital stock.
R&D,/S Annual R&D expenditures divided by sales, R&D-active firms only.
R&D2/S Annual R&D expenditures divided by sales, sample includes nonreporting firms with R&D/S set to zero.
PAT/S Patents granted per year, divided by sales (in millions of 1972$).
INV/S Annual investment expenditures divided by sales.
ADV/S Annual advertising expenditures divided by sales, advertising-active firms only.
K/L Net inflation-adjusted capital stock divided by employees (thousands 1972$).
EMPLY Employees, in thousands.
DEBT/EQUITY Value of long-term debt adjusted for age structure, divided by equity value.
\og(VA/L) Log of value added (thousands of 1972$), divided by employees (see chapter 6).
Q t ,_4 Annualized partial productivity growth rate, years t to f-4 (see text).
I-CR4 Four-firm concentration ratio in firm's primary 4-digit industry.
I-DOMSH Percentage shipments by domestic firms in firm's primary 4-digit industry.
I-GROWTH Annualized percentage growth rate in real industry shipments, years t to t-4, in firm's primary 4-digit industry.
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Proportion of firm's workforce covered by a collective bargain 
ing agreement in 1977.
Equals 1(0<UN<.30), 0 otherwise. 
Equals 1 if (.30<UN<.60), 0 otherwise. 
Equals 1 if (UN>.60), 0 otherwise. 
Equals 1 if (UN>.10), 0 otherwise.
Log of Tobin's q, where q is the market value of the firm divided 
by replacement cost of tangible assets, the latter proxied by the 
value of the net inflation-adjusted capital stock (Cummins et al. 
1985).
Gross rate of return on capital; gross cash flows divided by the 
net inflation-adjusted capital stock.
Log of annual capital expenditures in millions of 1972 dollars, 
deflated by industry deflator adjusted for fiscal year.
Log of annual R&D expenditures in millions of 1972 dollars, 
deflated by index shown in Cummins et al. (1985).
Log of value added per employee, in thousands of 1972 dollars. 
Value added approximated by (sales - cost of goods + labor 
costs), the latter estimated by [((1 -I- .25 UN) x average industry 
compensation) x EMPLY] where data on firm's labor compen 
sation and pension payments not available.
Partial productivity growth, calculated as the annualized growth 
rate in value added between years t and r-4, minus the growth 
rate in employment times labor's share of value added (firms 
assigned labor's share based on labor costs as defined above, 
using midpoint of four-year period).
Log of R&D stock in millions of 1972 dollars; calculated based 
on R&D expenditures and assumed 15 percent depreciation rate 
(Body and Jaffe, no date). Deflator shown in Cummins et al. 
(1985).
Log of R&D stock minus current R&D expenditure, in millions 
of 1972 dollars. Calculated only for firms with reported stocks.
Log of R&D stock in millions of 1972 dollars; actual values 
used for companies with reported stocks and predicted values 
for other companies (see text).
Measured by log(R&D-STK)est minus log(L).
129
R&D-STK/S R&D stock, divided by sales.
R&D-STK/Sest R&D stock, divided by sales; actual values for companies with 
reported stocks and predicted values for other companies (see 
text).
log(L) Log of employment, in thousands.
Log of net inflation-adjusted capital stock, in millions of 1972 
dollars, deflated by GNP investment implicit price deflator.
) Log of net inflation-adjusted capital stock minus current invest 
ment expenditures, in millions of 1972 dollars.
log(K/L) Log of net inflation-adjusted capital stock per employee, in 
thousands of 1972 dollars.
GROWTH Annualized growth rate in real company sales over the previous 
two years; sales deflated by industry-specific price indices.
I-GROWTH Annualized percentage growth rate in real industry shipments 
between years / and t-4 in firm's primary 4-digit industry. 
Shipments deflated by industry-specific price indices.
I-CR4 Four-firm concentration ratio in firm's primary 4-digit industry, 
adjusted for regional markets and imports, available for 1972 
and 1977. Pre-1972 data assigned 1972 values; post-1977 data 
assiged 1977 values; 1973-1976 data assigned values based on 
linear interpolation.
I-DOMSH Domestic firms' percentage share of sales in firm's primary 
4-digit industry, defined as 100(1- [IMPORTS/(SHIPMENTS + 
IMPORTS-EXPORTS)]), available for 1972 and 1977. 
Pre-1972 data assigned 1972 values; post-1977 data assigned 
1977 values; 1973-1976 data assigned values based on linear 
interpolation.
I-UN Proportion of eligible workers who are union members in firm's 
primary 2- or 3-digit industry during 1976-1978.
I-log(EARN) Log of payroll per employee in firm's primary 4-digit industry, 
in 1972 dollars, deflated by GNP implicit price deflator.
I-ENERGY/VA The proportion of energy costs to value added in the firm's 
primary 4-digit industry.
NOTE: In table 6.3, variables with "d" in front represent logarithmic differences between years 
/ and t-4, divided by 4. Variables with "bars" on top represent mean values of years t and t-4.
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